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Week of 7.18.08
What's Gone Wrong in Afghanistan?More From NOW:
Afghanistan: The Forgotten War |
What's Gone Wrong in Afghanistan? |
Impressions from Afghanistan |
Timeline: War in Afghanistan
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 NOW: Insurgents killed nine American soldiers in a single attack last week in one of the deadliest attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in years - and one of several violent attacks in recent months. Why are we seeing such an increase in violence? The insurgency in Afghanistan has been gaining strength over the past two years. One of the main reasons is that the insurgents have been able to regroup and reconstitute their forces in the northwestern part of Pakistan, just across the Afghan border. They have used this area as a sanctuary where they can train and launch attacks. Many of the attacks in recent months - including the attack last week - have been close to the border, which enables insurgents to attack and then return back to their sanctuary area without fears of being pursued by Afghan or NATO security forces. Another reason why the violence has increased is U.S. and NATO forces have expanded their presence throughout the country in the past two years. NATO forces were limited to operating in Kabul for several years, and only expanded into the western and southern regions of Afghanistan in 2006. During the previous five years, Taliban and Al Qaeda members had built networks of support and coerced the populations in many towns and villages in these areas. It was expected that they would attack the international forces as they expanded into new areas of the country, but they underestimated the strength of those attacks. NOW: Many Americans believed that the war in Afghanistan was won 6 years ago, shortly after we attacked the country. How were insurgents able to regain so much of their power? The military operations in the fall of 2001 led to the fall of the Taliban regime, but many members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fled into remote parts of Afghanistan and in some cases into Pakistan. U.S. military operations to track and capture these individuals have been hampered by the very difficult mountainous terrain and especially by the lack of reliable intelligence on their whereabouts. Also, the pace of reconstruction has been very slow. The Afghan government has not been able to extend its reach throughout the country, and remains plagued by capacity problems. The insurgents have taken advantage of this void, especially by threatening violence against populations in the south. NOW: How strong is the Taliban throughout the region? How are they different than the Taliban the U.S. encountered when we first attacked Afghanistan in 2001? The Taliban is a much more fragmented entity than it was in 2001. There are still a number of hard core Taliban members who seek to regain national power and continue to cooperate with Al Qaeda personnel. But there are also many people who still call themselves Taliban but are now more moderate in their views, and some of them have even sought to cooperate with the national government. The challenge for President Hamid Karzai and his administration is to determine how to work with these more moderate Taliban who are willing to renounce the use of violence. Al Qaeda, of course, will not renounce violence and will continue to conduct attacks, but its capabilities and influence in Afghanistan may decrease if there are fewer Taliban members willing to work with them. NOW: The U.S. has expressed frustration with what they see as insufficient efforts by Pakistan to fight militants on the Afghan border. Is Islamabad partially to blame for some of the recent violence in Afghanistan? The fact that the insurgents can operate freely from inside Pakistan has certainly contributed to the increase in violence inside Afghanistan. Studies of past counterinsurgency operations show that insurgencies are almost impossible to defeat while they have a sanctuary area where they can hide, train, and reconstitute their forces. The northwestern part of Pakistan, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, serves as that type of sanctuary for the insurgents today. NOW: Barack Obama has said that if elected President he would begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq and send some of them to Afghanistan. America currently has roughly 34,000 troops in Afghanistan. Do you believe an increase in troops is necessary? NATO commanders have repeatedly requested additional troops to be sent to Afghanistan, and NATO countries have repeatedly failed to provide the numbers that the commanders have requested. The U.S. and the NATO Secretary General had hoped that the European members of NATO would increase their force contributions, but only a few of them have done so and the total numbers have been relatively small. This means that any future increases in the number of troops for Afghanistan will most likely have to come from the U.S. And the U.S. cannot make any new force commitments to Afghanistan while the number of troops serving in Iraq remains at the current levels. So no significant increases in U.S. troop deployments to Afghanistan are likely until after troop withdrawals begin in Iraq, regardless of which candidate wins the presidential election in November. NOW: John McCain has called for the doubling the size of the Afghan army to 160,000, and said if elected President he also would appoint a top White House official to serve as an Afghan "czar". What do you think of McCain's plan? Increasing the size of the Afghan army may be helpful in the long run, but it would not help improve the security situation in the country any time soon. It takes a long time to train and equip a military force, particularly for the difficult challenges of counterinsurgency. The Afghan Army currently has approximately 50,000 soldiers, and is scheduled to grow to 80,000 soldiers by next summer. Increasing the targeted size of the Afghan army would not lead to increased capabilities for a number of years to come. In the shorter term, the way to address the current violence is to focus on improving the capabilities and training of the existing Afghan army units, so that they are able to conduct operations with less assistance from the U.S. and NATO. NOW: How serious of a threat are the current problems in Afghanistan to American interests and security? The escalating attacks from the insurgents directly threaten the progress that has been made in rebuilding Afghanistan during the past seven years. They signal a resurgence in the capabilities of the Taliban and of Al Qaeda, and their influence could spread if it remains unchecked. Furthermore, the U.S. and its allies have made a commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and these attacks are designed to challenge that commitment. NOW: Opium production in Afghanistan is at a record high, according to the UN. What role does it play in the insurgency? Why has it been so difficult to curtail production? Opium plays an important role in the insurgency by providing an ongoing source of revenue that can be used to fund training and attacks. Curtailing production has proven difficult for three main reasons. First, some farmers grow opium because they are coerced into doing so by Taliban and Al Qaeda personnel who threaten them with violence if they do not grow the lucrative crop. Second, and most importantly, opium is a much more profitable crop than most of the alternatives. Farmers can earn much more money by growing opium instead of wheat or other food crops. Many farming plots are quite small, which means that farmers often cannot produce enough of other crops to earn enough to feed their families. Another complicating factor is the fact that the demands of counterinsurgency operations and counter-drug operations often conflict with each other. Counterterrorism operations require establishing close cooperative relations and trust with local communities, so that they are willing to provide information on insurgents hiding and operating within their midst. It is difficult to establish that type of cooperation when the same forces are involved in destroying crops or arresting farmers who are trying to make a living. The ultimately solution is for U.S. and NATO forces to focus on counterinsurgency operations and for Afghan authorities to focus on the counter-narcotics mission, but the Afghan authorities suffer from a lot of corruption in this area and are a long way from having the capabilities - not to mention the political will - to address the narcotics problem more effectively. |
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