off an Alaska Airlines flight midair.# Officials are looking into whether four## bolts that were supposed to hold the# panel in place were actually missing.

The investigation grounded at least 170# other planes from Alaska and United Airlines,## and it's leading to many questions# about Boeing and the role of the FAA.

Jon Ostrower covers this all closely as# the editor in chief of The Air Current.## That's a site with reporting on the# aerospace and aviation industries.

Thanks so much for being with us.

And, Jon, we should sa loose bolts during its early inspections# of the 737 MAX 9.

Alaska Airlin said it found what it called loose# hardware.

Based on your reporting,## what accounts for this, faulty# installations or poor design?

JON OSTROWER, Editor in Chief, The# Air Current: Well, I think you're## How did these bolts become loose?# Did it happen during flights?

Did## it happen during manufacturing?

Did it# happen during assembly?

And getting to## the bottom of that is really the key# question about what actually caused## this door on the Alaska Airlines flight# to depart the aircraft at 16,000 feet.

GEOFF BENNETT: The CEO of Boeing today# acknowledged the company's mistake.## This was during a company-wide town hall meeting.

What more can you tell us about that# and what all this means for Boeing,## which has come under fire for a series of# safety issues connected to thi JON OSTROWER: Well, yes, today's -- the town# hall in the factory in Renton, Washington,## where Boeing builds the 737, was a moment# for Boeing to pause and talk to its employees## about what they know, what they don't know,# what they can say, and what they're doing to## make sure that any issues in the factory# don't become safety issues in the field.

And I think that's something# that they're going to continue## to reiterate publicly.

I thi as we look at this and look at the span of the# history that has befallen Boeing over not just## the last five years with the grounding of the 737# MAX and twin accidents in Ethiopia and Indonesia,## is that coming off of that and rolling through# the pandemic, there was really a major shift in## how Boeing was producing the airplane, which was# that production had halted during the grounding.

And then the pandemic caused a huge turnover# of staff.

And those are both discrete events.## But I think what's really important to put into# context is that Boeing has tried to move beyond## that -- the tragedies that befell Ethiopian# Airlines and Lion Air back in 2019 and 2020.

But what they -- keep what keeps recurring is a# series of quality missteps that are not nearly## as severe as what we saw in the crashes# in 2019 and 2020, but certainly have not## mitigated these quality escapes, so to speak,# that cause tremendous disruption for Boeing,## for the airlines, in this particular case, a# very cute safety situation, safety crisis for the## MAX -- for Alaska Airlines and the 171 people,# passengers that were on board that airplane.

I think when Boeing looks at# how they move forward from this,## I think it's important to put into context# that Boeing's strategy fundamentally as a## company has not changed.

They have# adopted new safety procedures,## an ombudsman and reemphasized various tactical# moves in terms of how they approach safety.

But I think, fundamentally, the company's# strategy in terms of its goals for its -- both## its shareholders and its customers has not# changed in the last 20 years.

And so that## strategy currently is not, by all accounts in# the conversations that we're having with senior## leaders all across the aviation industry,# whether it be it Boeing's best customers## or their suppliers or other stakeholders who are# interested in their success as a national asset,## are looking at a strategy that is producing# the opposite results that they want to achieve.

And so that's going to be really the legacy# of this immediate issue once the aircraft is## expected to reenter service when more is known# and the initial investigation takes place.

GEOFF BENNETT: And in the minute we have left,# there are also questions about what this all means## for the FAA, that United and Alaska, which are# the two ai that they have both found loose parts in their# early inspections of the grounded aircraft.

It leads to questions about the FAA's inspection# processes and its overall oversight.

I mean,## what does accountability look# like for the FAA right now?

JON OSTROWER: Well, certainly,# Congress is going to be asking## questions about that in the weeks to com It's really important to remember that while the# conversation has focused on Spirit Aer the supplier to Boeing, and Boeing itself,# when the MAX returned to service in the end## of 2020 following the grounding, the FAA took# back responsibility for key delegated tasks,## including the final inspection and airworthiness# ticketing of each and every delivery.

So the FAA has played a role and been integrally## involved in Boeing's factories and their# deliveries since then.

So, certainly, how they have approached this is going to# be an important question going forward.

GEOFF BENNETT: Jon Ostrower of The Air# Current, thanks so much for being with u JON OSTROWER: Thanks so much.

Appreciate it.