New U.S. counterterror strategy focuses on drug cartels but omits right-wing extremism

Amna Nawaz:

American counterterror officials are meeting today with officials from other allied nations to coordinate efforts against what the U.S. calls deadly threats from terror groups and non-state actors.

But, as William Brangham reports, America's recently released strategy to fight terrorism contains some unusual targets.

William Brangham:

Amna, the U.S.' counterterrorism strategy, detailed in a 16-page memo released on Tuesday, identifies three main terror threats facing the U.S., narco-terrorists and transnational gangs, legacy Islamist terrorists, and violent left-wing extremists, including anarchists and anti-fascists.

That last group is later defined as those whose ideology is anti-American, radically pro-transgender and anarchist, citing, among other threats, the man accused of murdering conservative activist Charlie Kirk. The memo makes no mention of right-wing extremist groups, despite research from the U.S. government and others indicating those groups are responsible for the majority of violent attacks over the last years.

So, for more on America's counterterror strategy, we are joined by Colin Clarke. He's the executive director of the Soufan Center, where he focuses on domestic and international terrorism.

Colin, thank you so much for being here.

On first blush, what is your reaction to this counterterror strategy?

Colin Clarke, The Soufan Center:

Thanks for having me.

Well, it's about what I expected, if not a little bit subpar. Look, there's a couple of things that it gets right, and that's the focus on hostages and wrongfully detained persons, the focus on terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and the enduring threat posed by jihadist groups.

But it gets a lot wrong. It gets the wrong the omission of far right terrorist groups. It doesn't deal at all with domestic terrorism and homegrown violent extremism. And the entire document is riddled with partisan accusations and snubs, after proclaiming to be an apolitical document, which it unfortunately is not.

William Brangham:

Let's tick through some of those things. I mentioned the three main sources it sites as threats, the first one being narco-terrorists and criminal gangs.

I mean, the administration argues that the flow of drugs into America is a clear and present danger. What do you make of their framing of that threat?

Colin Clarke:

Look, these groups absolutely need to be countered and combated. Groups like the Sinaloa cartel, MS-13, and others, these are groups that are pushing crime and drugs into the United States.

But they're not terrorist groups. They're motivated by profit, not by politics. And so traditionally we have used law enforcement to deal with such groups. And so when you all of a sudden start painting every single non-state actor as a terrorist group, it muddles the picture.

It confuses those that are forced to deal with this issue. And, frankly, it takes resources away. We live in a world of finite resources now more than ever. And so, for the money personnel and training and expertise that goes to dealing with these groups, you have less of that to deal with other serious threats.

William Brangham:

Second on that list is the threat of Islamic terrorists.

And that still seems like a legitimate threat facing the U.S. What do you make of their strategy against those groups?

Colin Clarke:

Well, this document is not much of a strategy. It's actually more of a world view. So it's very descriptive in nature. It doesn't tell you exactly what the United States can and should do, other than a very kinetic approach.

Sebastian Gorka likes to talk about turning jihadis into -- quote, unquote -- "red mist" and this very aggressive, we will find you and we will kill you kind of tagline that he trots out. But there's very little nuance. There's very little substance behind that.

The document barely engages with emerging technologies and all of the tools that terrorists use as forced multipliers, including 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, unmanned aerial systems or drones, cryptocurrency, and the range of different tools that they use online, encrypted platforms, to recruit and radicalize new members.

William Brangham:

We should say Sebastian Gorka is the U.S. counterterrorism official who is believed to have authored this report.

But the third on that list was this inclusion, as I mentioned, of left-wing radicals, pro-transgender activists. Is there any view that those groups or individuals are a substantive threat to America?

Colin Clarke:

Look, I do think we have seen an uptick in far left violence. Part of that is due to what we call reciprocal radicalization., As the far right has grown in this country -- and we can go back over the past few years and look at very violent attacks in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where I join you today, at the Tree of Life Synagogue, at the Walmart in El Paso, at a supermarket in Buffalo, where a white supremacist targeted African American Americans.

There's been highly lethal right-wing attacks. Any time you have a rise in the far right, you're going to have a rise in the far left. And so we have seen an uptick in far left violence, and that uptick could continue, motivated by a range of factors, whether socioeconomic, anger over Gaza or other issues.

But, on balance and in aggregate, far right terrorism still poses a far more significant threat than the far left does. And so to focus on one over the other and not look across the ideological spectrum comes across as cherry-picking and politicizing counterterrorism, rather than using intelligence and data-driven methods to deal with it.

William Brangham:

Lastly, I couldn't help but notice, as you mentioned, that so many of the remedies here are militaristic and force-based, killing bad guys, so to speak, and no mention whatsoever of American soft power, which has been a bipartisan belief for a generation.

What do you make of that omission?

Colin Clarke:

Well, I have to believe it was somewhat deliberate.

If you look at the DOGE cuts to USAID and others, it really pulled the mat out from under our soft power efforts, including in sub-Saharan Africa. And so as we see a growing crisis in Mali with al-Qaida-linked groups there, the lack of funding for things to help improve governance, to help deal with border security, to help deal with all of these issues that we know contribute to the structural conditions and the drivers of radicalization, none of that is present anymore.

And so all we're left with is the kinetic option. But if we think back to the global war on terrorism, we deal with the old adage of, are we creating more terrorists than we're killing? And it becomes a game of Whac-A-Mole. We tried that for two decades. It didn't work. In fact, it backfired spectacularly.

And, unfortunately, this document seems to be heading back into that exact direction.

William Brangham:

All right, that is Colin Clarke of The Soufan Center.

Colin, thank you so much for being here.

Colin Clarke:

Thank you.