>> The problem with American foreign policy is that we are so often reactive and not as proactive as we could be given our power, and the danger is we've gotten to the point that we may no longer be a superpower.

♪♪♪ >> Hello and welcome to "GZERO World."

I'm Ian Bremmer, and today a look at the Biden administration's rocky record on foreign policy over its first eight months.

Sure, most allies are grateful that he's no Donald Trump, but following some recent geopolitical crises, has America's global standing really improved since Joe Biden took office?

I'll be discussing the foreign policy road ahead with award-winning "New Yorker" writer Robin Wright, whose international reporting has covered everything from war-torn, failed states to last month's United Nations General Assembly.

Don't worry.

I've also got your "Puppet Regime."

>> I'm sorry, is there a fly buzzing on this phone?

A fly from some silly little island?

>> But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

>> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by... >> I speak to you today as President of the United States at the very start of my administration, and I'm sending a clear message to the world.

America is back.

>> "America is back."

Those three words from President Biden, after four long years of the Trump administration's "bull in a China shop" approach to foreign policy were like Xanax to the diplomatic community.

The world's red, white and blue beacon of democracy and multilateralism may have hit an orange roadblock, but it was back on track.

You could practically hear America's allies exhaling in unison.

But was it actually true?

Some major foreign policy snafus from the past eight months have thrown America's renewed global standing into question.

At the very least, we can say the honeymoon is over.

Ah, but what a honeymoon it was.

Remember the G7 summit at Cornwall, and that sun-dappled day at the beach with a handsome young Frenchman?

But just three months later, when the U.S., Britain and Australia announced a historic Asia-Pacific security pact involving nuclear submarines, a pact that royally screwed the French out of their own deal with the Aussies, Macron's foreign minister used the word "back" in a somewhat different way.

There is no question that the French government was happy to say [French accent] au revoir [Normal voice] to the Trump administration.

[ French accent ] That is my French accent.

[ Normal voice ] But it is precisely because their hopes for the Biden folks were so much higher that this move felt like such a betrayal.

In fact, just weeks before the sub snub, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who grew up in Paris and speaks fluent French, visited the City of Light, and he gave no indication that anything was amiss.

But the Biden administration's foreign policy stumbles have exacted a greater toll than simply offending some government officials across the pond.

>> Well, there are scenes of panic and pandemonium at Kabul Airport today as desperate people pour onto the runway trying to flee the country in what can only be described as a chaotic exodus, >> I was not going to extend this forever war, and I was not extending a forever exit.

>> A botched U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan facilitated the near instantaneous Taliban takeover of that country after a 20-year American occupation.

It was the biggest foreign policy crisis for the Biden administration to date.

Heck, it was bigger than any crisis under the Trump administration in foreign policy, and it was also largely self-inflicted.

I've said it before on the show, but it bears repeating.

The failure lay not in the decision to exit Afghanistan, but in the way the U.S. went about leaving.

The logistical capabilities of the U.S. military are nothing short of awesome, and yet chaos at the Kabul Airport cost countless Afghan lives and those of 13 U.S. service members.

The diplomatic fallout was also severe.

The U.S. fought alongside allies in the coalition for two decades.

But when the time came to pull the plug, Biden did so alone, both in making the decision, the announcement, the execution and in the aftermath.

The next true test to America's global standing is now just weeks away.

The already troubled COP26 later this month, the most consequential climate summit since the 2015 Paris Accords will be a critical moment for leaders looking to avoid environmental catastrophe.

And given that China is the world's largest CO2 emitter, Beijing will need to be on board.

President Biden said at the United Nations General Assembly last month that the United States was "not seeking a new Cold War or a world divided into rigid blocs."

But he's also opted to continue Donald Trump's tariff war on China in an ongoing effort to stunt the growth of China's largest tech company, Huawei.

And that's why if Biden is going to make any headway with China on climate, he's going to need some European friends at the table.

Can President Biden tamp down growing global skepticism and persuade his allies, especially across that pond, that the U.S. is indeed back for real?

Or is America's credibility irreparably damaged no matter what Biden or any future president says or does?

I'm joined today by "The New Yorker's" Robin Wright, and here's our conversation.

Robin Wright from "The New Yorker," so good to be with you today.

>> Great to be with you.

>> There's so much to talk about, but it is true that there are big questions in the world today about to what extent the United States can be counted on and what the U.S. stands for.

Tell me how you are thinking about this moment.

>> I think this is a moment where not just Joe Biden, but America in general is being questioned by the world.

Can we lead?

Can we create the new institutions, the structures that will address an array of issues?

I mean, there are so many to talk about, whether it's the fact that warfare is no longer only decided by who has the biggest bombers or the most tanks or the most troops.

It's who dominates the field of information, who has control of the Internet, who has the economic power.

Then there's also the kind of rusty infrastructure of ideology, the fact that democracy is in trouble.

We celebrated 30 years ago the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet Empire, the end of minority rule in Africa and the collapse of military dictatorships in Latin America.

And yet you look at the world and whether it's Venezuela, the first democracy in Latin America that is now a failing state with rival governments backed by rival powers; South Africa, which was, like the United States was to the West, the exception in Africa.

And today it's a country that's beginning to fail as well, with huge electricity blackouts despite gold and oil, where they deployed 25,000 troops to deal with the largest protests since the anti-apartheid movement; Lebanon, which is a failing state, and it was the Middle East's first democracy.

So many challenges that we're doing things piecemeal and there's no great strategic vision.

>> Do you think we stand for something different than during 9/11, for example?

>> I think America hasn't really answered that question.

We are so divided among ourselves that we're not even certain what we are.

I actually wrote a piece about Is America a myth?

And we've gone through many crises and cycles of crises in our lives where we wondered about who we were, and we fought a civil war.

But I think today the question is which side prevails in what is a corrosive political environment?

9/11, we came away because we knew what we opposed more united.

And I think it is those moments when we oppose something that we do stand together and do say yes, democracy and the American flag and so forth.

But when we -- In other moments, we are not quite so sure about what it is we want, how much we want to intervene in the world.

And is it to do good or is it just to protect ourselves?

And I think both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan indicated we were out to defend ourselves, protect ourselves.

But we certainly didn't leave those countries in better shape than they were.

>> Today, to the extent that enemy exists, increasingly, it appears to be China.

Do you see that as a cohesive shift in American strategic vision?

>> Well, the thing that concerns me about China is that, Biden, to his credit, is trying to build the institutions to deal with China, whether it is elevating the so-called Quad of Japan and India and Australia and the United States to leader level.

Biden hosted, after the United Nations, a meeting of the four in Washington, and all four of them were present, not virtually.

They don't like to talk about it in terms of China.

They talk about the Indo-Pacific.

>> They never mention China when they're talking about the Quad, but we all know kind of it's there.

>> Yes, and the same thing with the submarine deal that brought together Britain and Australia to provide nuclear technology so that Australia would have nuclear subs and a greater reach in the Indo-Pacific region.

Again, not mentioning China, but we all know what it's about.

So there is that beginning of a piecemeal construction of institutions to deal with China.

But there's not enough that is substantive, and there's not a direction saying to the world, "This is what we want to do," kind of for fear that we're going to alienate the Chinese and that will lead them to do something to counter.

>> And that a lot of American allies aren't up for it.

>> That's right.

The Europeans are kind of divided between the United States and China and who they -- do they want to get involved with the United States as they were against Russia during the Soviet era.

>> If Trump had never existed, how would you rate Biden so far as the President?

How would you think he was doing if Trump just didn't exist?

>> Biden is clearly the most experienced president in American history when it comes to foreign policy.

He knows the world.

The danger is that he has spent most of his life beginning in the early 1970s and politics in the 20th century.

And the idea is the format, the framework, the infrastructure of dealing with the world comes from the 20th century.

And as I said, he's piecemeal, trying to create something as an alternative.

But I don't think he's spoken enough, partly because we're stuck between climate and COVID in dealing with existential questions.

The problem with American foreign policy and again, as you know better than anyone, is that we are so often reactive and not as proactive as we could be given our power, whether it's military or economic.

We are still very insecure.

We've never quite understood that we really are a superpower.

And the danger is we've gotten to the point that we may no longer be a superpower, because of the very many different power centers evolving around the world.

>> You know, you made very clear Biden is by far the most experienced foreign policy hand of any president in recent memory.

He's done it from the Senate.

He's done it from the vice presidency.

He's traveled around the world.

He knows many of these leaders individually.

His Cabinet, they're adults.

They're also very experienced.

They've been around the block.

You know them.

I know them.

And yet the things that he seems to be doing wrong seem to be about basic execution of stuff that these people should know how to do.

Why do you think that is?

>> You're right that many of these people are on their second and even third time around, or they've been close to Biden for a very long time.

Biden, at the end of the day, makes the decisions.

We know that he has sometimes a bit of a temper.

He's going to do what he wants to do, as he did in Afghanistan, over the advice of some of his top generals.

He thinks he's got a way out and a way into the 21st century.

And the problem is, I think he sees ways out of the past.

I'm not sure that he gets ways into the future, and I fault some of the people close to him.

I'm not sure they're as brave or bold or as big thing.

They're good thinkers.

They're people with integrity.

They're not newcomers to foreign policy.

But I'm not sure I can identify any one of them that I think is, you know, the lightning, the inspiration, the one who is going to be defining what a different world looks like coming out of conflict.

The thing that was so striking about the United Nations session was how Biden got up and tried to say he was effectively resetting foreign policy, that the era of relentless wars is over and the beginning of relentless diplomacy.

Okay.

What does that mean?

And I'm not sure any of us came away with a better understanding.

My gut is that it's a weak administration, that its heart's in the right place.

Is its mind kind of coming up with enough?

And are its feet moving fast enough?

And the answer is no.

>> Let me turn to the Middle East, a place that you've spent an awful lot of time, and the United States, in focusing more on China, seems to be focusing less on the Middle East, and certainly American allies in the region do feel that way.

Do you think that the United States should be doing meaningfully less in and with the Middle East?

And if so, are we handling that well?

>> So, every president has said for almost 70 years, "We're going to get out of the Middle East" and kind of whether it's deal with the Soviet Union, deal with, you know, the other flash points, and every president has managed to get sucked back into the region, the most consistently volatile part of the world.

The tragedy is the United States is leaving at a time that the Middle East has never been in worse shape.

There are more failing or failed or fragile states in the region than at any time since World War II.

When you look at whether it's Lebanon, Syria, Iraq is in terrible trouble, Libya, Yemen, other countries, you know, Egypt, led by a dictator.

The Arab Spring has disappeared across the region.

Tunisia is in trouble.

And, of course, MBS, Mohammed bin Salman is the crown prince in Saudi Arabia and has engaged in kind of murders whenever he doesn't like somebody.

>> Sounds like a good time for the Americans to get out.

>> Well, sure.

But there's one big issue looming out there, and that's Iran, and we can't walk away from the Middle East until we resolve the issue that is represented by nuclear weapons but really involves now so much more.

>> Now, you recently met with the Iranian foreign minister.

It's why you came to New York.

This is your first time sitting down with him.

So why don't you give me first impressions?

>> Look, this is a regime that is going to be much harder line.

It's much more nationalistic.

It's looking at the neighborhood.

It doesn't want to reach out to the West as much.

It claims that it's managed to stabilize its economy.

It claims that its resistance economy, as it calls it... >> That's what they call it, yeah.

>> ...will survive, maybe not thrive, but it will survive even without a nuclear deal.

I think at the end of the day, they want a nuclear deal.

But again, I don't think that's -- I think we were missing in many ways the threat from Iran.

I think there's something very different that's happened, particularly during the Trump era, that the Iranians felt so pressured and so cornered that they worked on their missile program, they worked on their drones, and Iran today has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East.

Its missiles can reach deep into China and Russia, as far west as Greece and as far south as Somalia and Ethiopia.

>> And they launched an attack against Saudi Arabia, their largest refinery, which was quite staggering at the time.

That, of course, they've been not in compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions on ballistic missiles for quite some time.

It's part of the reason why, even with the Iranian deal, we still have sanctions on Iran.

Did you get the sense that they would be willing to negotiate on any of those issues, leaving aside the nuclear deal itself?

>> Well, it's the missile issue.

It's the intervention in the region, involvement, meddling, whatever.

>> Support of terrorism, yeah.

>> I don't think that there is any mechanism to compromise.

Iran's position on missiles is "Okay, you want us to limit ours?

Then you limit everybody's in the regions, including Israel."

And that's a nonstarter for Israel.

So we're not going to go any place on any of these issues.

And the danger is that we've gotten to a place with Iran that it will still be a threat.

And with the resistance alliance it has built with its allies in Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Yemen, they now have missile arsenals from Iran that can hit Israel.

Iran never has to lift a finger.

It's trained engineers and scientists in each of these countries.

Iran has the most effective alliance in the Middle East.

We don't.

They do.

And that's something they've built up steadily over the last two decades, but particularly during the Trump era.

>> And the fact that when General Soleimani was killed by the Trump administration, it was quite a slap to the Iranians, and their response was virtually nothing.

Their bluff essentially had been called by the Americans, I mean, that didn't seem like they felt like they were in a strong position, at least at that point.

>> So, I think the American military would disagree with you there.

>> How so?

>> Well, the attack on al-Asad base -- and I was there again in March four times -- >> Where Americans were stationed.

>> Where Americans were stationed and which was the target of the Iranian counterattack.

>> Right.

>> And, you know, more than a hundred troops came down with brain injuries, and the Iranians said, "That's a warning."

And I think neither side wanted to see it escalate beyond that.

I think the Iranians were shocked that the Americans would go after Soleimani.

In some ways, he was safe because he was so high level, nobody would touch him, and that we would do this in Iraq, no less, which was an ally, and he was on an official state visit.

You know, this was not one of his kind of nefarious trips.

But the Iranians...

I think the Americans felt that this was a terrifying turn of events and that it signaled how far Iran was willing to go in using its arsenal.

It's one thing to build stuff because you're paranoid or you want to defend yourself.

It's another thing to actually fire them against a great power, knowing that it could lead to repercussions and a bigger conflict.

And I don't think Iran wants that yet.

>> So leaving aside the fact that Iran would like to get back into the old nuclear deal because it would reduce sanctions and improve their economy, and they had already been complying with the old conditions, what else do you think Iran actually is looking for strategically in the region right now?

>> Iran views itself ironically as strategically lonely, which is why it has built this network, this alliance throughout the region.

What it wants in the region is a sense of, I think, security and that it doesn't have to face the kind of war it did in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein invaded, one of the Middle East's longest and costliest wars, the use of chemical weapons every year when the world didn't care that Iran developed a paranoia.

It's still a revolutionary environment, remember, and revolutions are always paranoid.

We're not to that period of normalcy.

I think the Iranians have tried, but there's always been this conflict, most of all with the United States, and they've never gotten to that point.

The revolutionaries are also dying out.

They're in their 70s and 80s, and many of them are long gone.

They're trying to cater to a younger generation.

And so ensuring the continuation of the "Islamic Republic" is part of the goal and that, they have to feel they're not under pressure, whether it's from -- or threat, whether it's from Israel or Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies in the Gulf.

>> In terms of American foreign policy priorities, where would you put Iran today?

Is Iran, in your view, a first-order national security concern for the Americans?

>> It's a short-order priority.

It's one they want to get through, get back to the JCPOA, get back to where they were so that Iran is not two or three months away from developing enough fuel to fuel a bomb and then move on.

I think this is the one -- It's kind of the last issue in the Middle East and then let the Middle East do for itself and sort itself out.

I think there will be profound concern about Iran's military capabilities, its mischief in the region.

But in terms of trying to sort that out, that's one that's a tangible achievement.

Check that off the list.

You got the nuclear deal and then you can move on to the climate and China and the things where Biden really cares about personally.

>> So they got out of Afghanistan, as ugly as it may have been.

They need to get the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear deal done and then on to the rest of their agenda for the rest of the administration.

>> I think that's where they're going.

>> Robin Wright, thank you so much.

>> Thank you.

>> And now to "Puppet Regime," where a recent geopolitical dustup amongst allies has the Brits feeling a tad insecure.

Roll that tape.

[ Telephone rings ] >> Hello.

>> Manu, did you actually not withdraw your ambassador from the United Kingdom over this submarine thing?

>> [ Laughs ] No.

>> No?

Wait.

You mean like, no, you didn't or no, you did not, meaning you did?

>> I withdrew nothing.

>> Well, why the bloody hell not?

>> I'm sorry, is there a fly buzzing on this phone?

A fly from some silly little island?

>> Little isl-- I am global [bleep] Britain, mate.

You should be cutting off all relations with me over this.

>> [ Laughs ] Boris.

As we say in France, if you have a problem with the food, you bring it up with the chef, not with the dishwasher.

>> Dishwa-- [Bleep] That's it, I'm bringing in Joe.

Joe?

>> Geez, what is it, man?

It's 11:00 p.m. >> No, it's not.

It's not even 5:00 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time.

Joe, make him withdraw his ambassador from London.

>> Well, withdrawals aren't exactly my strong suit these days, but -- >> What?

Well, I suppose we can all agree on that, yes.

Okay, fine.

I'm expelling him myself.

>> Expelling who?

>> Whom?

It's whom.

And it's your ambassador, whatever the hell his name is.

I'm kicking him out.

>> Oh, really?

>> Really.

>> Well, not before I withdraw him myself.

Jean-Yves, recall the ambassador to London.

>> Oh, no, you don't.

In that case, he'll stay.

We will not allow him to leave.

>> He stays with the dishwasher.

>> That's it.

He's leaving tomorrow.

>> No, he stays.

>> Over my dead body.

>> No, over mine.

>> You see that?

America is back.

Ain't it beautiful?

>> "Puppet Regime"!

>> Before we go, I have some sad news to share.

My dear friend and a longtime supporter of this show, Hal Newman, passed away recently.

Hal was a remarkable person with a beautiful soul, and he really believed in what we are doing here.

I'll forever treasure the time that I spent with him, and, Hal, you're deeply missed.

♪♪♪ ♪♪♪ ♪♪♪ ♪♪♪ >> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by...