What Joe Kent's resignation says about U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism efforts

Amna Nawaz:

All right, let's get another take on National Counterterrorism Director Joe Kent's resignation.

Geoff Bennett:

And, for that, we hand it back over to Nick Schifrin.

Nick Schifrin:

To discuss Kent's comments about Iran and what his resignation says about the intelligence community, I'm joined by Nick Rasmussen, who under the Obama administration directed the National Counterterrorism Center, the same center from which Kent resigned today.

Nick Rasmussen, thanks very much. Welcome back...

Nicholas Rasmussen, Former Director, National Counterterrorism Center:

Thank you.

Nick Schifrin:

... to the "News Hour."

In the letter, Kent refutes the president and says Iran was not an imminent threat. What do we know about what Kent might have seen in the intelligence that would lead him to so publicly go against the president?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

Well, the question of imminence when you're talking about threats, national security threats, is not a black-and-white matter, as you can imagine. And even in what Director Kent put on the record with his letter today, he didn't speak specifically to the nuclear threat or the threat to U.S. interests from terrorism or the threat from, for example, Iran's ballistic missile program.

So in a sense, we don't know exactly what he was alluding to with his comments. As I was saying a bit ago, the concept of imminence is not black and white. It can have a very temporal component to it. If the intelligence community, for example, were in possession of information that said or suggested that an attack on U.S. interests was going to happen at this place on that day in this manner, that would certainly constitute an imminent threat.

But you can have imminence without having all of those elements as well. If you feel like -- and I say feel -- if you feel like you don't have the ability to forecast and project when an attack might happen, that might create a sense of imminence, even if you don't have that specific intelligence giving you time and place.

Nick Schifrin:

Kent also says in the letter it's quote "a lie" that there's a clear path to victory. We don't really know what necessarily that means, but U.S. officials have told me that the intelligence assessment is that the Iranian regime is unlikely to fall despite this war.

Is that the kind of thing that he would be saying, that he would be talking about there?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

Again, I don't really -- obviously, I have no insight into what the intelligence assessments say right now about what Iran will look like in the aftermath of this campaign.

But I will say that most national security professionals I know of on all political sides very much want to see the Iranian capability to carry out terrorist activity around the world, to act aggressively against neighbors, to threaten the West, want to see that capability degraded and diminished.

And so that is something I think on which there is pretty wide unanimity among intelligence and national security professionals.

Nick Schifrin:

Bottom line, the NCTC is responsible for analyzing, assessing the threat, and integrating intelligence, both foreign and domestic.

So is that mission affected by his resignation today?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

I mean, I'd like to think and I have confidence that the men and women who work at NCTC are still doing exactly that work, Nick, and kind of keeping their eye on the ball. They're very mission-focused, making sure that they have their eyes on every bit of available intelligence so that they can prepare the best possible assessments to support policymakers, up to and including the president.

At the same time, any time a leader is -- departs the scene, it can be a little bit disruptive. And I suspect the acting director, whoever he or she, is moving to try to send signals of stability and confidence to the work force to keep them on track.

Nick Schifrin:

How much do we know whether the NCTC has been doing, whether Joe Kent has been doing, that role that we traditionally believe the NCTC has done, including under you?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

Well, the organization has certainly been preparing, I would believe, the intelligence assessments to undergird and to support good policymaking and good decision-making.

As ever, it's a question of how those assessments are landing with the customer set.

Nick Schifrin:

Right, the customer, of course -- the ultimate, of the I.C., customer is the president of the United States.

Nicholas Rasmussen:

Exactly.

Nick Schifrin:

Right.

Nicholas Rasmussen:

But I don't want to understate how important it is that that work go on even to support those beyond the president.

For example, when you're thinking about the homegrown violent extremist threat here in the United States, it's just as important, I would argue, that NCTC, along with FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and CIA and our other intel community partners, support the state and local apparatus around the country as they try to worry and deal with potential homegrown threats.

So that customer set is wide, deep, and very expansive.

Nick Schifrin:

And -- but since the war has started, we have seen multiple homegrown attacks, some of which it does seem to be, to be inspired by the war, whether in Iran or in Lebanon with Hezbollah.

How much would the NCTC have been focused on that and how much will it be going forward?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

They would certainly be focused on those kinds of attacks. When an attack like that happens along with FBI partners and other intelligence community and law enforcement partners, they would be digging in to try to determine what motivated this individual to carry out the attacks that were undertaken.

And I would surmise we don't know the full answer to that. We have seen some early press reporting, as you suggested, linking these attacks to what happened in Iran or what's happening in Lebanon. But that work probably continues with FBI in the lead as an investigative matter.

Nick Schifrin:

And just quickly, in the last few seconds we have, overall, zoom out for us.

Where is the overall counterterrorism effort for the United States today?

Nicholas Rasmussen:

I mean, I worry a bit.

But, again, I'm used to worrying in this sense. You always worry when you come from a background where you focus on terrorism and counterterrorism. But I worry a little bit about the hollowing out of a work force that has gotten younger and less experienced over time with departures from government service, either voluntary or involuntary, downsizing, budget cuts, budget reductions, the shift in emphasis away from counterterrorism and terrorism towards state competition, state conflict, and other administration priorities, to include immigration.

Nick Schifrin:

Nick Rasmussen, thank you very much.