Iran just elected its first reformist president in two decades. What’s next?

Lisa Desjardins:

Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian will ascend to the Iranian presidency in a delicate moment for the Islamic Republic, both on the world stage and within its borders. He faces a government still largely controlled by hardline clerics tension with the West over Iran's nuclear program and domestic frustrations with the regime. Ali Rogin has more.

Ali Rogin:

To discuss what this means for Iran, the U.S. and other stakeholders. I'm joined by Suzanne Maloney. She's the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. Suzanne, thank you so much for being here.

Tell us a little bit more about Masoud Pezeshkian? What did he campaign on?

Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institute:

Masoud Pezeshkian is a 70-year-old longtime member of the parliament who served also as the health minister during the second administration of President Mohammad Khatami, who was Iran's first reformist president.

He has kept a relatively low profile. Up until this campaign, he did register previous rounds of Iranian elections back in 2013. And then again in 2021, when he was in fact prohibited from running by the Guardians Council, which vets all the candidates.

This time around, it was a little bit of a surprise that he made it through in part because he wasn't terribly well known. But of course, all of the elements about this election were very improvisational, because it came in the wake of the unexpected death of the prior president, Ebrahim Raisi.

Ali Rogin:

And Pezeshkian had fashioned himself a reformer, what sort of campaign did he run? What kind of message was he putting out there?

Suzanne Maloney:

Well Pezeshkian is a longtime member of the Reformist Party that has largely fallen out of favor due to the fact that President Khatami its standard bearer, and others were really unable to affect meaningful change for the Iranian people.

And yet it has remained a part of the Iranian political system and Pezeshkian when he was selected to run title his came, Baraye Iran or For Iran, it was really meant, I think, to talk about the theme of Pezeshkian's campaign, one of being pro Iran, very much nondisruptive very much in favor of the current clerical lead system, but one in which he wanted to see Iran, more engaged with the world and less confrontational and hostile to the world.

Ali Rogin:

Iranian officials have long pointed to relatively high turnout levels in Iranian elections as a sign of legitimacy behind the regime. But this time around, there were two rounds of voting, and both of them had relatively low turnout numbers compared to previous years. What does this year's turnout say about the feelings among the Iranian voting public?

Suzanne Maloney:

I think it's been clear for many years that much of the population is incredibly disenchanted with the Islamic Republic and the clerical theocratic regime that runs Iran, but they haven't really had a way to demonstrate that dissatisfaction.

The fact that only 40 percent turned out in the first round of this election was really a startling number. In past elections, it's run as high as 70 and 80 percent of the voting population that has in fact voted, in part because there are requirements for individuals to vote.

And so there's so many risks that requirement to stay at home was a real concern for the regime. And I think it was part of the reason why the election went to a runoff and in fact, why the clerical establishment is quite happy to have someone like Pezeshkian in this position now.

Ali Rogin:

Where does this deep frustration with Iran's ruling class come from? And how might the presidency of Pezeshkian impact that?

Suzanne Maloney:

Well, Iran has an incredibly young population, most of the population has been born not just since the revolution, but since the end of the Iran Iraq war in 1988. And they have seen various attempts to try to normalize the regime, varied efforts to try to promote some real liberalization of both politics and society, as well as some expansion of Iran's ties with the world. But none have really succeeded in part because of the very hardline stance of Iran's ultimate authority, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

And so they become very disgruntled, very much disillusioned with even the modest efforts of the system to try to give them some kind of political participation. They've also been very dissatisfied with the state of the economy, which has been subject to both very heavy American sanctions, but also to considerable mismanagement by the clerical system.

It's really unclear that Pezeshkian's presidency will make a meaningful difference. He is someone who's quite loyal to the system itself. But he will bring about a kinder, gentler Islamic Republic to some extent, and that at a time of considerable tensions on the regional scene, and considerable dissatisfaction at home might just be a benefit for both the population and for the leadership.

Ali Rogin:

There is, of course, the Iranian nuclear program, which is the source of so much tension between Iran and the West and of course, rising tensions with Israel that we've seen play out since the October 7 attack.

How do you think this election may affect Iran's approach to all of those issues?

Suzanne Maloney:

I expect the Pezeshkian election will have very little impact on Iran's foreign or regional policies, he will have limited bandwidth, or engagement with the nucleophile. The same is true for Iran's relationships with its proxies across the region. It is possible though that Pezeshkian can inject a note of caution a note of prudence, which seems to have been both his style and his message on the campaign trail.

Ali Rogin:

Suzanne Maloney with the Brookings Institution thank you so much for joining us.

Suzanne Maloney:

Thank you.