Seven years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the vast nuclear weapons
complex Russia inherited is teetering on the brink of economic collapse.
The continuing economic crisis in Russia and the Russian government's empty
coffers worsen the situation in the 10 "nuclear cities," which house
three-quarters of a million people and remain fenced off from the outside
world. The economic meltdown in these cities increases the risks of theft of
nuclear materials or that experts will provide their knowledge to help Third
World nuclear-weapons programs.
Moreover, the gigantic size of Russia's nuclear complex means that Russia could
still produce new nuclear weapons at Cold War rates that no other country could
match, should political and economic circumstances radically change.
In short, the United States has several urgent reasons to collaborate with
Russia on the economic stabilization and downsizing of its nuclear complex-a
downsizing that is also in Russia's interests.
While residents of the "closed cities" once received the best of everything the
Soviet Union had to offer, they have shared the pain but not the benefits of
reform. With the post-Cold War collapse of state orders for nuclear weapons,
budgets have been slashed. Wages are far below what is needed to maintain
workers' previous standard of living, and they are paid months late. Desperate
to keep their people paid, the facilities have taken out high-interest loans
from Russian banks, but have no means to repay them.
In late 1996, Vladimir Nechai, director of Chelyabinsk-70, one of Russia's two
nuclear weapons design centers, killed himself. A suicide note reportedly said
that Nechai could no longer watch his life's work fall apart; he was ashamed to
face the people at his center who had not been paid for five months.
The situation today, unfortunately, is much the same. Last February, Viktor
Mikhailov, then head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), reported in a
press conference that 1997 had been the worst year ever for financing the
nuclear complex; it had received only half the money promised in the budget.
By spring, many at the key nuclear weapons institutes were more desperate than
ever. They had not been paid in more than seven months and had used up what was
left from the flush years of the Cold War. On July 23, thousands of workers at
Russia's premier nuclear weapons lab -- Arzamas-16 -- went on strike, protesting the
government's failure to provide the institute's promised funds.
Only the intense pride and patriotism of Russian nuclear experts has prevented
a proliferation catastrophe. At a time when virtually everything else in Russia
is for sale on the black market, there is an increasing risk that the barrier
of security and discipline protecting Russia's nuclear materials will erode.
Fortunately, there is some hope for improvement. Russia recognizes that it no
longer needs and can no longer afford such a giant nuclear weapons complex.
Some fissile material production facilities have already been redirected to
commercial work. In his February press conference, Mikhailov announced that
three major facilities, including two of the four plants used for the assembly
and disassembly of nuclear weapons, will be completely out of military work by
the year 2000.
Also, the nuclear cities themselves, long totally controlled from Moscow, are
working on their own to shift to new lines of work, using tax incentives to
draw new businesses and to create special funds to finance the startup of new
The reform effort received a boost last March, when Vice President Albert Gore
and then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced a "Nuclear Cities
Initiative" to promote conversion in Russia's nuclear cities. The initiative
came, in significant part, in response to the recommendations of the
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), in which three of
us-Bunn, Luongo, and von Hippel-participate along with Russian colleagues,
including Evgeniy Avrorin, Nechai's successor.
Federico Peña, then U.S. secretary of energy, and Russia's new minister
of atomic energy, Evgeniy Adamov, quickly followed up the Gore-Chernomyrdin
announcement with a joint statement outlining the basics of the new approach.
In a government-to-government meeting on the new initiative in Washington on
July 9, the two sides established an interagency task force to move the effort
forward, and they began discussing funding of specific projects.
On July 24, Gore and Russia's new prime minister, Sergei Kirienko, endorsed the
new initiative and announced their intention to start several major projects in
the nuclear cities during the remainder of the year.
Achieving the goals of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, however, will require an
integrated, comprehensive strategy, including both private-sector development
and concrete steps to address the post-Cold War nuclear challenges Russia
Some of the tens of thousands of excess nuclear scientists and workers should
be redirected to the tasks of nonproliferation, arms control, management and
disposition of surplus fissile materials, and environmental cleanup. There are
opportunities for increased U.S.-Russian cooperation in each of these areas.
But for the majority of the residents of the nuclear cities, the creation of
private-sector jobs is the only long-term answer.
Built between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, Russia's Cold War nuclear
weapons complex was even more oversized than its huge U.S. analog. The biggest
facilities are located in the 10 nuclear cities, although other nuclear
weapons-related institutes are scattered throughout Russia-including Moscow. Of
the roughly 730,000 people who live in the closed cities, some 130,000 actually
work in the key nuclear facilities. The cities are:
Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, where the weapons-design laboratories are
located. (Arzamas-16 also has a warhead-production plant.) Penza-19,
Sverdlovsk-45, and Zlatoust-36, which contain warhead-production plants.
Krasnoyarsk-26, Kransnoyarsk-45, Tomsk-7, Chelyabinsk-65, and Sverdlovsk-44,
where highly enriched uranium and plutonium were produced.
These names are taken from post office box numbers in nearby "open" cities-in
Soviet times the very existence of the nuclear cities was secret. The cities
now have real names, but they are still commonly known by their "box" numbers.
Even today, the nuclear cities and large surrounding areas are enclosed by
double fences, with the perimeters patrolled by armed guards of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. Access is restricted and controlled by the Federal Security
The nuclear facilities inside the cities lie within even more tightly
controlled security zones. At Krasnoyarsk-26, where the madness of the Cold War
reached a peak, the plutonium production complex, including three reactors, is
located 600 feet beneath a mountain. That way, it could continue to produce
plutonium even after a nuclear war had laid waste to the surface.
Controlled access and armed troops once protected the nuclear installations
from foreign spies and sabotage. Today, they help limit the influence of
criminal organizations, which have become ubiquitous elsewhere in Russia. But
isolation also insulates the cities from important changes in Russia, including
many of the opportunities arising from economic reform.
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, state orders for nuclear
weapons began to decline and the nuclear weapons missions of the nuclear cities
began to change. For example, the fissile-material production facilities are no
longer needed to produce new materials for bombs; now they must provide secure
storage for and disposal of excess weapons materials.
Warhead production facilities are now mostly devoted to dismantling nuclear
warheads, but their workload will decline as work on the 10-20,000 nuclear
weapons retired in the early 1990s is completed. Meanwhile, the weapons design
institutes are trying to maintain the continuing safety and reliability of
Russia's reduced arsenal. But all these tasks require many fewer workers than
were employed during the Cold War.
In his February press conference, Mikhailov said that the registered
unemployment rate in Russia's nuclear cities averaged about 3.5 percent in
1997. But Russia's State Statistics Committee estimates that the real
unemployment rate in Russia is at least three times the official figure. Beyond
that is the real morale-shattering problem of the nuclear cities,
At two nuclear weapons institutes located in Moscow, two-thirds of the staff
have reportedly left for better-paid jobs. The staff of the main weapons
institutes at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 could shrink by a similar
fraction-if other employment opportunities were available to their workers.
But very little alternative employment is available in the nuclear cities and
most people do not have enough money to buy apartments in "open" cities such as
Moscow, where jobs can be found. Fearful of a social explosion, the institute
directors avoid layoffs and try to stretch the available funds to support their
entire staff, which means that salaries are both insufficient and intermittent
for almost everyone. In the absence of consolidation, the risk increases that
the long-feared nuclear leakage may finally begin.
Each of the nuclear cities is unique and faces a somewhat different situation.
The fissile-material production centers in Sverdlovsk-44, Krasnoyarsk-45,
Tomsk-7, and Chelyabinsk- 65 are generally less desperate because they have
substantial income from blending down highly enriched uranium for the
U.S.-Russian uranium purchase agreement, as well as from foreign contracts for
commercial nuclear services.
The warhead assembly/disassembly cities are probably in desperate straits, but
they are considered particularly sensitive by Russia's security services and
are closed to virtually all interactions with non-Russian entities.
Krasnoyarsk-26 is no longer paid for the weapons-grade plutonium it continues
to produce from the production reactor, which is still needed to provide heat
and power to the city's residents. It, along with Arzamas-16 and
Chelyabinsk-70, should be targeted by the Nuclear Cities Initiative-along with
the nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly cities, if access to them becomes
The city governments of the nuclear cities and the facilities themselves are
desperately struggling to find new sources of income to keep their communities
afloat. They have mounted a number of conversion projects on their own and
there have been a few glimmers of success.
A large plant that produces video and audio tape for BASF, a German-based
multinational, has been built in Krasnoyarsk-45, financed in part by the sale
of low-enriched uranium; a Korean firm recently announced a $43 million
investment in diamond-cutting capabilities at Arzamas-16; Intel, a U.S. firm,
has a contract with scientists at Arzamas-16 to work on software related to new
computer chips; and in May, Microsoft's chief technology officer, Nathan
Myhrvold, led a mission to some of the closed cities, prospecting for
opportunities for low-cost software development.
Some nuclear cities also have exploited a break in the Russian tax law. In
Russia, most taxes go to the federal government, with only a small part
remaining with city governments. In contrast, closed cities are allowed to keep
virtually all the tax receipts collected within their boundaries -- a provision
that was designed to help them through these hard times.
The cities have used this provision to create "investment zones," where
businesses that register within the city get a substantial tax break, even if
their operations are located elsewhere. But the tax break expires at the end of
the year, and with the central government under pressure from the International
Monetary Fund to collect more taxes, prospects for its renewal are not
Arzamas-16 took advantage of the provision by having companies registered
within its investment zone pay a fraction of their tax savings into funds to
finance the startup of new private businesses, municipal infrastructure, and
Managers of the new-business start-up fund assert that its books are
transparent, that all lending decisions are made on the basis of carefully
reviewed business plans, and that none of the money goes to the nuclear
facility. More than a hundred businesses have registered in the Arzamas-16
investment zone. As a result, the city government is in far better financial
shape than the nuclear facility.
Overall, however, few conversion efforts have been successful. The nuclear
cities may have many outstanding scientists and engineers, but few have
business experience. Moreover, the obstacles to investment in the closed cities
are great-tight restrictions on access, limited information about capabilities,
remote locations, and significant political risks.
To have any hope of creating enough alternative employment for the large number
of people no longer needed for weapons work, a concerted effort needs to be
made to create a more investment-friendly environment. This will require the
Russian government, the U.S. government, and the private sector to work closely
The United States and other countries have launched a variety of cooperative
nuclear programs with Russia, which now represent a small but important source
of income for the nuclear cities. (In meetings in Moscow in May 1997, the
directors of Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 told us that in 1996 these programs
provided their two institutes with seven and nine percent of their budgets,
respectively.) The two broad areas of cooperation are:
Securing and reducing nuclear materials stockpiles. By far the biggest source
of income for Russia's nuclear complex from U.S. programs is the uranium
purchase agreement. This arrangement reduces stocks of weapons-usable material,
provides a valuable commercial product to the United States, provides hard
currency for Russia, and gives an economic incentive to continue dismantling
nuclear weapons -- all at virtually no net cost to the U.S. taxpayer, because the
purchase price is recouped by selling the blended-down material on the
The annual income from this deal is hundreds of millions of dollars, although
how much finds its way to the facilities doing the work -- rather than being spent
on other projects by the central government or by Minatom headquarters -- is not
The next most important program in this category is the Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting program, under which U.S. and Russian experts cooperate
to install systems to insure that all the plutonium and highly enriched uranium
in Russia is secure and accounted for. Progress in this effort is accelerating
rapidly, with a 1998 budget of $137 million. In 1997, $10-20 million of the
program's funds were spent in the nuclear cities on labor and equipment; this
year the amount will be greater. However, funding is scheduled to decline after
The U.S. Defense Department, under the Nunn-Lugar program, is also funding
construction of a secure storage facility for weapons-grade material at
Chelyabinsk-65, with some of the money spent on labor and materials procured in
In the next few years, hundreds of workers could be put to work in the
U.S.-Russian program to convert the three operating plutonium production
reactors at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 so they generate heat and power without
producing separated plutonium as a now-unwanted byproduct. And, should the G7
countries provide the financing, the disposition of Russia's excess weapons
plutonium could become a major new mission for a few of the plutonium
The International Science and Technology Center was established in Moscow in 1992 by the United States, the European
Union, and Japan to underwrite civilian research by scientists who formerly
worked on the development of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, the
center's expenditures in the nuclear cities total about $10 million annually
and support about a thousand scientists there, primarily at Arzamas-16 and
The Industrial Partnership Program -- now called Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention -- was established within the U.S. Energy Department in 1994 to use
experts at its national labs to facilitate joint ventures between U.S.
companies and technical institutes in the former Soviet Union.
Funding for fiscal year 1998 totals $30 million, but only a small fraction is
being spent in the closed cities -- principally in Arzamas-16 and
Chelyabinsk-70 -- and the Clinton administration's 1999 budget request to Congress
for this initiative was only $15 million.
The Defense Enterprise Fund -- now called the Global Partners Venture -- was
established by the Defense Department to invest in defense conversion in the
former Soviet Union. Since 1994 it has received a total of $71 million in
Nunn-Lugar funds, which are now fully committed.
Its only project in the closed cities is a joint effort with the Industrial
Partnership Program to develop a business plan for a proposed $200 million
plant in Krasnoyarsk-26, which would produce purified silicon for the Russian
electronics industry and for export abroad. The project has received political
and financial backing from the government of the Krasnoyarsk region, but it
still needs to find a strategic partner and investor.
The United States and Russia need to mount a more focused and multifaceted
program that would more directly help Russia restructure its nuclear weapons
complex. The Nuclear Cities Initiative announced by Gore and Chernomyrdin in
March should be structured around a coordinated plan, with new funding for
targeted initiatives in four key areas: nonproliferation and arms reduction,
nuclear cleanup technology, private sector development, and downsizing.
Such a strategy would require resources. In June, two senators -- Pete Domenici, a
Republican from New Mexico, and Joseph Biden, a Democrat from Delaware -- attached
an amendment to the Energy and Water appropriations bill setting aside $45
million for efforts to promote conversion in Russia's nuclear cities -- $15
million in additional funding for Energy's Industrial Partnership Program, and
$30 million for the Nuclear Cities Initiative itself.
At the Bulletin's deadline in late July, however, it was uncertain how much of
this funding would survive the House-Senate conference on the bill.
At an April workshop in Moscow with senior
Minatom officials and leaders of the Russian nuclear labs, we worked out a
broad agenda of potential cooperative work relating to nuclear nonproliferation
and arms reduction. The work would range from improving export controls to
reconciling the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear secrecy
requirements, which impede cooperation.
Weapons laboratories in the United States have already shifted hundreds of
weapons experts to specialized centers or divisions focused on nonproliferation
and arms reduction programs, providing a broad range of technical support for
U.S. policy-makers and for international organizations such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
For example, when a U.S. company requests a license for a nuclear-related
export, the request is sent to the U.S. national labs, which analyze it against
databases of sensitive technologies involved in nuclear weapons programs and
recipients of concern. At present, the Russian government does not have a
comparable database system to help it make export decisions -- but it would be
very much in the U.S. interest for Russia to have such a system.
A central goal of increased cooperation should be to help build up centers of
expertise at the Russian labs to provide similar support to the Russian
government. Initial U.S. government support of such centers would have to be
coupled to products of direct interest to the United States. Over time,
however, as the Russian labs succeed in demonstrating the importance of these
capabilities and Russia's economy improves, the Russian government should
become the principal customer.
As a first step, the United States should underwrite fellowships for experts
from Russian institutes to visit national laboratories and universities that
work on nonproliferation and arms control. The fellows would gain insight into
how the national laboratories operate in these areas, and -- while visiting
universities -- they could learn how non-governmental analysts contribute to
policy-making. Princeton University and Sandia National Laboratory are
cooperating in a pilot effort by hosting two scientists from Chelyabinsk-70
during the 1998-99 academic year.
To initiate these efforts, we recommend that $10 million of the 1999 budget of
the Energy Department's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security be set
aside for expanding these cooperative nonproliferation and arms reduction
Nuclear cleanup is another key area of common
interest. The nuclear complexes in both countries -- particularly the plutonium
production facilities -- face contamination problems that will cost hundreds of
billions of dollars to address.
The United States spends roughly $300 million per year developing new cleanup
technologies. A small portion of this research and development effort should be
contracted to Russian experts.
While U.S. laboratory or commercial experts, fully loaded with benefits and
overhead, can cost the U.S. government $250,000 per year, the cost of a senior
Russian scientist is in the range of $10,000 per year. Further, contaminated
Russian facilities can be used as test-beds for new cleanup technology. This
would be a "win-win-win" scenario, in which the United States would get
technology developed at far lower cost; Russian nuclear experts would get
interesting and useful jobs; and Russia would be able to use the technology
developed to help clean up its complex as well.
There is already a small U.S.-Russian program, which has spent about $10
million cumulatively since 1992 in this area -- although little of it has gone to
the nuclear cities. We recommend that this effort be substantially expanded. As
a first step, it would make sense to set aside roughly $5-10 million of 1999
funding for the development of nuclear cleanup technology. That would put
500-1,000 Russian experts to work.
While high-tech research and development funded by
the International Science and Technology Center and Industrial Partnership
Program is important, it is not enough. Neither of these programs has yet
succeeded in fostering the establishment of a single self-sustaining commercial
enterprise employing a significant number of people in a nuclear city.
In any case, the bulk of future private sector employment in these cities will
not necessarily be high-tech. Small businesses -- most of them low-tech -- have
provided one of the few bright spots in Russia's largely stalled economy. By
some estimates, small business employment in Russia had grown from 6.6 million
in 1994 to 13 million -- or 13 percent of Russia's workforce -- by 1997.
Russian nuclear-city officials estimate that some 30,000 jobs need to be
created in the nuclear cities over the next few years to employ excess nuclear
workers, and that a combination of public and private investment totalling
almost $1 billion might be necessary. (In fact, the number of new jobs needed
may be even larger. Some experts estimate that two-thirds of the entire
workforce at the nuclear facilities -- more than 80,000 people -- ultimately will
not be retained.)
During discussions in July, city and Minatom officials proposed a joint program
involving $100 million each from the U.S. and Russian governments. The program
would be designed to leverage several times that amount in private
What is needed now is for both governments, working closely with the private
sector, to flesh out the reality behind these preliminary estimates. Both
governments should finance some initial projects -- after expert review by people
in firms with experience in private business, not just by government officials
and laboratory scientists.
The private sector will have to be front and center in any such initiative. As
Senators Biden and Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, recently
suggested, the administration should use the power of persuasion to pull
together a high-level private-sector team that could assess the capabilities
and potential opportunities in the nuclear cities, identify promising projects,
and make recommendations for steps that governments could take to foster
investment and reduce barriers to private-sector growth.
In short, the primary role of the U.S. and Russian governments in the Nuclear
Cities Initiative would be to facilitate efforts by the private sector. This
will require a range of steps that go well beyond research and development. The
governments will have to work together -- ideally in concert with other
governments and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) -- to break down
the barriers to, and provide incentives for, private investment. If done
properly, a little bilateral and multilateral money could leverage a lot of
Meanwhile, Russia's central and local governments need to create an
enterprise-friendly climate in the nuclear cities, providing information,
clarifying tax and property-rights issues, cutting through the legal tangles
for possible investors, and -- where necessary -- negotiating new legislation.
The central and local governments should, for instance, provide information
concerning the expertise and infrastructure available and the businesses
already in place in each nuclear city, to help interested businesses know where
they might look to invest.
They should also loosen restrictions on physical access. Some projects have
already been able to negotiate multiple-entry permits, so that 45-day advance
notice is no longer required every time a foreign participant needs to visit a
facility in a nuclear city.
Over time, however, the nuclear cities will have to become more open, with the
perimeter security around the individual nuclear facilities becoming the
principal line of defense, rather than a fence around the entire city. Local
law enforcement will have to be beefed up to help limit the penetration of
On a broader level, international financial institutions should help stimulate
private-sector growth by providing money for:
Market research, feasibility studies, and preparation of business plans.
Investment missions to bring business executives to the closed cities to
explore possible investment opportunities, and other assistance in making
connections with potential investors. Equity investment funds and revolving
credit lines to provide the initial capital to start up new businesses, and
loan guarantees and political risk insurance to reduce the risks faced by
This complex program cannot be implemented through occasional visits. In-depth,
on-the-ground training by Russian speakers with experience doing business in
Russia needs to be provided to give people in the nuclear cities the tools they
need to translate their ideas and energy into successful businesses.
A business assistance team is needed in each targeted nuclear city. Each team
should include a project manager, an investment officer, a scientist or
engineer with experience in industry, a business development consultant with
significant work experience in Russia, and a lawyer with experience in
international and Russian corporate law.
It would also make sense to establish permanent business training centers to
help foster the creation of new businesses, and to provide consulting services
to help those businesses overcome problems as they arise.
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank's International Finance
Corporation and the EBRD could sponsor such teams and business centers. They
are chartered by the international community to promote private-sector growth
and have demonstrated track records of doing so -- including hundreds of millions
of dollars in investments and in financing for investments within Russia.
These institutions have already created regional business centers in other
parts of the former Soviet Union. With sufficient support from the United
States and other governments, they could also establish a small investment fund
to help provide initial start-up capital for new enterprises in the nuclear
We estimate the total cost of funding business assistance teams and business
centers in three nuclear cities for two years at about $20 million. The U.S.
government should set aside roughly $10 million of its 1999 funding for
economic assistance in Russia for activities in the nuclear cities. It should
also direct the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and
encourage the World Bank Group to make loan guarantees and political risk
insurance available for investments. And it should also direct OPIC and other
agencies to organize investment and trade missions to the closed cities.
These initiatives may make it possible to shrink
Russia's nuclear weapons complex from its Cold War size while employing the
tens of thousands of workers the complex no longer needs. Doing so is in
Russia's interest, because a smaller complex would be more efficient and
sustainable in meeting Russia's post-Cold War requirements. And it is certainly
in the U.S. interest to insure that nuclear arms reductions could not be
In the past, Minatom has sought to maintain its gigantic empire. Now, however,
its officials recognize that a major downsizing is needed, and they are asking
for more information on how the United States is consolidating its complex.
This discussion has begun at the "lab-to-lab" level, where it has been
established in recent years that productive exchanges can occur on the most
sensitive topics. The goal of the dialogue should be to help Minatom develop a
feasible plan to downsize the Russian complex to a level that matches its new
missions and is sustainable.
Molding all of these disparate initiatives -- from nonproliferation and cleanup
cooperation, to private-sector development, to complex downsizing -- into a
coherent, effective, and sustained restructuring will require high-level
leadership in both Russia and the United States. Success is not assured.
On the Russian side, Minatom's Adamov has appointed an energetic and capable
adviser for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, reporting directly to him. Making
U.S. support for this effort effective will require strong leadership from a
similar high-level, full-time central coordinator, and sustained support from
the White House. Serious business expertise should be brought to bear on the
business-promotion task, something that has not yet been done.
Making the Nuclear Cities Initiative work will also require sustained
investment by both governments. If they are preserved in conference, the funds
set aside by Senators Domenici and Biden would be enough to make a substantial
start on the monumental task of shrinking the Russian nuclear weapons complex
and redirecting its workers to productive civilian tasks. But these funds would
need to be combined with other U.S. government resources such as OPIC
guarantees and Energy Department environmental technology development funding,
matched by Russian government support.
The effort proposed here could make a genuine difference in key areas and
demonstrate the U.S. commitment to easing Russia's transition. To sustain
support both in the U.S. Congress and in Russia, however, it is absolutely
crucial to achieve some tangible successes in the first 12-18 months.
The nonproliferation stakes could hardly be higher. Nothing the United States
does to build improved security systems for fissile material is likely to be
enough if workers with access to that material and the guards who run the
security systems continue to go unpaid for months at a time, and the economies
of the nuclear cities continue to collapse around them.
And nothing else the United States can do to prevent nuclear proliferation will
be enough if the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs -- and the expertise
needed to make them -- become available on a nuclear black market.
After the funeral of Vladimir Nechai, Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the
liberal Yabloko party, wrote in the New York Times: "At the funeral, I could
not look at these people without compassion. Here was the pride of Russian
science; here were the physicists of world stature, dressed in their threadbare
jackets and faded shirts with frayed cuffs."
Did Moscow not understand, Yavlinsky asked, "how dangerous it is to drive
people who hold the nuclear arsenal in their hands to this state?" The same
question could be asked of Washington.
Oleg Bukharin is a member of the research staff at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Studies (CEES) at Princeton University. Matthew Bunn, an adviser
to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy during the first
Clinton term, is assistant director of the Science, Technology and Public
Policy Program at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs. Jill Cetina, formerly a researcher at CEES, is with the U.S. Treasury
Department. Kenneth Luongo, former director of the Energy Department's Office
of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, is director of the Russian-American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council and a CEES Senior Visiting Fellow. Frank von
Hippell, a former assistant director for national security in the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, is a professor of public and international
affairs at Princeton.