An Update: John O’Neill and the 9/11 Commission
This 2004 file photo shows a Barnes and Noble book store in Springfield, Ill., displaying "The 9/11 Commission Report", the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States. (AP Photo/Seth Perlman)
FRONTLINE’s story on John O’Neill spotlights two central issues that emerged during the 9/11 Commission hearings held in the spring of 2004 investigating why the U.S. intelligence community failed to prevent the Sept. 11th terrorist attack:
– The 9/11 Commission’s investigation revealed that America’s $30 billion intelligence community, spread over more than a dozen agencies, was disorganized, fractured and impaired by organizational and legal restrictions on the sharing of information.
These disclosures directly relate to John O’Neill’s story. He came tantalizingly close to possibly uncovering the 9/11 plot. But his investigations into the USS Cole terrorist attack and into Al Qaeda’s presence in the United States were both undermined by the CIA and FBI’s failure to share information with each other. Read FRONTLINE’s “What If” report for details.
– The 9/11 Commission hearings also revealed how the FBI was not capable of functioning as a domestic intelligence service because of limited resources as well as a culture and organization that emphasized a traditional law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. FBI agents were trained to build criminal cases that could be prosecuted. As the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement noted, “The Bureau rewarded agents based on statistics reflecting arrests, indictments and prosecutions. As a result, fields such as counterterrorism and counterintelligence, where investigations generally result in fewer prosecutions, were viewed as backwaters.”
John O’Neill had run up against this FBI culture; his counterterrorism efforts directly threatened the dominance of the group who held sway over the bureau – the criminal division. O’Neill also fought to improve the FBI’s resources and capabilities to fight the new terrorism, arguing for a plan that represented a seismic shift in the way the FBI had always operated. One example: He would have given authority to a new more analytic agent who would have enhanced technology to fight terrorism. As the 9/11 Commission hearings disclosed, “66 percent of the bureau analysts were not qualified to perform analytic duties.”
Some selections from the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement No. 9 (April 13, 2004) relating to the FBI’s problems in fighting terrorism:
Counter Intelligence Not a Priority–“The FBI took a traditional law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. Its agents were trained to build cases. Its management was deliberately decentralized to empower the individual field offices and agents on the street.” … “The Bureau rewarded agents based on statistics reflecting arrests, indictments, and prosecutions. As a result, fields such as counterterrorism and counterintelligence, where investigations generally result in fewer prosecutions, were viewed as backwaters.” … “Agents developed information in support of their own cases, not as part of a broader more strategic effort. Given the poor state of the FBI’s information systems, field agents usually did not know what investigations agents in their own office, let alone in other field offices, were working on. Nor did analysts have easy access to this information. As a result, it was almost impossible to develop an understanding of the threat from a particular international terrorist group.”
Reno Told Freeh to Shift Resources to Counterterrorism–“Reno told us that the Bureau never seemed to have sufficient resources given the broad scope of its responsibilities. She said in light of the appropriations FBI received, it needed to prioritize and put counterterrorism first. She also said that Director Freeh seemed unwilling to shift resources to terrorism from other areas such as violent crime. Freeh said that it was difficult to tell field executives that they needed to do additional counterterrorism work without additional resources.”
FBI Statistically Driven–“Collection of useful intelligence from human sources was limited. By the mid-1990s senior FBI managers became concerned that the Bureau’s statistically-driven performance system had resulted in a roster of mediocre sources. The FBI did not have a formal mechanism for validating source reporting, nor did it have a system for adequately tracking and sharing such reporting, either internally or externally.”
Problem of Rotation Through Headquarters–“Additionally, the career path for agents necessitated rotations between headquarters and the field in a variety of work areas, making it difficult for agents to develop expertise in any particular area, especially counterterrorism and counterintelligence.”
No Ability to Know What It Knew–“Prior to 9/11, the FBI did not have an adequate ability to know what it knew. In other words, the FBI did not have an effective mechanism for capturing or sharing its institutional knowledge. FBI agents did create records of interviews and other investigative efforts, but there were no reports officers to condense the information into meaningful intelligence that could be retrieved and disseminated.”
Reno Warned FBI to Strengthen Intelligence–“Reno told us that she was very concerned about the Bureau’s information sharing and intelligence capabilities. In 2000, Reno sent several memoranda to Director Freeh expressing these concerns. One memo stated that ‘it is imperative that the FBI immediately develop the capacity to fully assimilate and utilize intelligence information currently collected and contained in FBI files and use that knowledge to work proactively to identify and protect against emerging national security threats.’ Reno’s requirements involved improved information sharing, improved counterterrorism training, a threat assessment, and a strategy to counter that threat. It is not clear what actions the FBI took in response to these directives from the Attorney General.”