Violence Flares Up in Iraq, Threatens Truce

MARGARET WARNER:

Despite the expectations for a lull, 54 American soldiers were killed in Iraq in July, making it the fourth deadliest month for American soldiers since major combat was declared over last year.

For Iraqis, the July toll was even worse. The Pentagon says at least 1,000 Iraqis have been killed or wounded since the hand-over of sovereignty five weeks ago. Why the upsurge in violence?

For that, we turn to: Retired Marine Captain Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration — he was with the marines in Iraq, researching a book this past April, May and July; Laith Kubba, an Iraqi-American and a senior program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy; and Mark Levine, assistant professor of Middle East History at the University of California, Irvine. Fluent in Arabic, he was in Baghdad, Fallujah and Najaf this spring.

Welcome to you all.

Fifty-four American deaths last month, Laith Kubba, is the security situation actually deteriorating?

LAITH KUBBA:

It seems it has, for a simple reason: the forces that have been opposing more or less the transition, there was a moment where the government could have won many of them, and it seems that moment is lost.

And it seems many of the political forces are refusing to join the process, and hence continue to shelter or give some cover for those who are violently opposing the transition.

MARGARET WARNER:

Captain West, explain it from a military perspective for us. In April and May, which were the worst months, the U.S. was mounting major offensive operations: Fallujah and in the South. Now they are not, I gather.

Why do the American deaths continue at the rate they are?

BING WEST:

Well, the fighting is episodic. It reached a peak in May, it was emotion based, and the flames just got racing across the West and the South.

Now we're seeing that same sort of thing with Sadr in the South, and it reaches up to a certain peak and then it goes back down again. Underlying that, there's the persistence of this improvised explosive device, which is the single largest cause of our casualties.

And as long as we're on the highways in that country, under the current situations, that steady state of casualties from those improvised explosive devices will continue.

And then occasionally, about once every month or two months you get these spurts where they come out and they get into actual fire fights with the Americans. Then they're beaten down again, then it comes back up again.

MARGARET WARNER:

Professor Levine, the expectation was that once the handover of sovereignty took place and the government had an Iraqi face, that the U.S. forces would not be targets to the same degree.

How do you explain that U.S. forces are still targets?

MARK LEVINE:

Well, I don't know whose expectation that was; certainly no one I know expected that.

I think basically we all felt that the roots of the occupation going back to the immediate aftermath of the invasion had produced a situation of chaos, a situation of the dissolution of a central authority and a new regime, the new occupation regime that had very little legitimacy among the Iraqi people that made it impossible really to build a viable public sphere, a viable democratic civil society among Iraqis.

The only people who were taking to the streets in a political manner were basically young, angry and armed and religiously conservative men who had nothing to lose.

And this clearly was creating a situation where it was going to be impossible to build an alternative to violence. And on top of that, you had a situation where because the central authority was really dissolved and nothing was put in its place, tribal networks and older systems of association filled the void quite naturally and rationally, but these networks really were severely opposed to the U.S. occupation and are opposed also to the current government because of its perceived and real ties to the U.S.

So in this situation, it's hard to imagine anything else other than more violence.

MARGARET WARNER:

So, Laith Kubba, who are these insurgents now mounting these attacks? How many different groups are we talking about and what is the objective?

LAITH KUBBA:

Well, since the fall of Saddam Hussein, initially there were Saddam loyalists, a small network of people, maybe directly related to him. Then came the foreign fighters linked to al-Qaida.

Then there was the emergence of very much a home grown version of al-Qaida, extremist religious groups, young in their early 20s, very radical and have copied the method of al-Qaida. T

hen there were nationalists who basically opposed to foreign troops being in their country. That includes whether it's Muqtada al-Sadr from the Shiite side and some from the Sunni side.

And most recently I think some of the former Baathist networks have activated themselves and they are repenetrating the establishments, so the convergence of different shades of these forces are on play undermining the regime.

MARGARET WARNER:

And do you agree with Professor Levine, that all these forces, they don't see this Iraqi government of Prime Minister Allawi as a legitimate Iraqi government?

LAITH KUBBA:

Well, I would say two things: One, they oppose the presence of foreign troops. So I think the sooner the Iraqi government addresses this issue by building an Iraqi army, the better it is for everybody else.

Number two, the majority of Iraqis are in support of the government, and in fact they want the reassurances of having some form of troops to protect them.

But the only answer to that is to build Iraqi troops. But for these groups who are attacking, yes, they do see this political process, its leadership and where it's heading very much under foreign influence.

MARGARET WARNER:

So Captain West, when you were in Iraq, and you were there with the marines, how did they assess the nature of the insurgency, and how did they assess the progress that the Iraqi forces were making in getting trained and capable of dealing with it?

BING WEST:

Well, the professor I think is dead on. The marines do assess it the same way as he saw it.

They can, the American marines and soldiers can win every battle, but they can't win this insurgency. Only the Iraqi government and its soldiers can do that. And the key is getting them out there, getting them into the battle. And that's taking time.

But that is absolutely the key and the troops out there see it the same way — that they want to see the Iraqi soldiers and the Iraqi police becoming much more involved.

MARGARET WARNER:

And so what is the problem there? I mean, do they lack the capability or do they lack the will?

I remember back in the spring, there were stories of Iraqi soldiers and police actually just saying I'm not going to fight other Iraqis and abandoning their units.

What's the situation now?

BING WEST:

In my judgment the key is the leadership on the Iraqi side, especially the officers.

Now, when we made the mistake of disbanding that entire army, that meant that you had to start all over again from scratch, and that takes time.

But the absolute key is the officer corps on the Iraqi government side in getting out there in those cities, not staying in Baghdad.

MARGARET WARNER:

And you say that they're not doing that?

BING WEST:

They have to show up much more for the battles.

MARGARET WARNER:

Professor Levine, if you look at the insurgency, is it your sense that these are still sporadic self-starting groups, or do you think they are acting in concert and do you think they are actually now, as John Burns suggested, seizing effective control of certain parts of the country?

MARK LEVINE:

Well, my perception of it is that they are in many ways locally based, but when you have enough locally based movements gaining some control, and especially when they're tied to the only structures that work in this society right now, which are local or tribal structures, then you have the perception from above that there is a clear tribal control or a clear control of large swaths of the country by the insurgency.

But it's a bit problematic to talk about different levels of control, a lot of people talk about foreign control; they talk about the role of Zarqawi in it as a foreigner and other foreign troops.

But we need to remember, when the state is sort of dissolved, when borders are opened, when a national identity is in flux, as it is now, local Iraqis are not necessarily going to see someone like Zarqawi as a quote unquote foreigner.

MARGARET WARNER:

You're talking now about Zarqawi who has been identified by U.S. forces as al-Qaida inspired and so on, a Jordanian?

MARK LEVINE:

Yes, yes, he's a Jordanian. Many Iraqis I know don't necessarily believe he actually exists, but he seems to be blamed for almost everything, and it sort of ties it to a foreign element, which allows us to not think that the insurgency is locally rooted when I think it clearly is.

And that's why while I agree with both other guests that security is absolutely crucial, if you don't build on the ground a democratic political process on the grassroots and nurture it, then all the security, all the troops, no matter whose nationality they are, they're still not going to be able to build a democratic society and stop the fighting.

MARGARET WARNER:

Laith Kubba, didn't Prime Minister Allawi have this strategy of trying to reach out to all these different groups, including some former Baathists and some of those who had been in the anti-American insurgency?

Is he still pursuing that, and is it just not effective, what's the status?

LAITH KUBBA:

Well, no question, I think there was a lot of optimism, because he adopted that line, and he has moved in the right direction.

But it simply wasn't sufficient. I think he took a gamble that by reaching out to the Baathists and the former, the Sunnis, Baathists and nationalists, and open the doors of Iraqi ministries for them, that he would have them in to buy into the political process.

Unfortunately this hasn't paid off. They are still remaining outside, there are problems with the national assembly that was due to take place.

And bearing all this in mind, the country has not yet reached a minimum level of consensus where it can put all players in and rebuild the state. I don't think we have reached that point yet.

MARGARET WARNER:

Professor Levine, isn't it really a chicken and egg problem when you say security won't solve every problem, but the lack of security is causing additional political problems, is it not, if you're talking about say the kidnappings, for example?

MARK LEVINE:

Well, absolutely. The chicken and the egg is actually the best way to look at it, and this is why you need to go beneath the chicken and the egg and think how can we transform the situation.

One way, one of the problems that most of the Iraqis I'm in touch with is that Allawi, for example, when he backs U.S. raids that kill lots of civilians, when he's purported to have gone into jail and killed several people with his own hands, a report that hasn't been vigorously investigated or denied, which just fuels more rumors, when the corruption is continuing to be rampant in the country, it makes people think that they can't really trust or rely on this government and that using local structures which may or may not be tied to a violent opposition is the better bet for them.

So that's why I think and most of the scholars and people I speak to really believe that you need to have a paradigm shift in how Iraq is going to be administered and governed until some kind of elections, and that means a much more robust UN presence, removing to the extent possible U.S. troops, which many think will lead to greater chaos.

But the chaos, as the report from Baghdad shows, is getting worse with them there, and replacing them with a robust UN peacekeeping presence that could have the respect of the Iraqi people because they wouldn't be tied to the occupation.

MARGARET WARNER:

Captain West, what is your prescription here? Do you think removing U.S. troops is the answer?

BING WEST:

If we did that precipitously, the country would fall apart. But at the same time, we are having our troops withdraw and we are saying to the Iraqis, it's time for you to step forward.

And that's a delicate balance, but that's basically what's going on, and I think if you see something like this week, we're going to go through those episodes, it will die down again, then it will pick up again.

What's absolutely critical here is that the pressure be kept on the Iraqi government so that it does get its own security forces out there. That absolutely has to be the solution.

MARGARET WARNER:

All right. Captain West, Professor Levine, Laith Kubba, thank you all.