Former Iraqi diplomat on forces driving Iran war across region

Geoff Bennett:

For perspective, we turn now to Feisal Istrabadi, a former Iraqi diplomat and the founding director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East at Indiana University-Bloomington.

Thank you for being with us.

Feisal Istrabadi, Former Deputy Iraqi Ambassador to United Nations: My pleasure.

Geoff Bennett:

So how significant is it that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia bombed a militia group in Iraq? Do you see this as a true expansion of the war?

Feisal Istrabadi:

Well, I think it's extremely significant. First of all, remember Iraq has a new government. That government has actually reached out to Saudi Arabia. The foreign minister was in the Saudi capital just before the prime minister came to Washington 10 days ago, and there had been hopes of restoring better relations with Saudi Arabia.

This attack by the militias from Iraqi soil into Saudi Arabia complicates all of that. The American-Saudi response is an escalation. True, the Americans have hit these groups before, but, to my knowledge, it's the first time that Saudi Arabia has participated in striking Iraqi soil actually since the 1991 Kuwait war.

Geoff Bennett:

How much operational control does Iran have versus these militias operating on their own?

Feisal Istrabadi:

Iran has tremendous control over these militias, and these militias would not be doing this if they -- if Iran did not want them to, indeed, if Iran did not direct them to.

They -- although they are also funded through various nefarious means from within Iraq, Iran has historically funded these groups. It arms them. It trains them. I do not know if it specifically has transferred the technology for manufacturing drones, but it has certainly transferred the technology for manufacturing other weapons to such groups in the last 20 years.

Geoff Bennett:

Saudi Arabia spent five months avoiding direct combat. What pulled Riyadh out into the open now? What were the risks of staying on the sidelines?

Feisal Istrabadi:

Well, I mean, there is a question of national pride and a limit to which the Saudis can take continued violation of their territory and their sovereignty.

The Iraqi prime minister has said, as your report points out, that this could be a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, but it is also a violation of Iraqi sovereignty for quasi-governmental groups within Iraq, in violation of Iraqi government policy, to attack a neighboring state which has not attacked Iraq, Saudi Arabia.

And so there is more than mere national pride at stake. It's also a matter of deterring, deterring Iran and its allies and proxies from further attacks and show that these groups will suffer consequences and cannot hide behind an international boundary.

Geoff Bennett:

This war has now pulled in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon within recent weeks. What's really driving this expansion?

Feisal Istrabadi:

Well, the war itself, I would argue, the attack on Iran itself lacked a vision for what its intent was.

Every sort of announced policy objective that the president of the United States announced at the very beginning of this war was compromised away in the initial cease-fire agreement that the United States and Iran signed, which, of course, is now passe, well past its events.

But there has been no focus. There was no obvious strategic objective that could be achieved by this war, which it seems to me is a reason that previous American administrations over the last five decades did not choose this option. It was always a possibility, indeed a probability, that Iran's response would be to make this a regional war with consequences throughout the region.

And, of course, the number of states Iran has attacked is much longer than the list that you began this question with.

Geoff Bennett:

Well, given that, is there any framework left right now for de-escalation?

Feisal Istrabadi:

I hope so, because continued conflict is in is in nobody's interest in the region, and certainly not in Iraq's interest. My hope is that at some point the Iranian government will come to the conclusion that it has in fact survived this war, which both the Israelis and the Americans assumed would not be the case.

It has survived. That is the single most important fact to it, that it has not successfully been overthrown through these -- through the attacks, and therefore that it is now in its interests to de-escalate. The problem, of course, now is that the control over the Strait of Hormuz has become since the war a part of the equation, and that's a difficult conundrum to solve.

Geoff Bennett:

Feisal Istrabadi, thank you for speaking with us this evening. We appreciate it.

Feisal Istrabadi:

Always my pleasure. Thank you.