♪ (Music playing) ♪ - Welcome to the Aaron Harber Show, my guest today is Ambassador David Satterfield who is also the director of the Baker Institute in Houston Texas.

Mr.

Ambassador, thanks for joining me.

- Aaron happy to be here.

- My pleasure so I would like to start out with kind of your career has been extraordinary ambassador of Turkey, you served in so many different diplomatic positions, of course your involvement recent involvement, and what's going on in the Middle East is one of the most extraordinary challenges you've ever had, what I would like your take kind of globally initially is given your tenure of service, how do you feel the world has changed?

- Aaron over the 45 years that I've been involved in foreign policy, we started out as bipolar world, like it or not fair or not, it was a world divided into camps.

With the Soviet Union, with the United States.

It was difficult, it required enormous strategic patience, to deal with this at times glacial bipolar conflict.

But in many ways it was a simpler world you could identify friends and you could identify enemies.

You had to pick sides, that's not the world we live in today, it's not the world we have lived in really since the fall of the Soviet Union in 91.

It is a multipolar or if you will a nonpolar world, but in the nonpolar world with all of its perplexities and beyond the challenges of lack of poles amongst nationstates you have another phenomenon that has arisen since the end of the 1970s.

Which are the presence of nonstate actors.

Groups, terrorists or otherwise, who have a significant impact on security, on policy decisions, the techniques and the tactics that were used for so many decades to confront state actors, nationstates, like the Soviet Union and its satellites, do not work when you're dealing with subnational, or non-national groups.

For the level of complexity it's a tough world.

Add to that what happened on the positive side in 1988, 89, in 90-91.

The liberation of Eastern Europe fall of the Berlin wall, then the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was in Francis Fukuyama's grotesquely mistaken judgment the end of history except it wasn't, history rolled on.

But it left the view of the definitive resolutions to crises, such had occurred in Eastern Europe and was perceived wrongly to have occurred in Moscow with the fall of the Soviet Union, that was the way things were supposed to be.

It did not matter what the complexities of a challenge were, you had to quest for a definitive resolution.

And I will project forward just a few years from the end of the Soviet Union to the problem of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

The tactics initially applied by the Clinton Administration were ones of containment.

Doing what we had done for so many decades, with the Soviet Union, containing rather than directly pushing for a definitive resolution.

That was not good enough anymore.

And both parties because it was a bipartisan approach pressed for a definitive resolution regime change and end.

It worked in Eastern Europe why shouldn't it work in Iraq?

And the slow March to 2003, began almost a decade earlier with Madeleine Albright's Georgetown University speech in which she basically said containment was not good enough there had to be regime change.

The consequences of questing for definitive resolutions in the complex world we have faced with the last several decades Henry Kissinger would have been the very first to say validate the principle of going for the best achievable stability for the sake of American interests rather than sweeping victories and definitive endings because latter do not come along very often and if you're only focused on them, you are led astray from much more achievable and practical beneficial steps for American interest.

But it requires strategic patience.

We had it during the Cold War.

We've lost it since.

If anything we and much of the West has become strategically impatient and that's a challenge.

- I want to talk about in that context, some of the conflicts that obviously have been in front of us many for years, some heightened in recent years, in recent times, let's start with Ukraine.

Was it a mistake for the United States and the rest of the West to not seriously respond when Russia invaded Crimea?

- Absolutely it was, I say that without hesitation.

What that silence in action or in adequate action did, was convince Vladimir Putin that his view of the world was correct.

Russia was strong, the rest of the world was weak.

Russia was patient the rest of the world was impatient Russia could absorb pain, the rest of the world did not want to do it either could not or would not absorb it, and the lesser was taken and he patiently worked on the next step.

Yes it was in error.

- And so do you think he was surprised at the West reaction when he invaded Ukraine several years later?

- He was absolutely surprised he was surprised by several things, in a strategic sense, the first was what you said it was the reaction of the West and beyond the West to what he had done, he assumed there would be an acceptance, complaining, resolutions in the UN which Russia could veto, in the end we deal with it and the world will move on, that was not what happened.

But his biggest surprise was of a different character.

It was the Ukrainians fought as Ukrainians.

His view was that Ukraine had a veneer of nationalist pro-Western politicians, but beneath that fingernail thin veneer, Ukrainians were fundamentally Russians and wish to be associated with mother Russia.

First mistake.

Ukrainians had become national, not Russian.

He had been an instrument doing that.

Second big mistake was what we both made, we both assumed the Russian military, whatever its deficiencies was good enough to win in a matter of weeks.

A campaign in the Ukraine.

- If not days.

- If not days and boy were we both wrong on that.

So a set of strategic errors made by Putin and several that we made as well.

In misjudging Ukrainian resolve and capacity and overestimating Russian capacity.

- So why did we fail to help Ukraine initially in a way that could have totally turned the tide, for example the initial invasion that you referenced where the Russian convoy got stuck for miles, we could have wiped that out, we could have set up immediately a no-fly zone.

Why did we not do that?

Why didn't we have the courage to do that?

- It is not a question of courage, it was strategic judgment, and strategic assessment of risks.

What would have been the consequence for the US?

If by our actions, we turned what was a Russia Ukraine conflict into a Russia US conflict with the potential theoretical potential for nuclear escalation.

That was the concern.

- But right but doesn't Putin already, didn't he already see it as a Russia US conflict?

- Oh I think Putin's original calculation was this would be over in a matter of days, a few weeks, the West would complain and the US we campaign, but we would do nothing.

No I don't think he made that initial assessment, that this was Russia, why did he do this?

What was this really about?

What this was really about was Putin's obsession with re-creating the Empire that preceded communism.

He was asked once, whether he was in fact a communist or pursuing communist policies, and so he derisively told his interviewer absolutely not.

If you want me to be critical of a communist, I'll tell you things you never heard from anyone else.

Vladimir Lenin betrayed Russia in his creation of false states like the Ukraine, like the Baltics, like Belarus.

This is an irredentist view that goes back well before 1970, this is the Empire he is appealing to not the communist state.

- One of the things that has fascinated me and you've been in so many diplomatic high-level diplomatic positions one of the things that fascinated me was how by the administration has seem to think that sanctions are an effective way of changing policy, on any country in particular Russia.

My sense is sanctions have had very little effect that Russia's case, they've been able to evade many sanctions, and that also add to a different dimension, I'd be interested in your take on, that is the flow of oil, that the US seems to be torn or at least the administration seem to be torn between knowing that it had the potential to stop the flow of Russian oil which generates half a billion or more daily which Putin could use to fund the war.

Versus, restricting global oil supply and resulting in price increases for gasoline which are politically.

- Or harm to critical US strategic allies like India.

Yeah it's a complex world, and if you're going to invoke sanctions, there's a general rule here over the last many decades, which is be sure that you have captured in support for your sanctions the regime, all the critical consuming countries who benefit from the flows you are about to cut off or the benefit you are about to terminate.

And that you are prepared to deal with the global consequences if in fact you really have done what you are setting out to do.

Sanctions have impacted Russia no question about that he's had to shift budgetary resources around, but he's had the capacity to absorb this in a way which was in Russian society and culture sustainable, and the sanctions have not had a determinative impact on his pursuit to the campaign to Ukraine because against the sanctions he has invoked with ever-increasing vigor the image of great Russia against what he refers to as the global West.

And its distorted corrupted values which challenge in a cultural religious as well as ethno nationalists sense what Russia is and what Russia stands for.

- So in that when it comes to getting your ducks lined up before you impose sanctions, essentially ready, aim fire our approach seems to be ready, fire, aim, because certainly China was not on board, India was not on board, Brazil a number of countries weren't on board and in fact those countries who are the countries buying oil from Russia they are benefiting by paying the lower price than market for the most part, and yet Russia is generating billions of dollars in revenue.

- In fairness, it was not ignorance, of those nonparticipant states, it was an assumption that the diminished revenues because of the massively discount oil that Russia would have to sell to make it attractive and de-risk the acquisition of oil from the sanction source for those states that net would come out in a favor of our position that diminished the Russian budget and Russia resources, Putin was able to mobilize enough money from the discounted sales.

A - b, Was able to shift resources around within Russia, C, mobilize the Russian people in a fashion that despite the horrific losses of Russians in this campaign, he has managed to sustain in this portrayal of Russia against the world.

- My sense is his popularity his support within Russia is as strong as ever, is that an incorrect assessment, not that there aren't people who are upset, but I'm pretty astounded and I don't know how accurate it is, but the polling data coming out a Russia seems to indicate far less dissatisfaction with the invasion of Ukraine than I would've thought.

- It's rather difficult to discern what the actual degree of support is for a brutal murderous dictator whose opponents tend to meet unexpected ends rather precipitously.

- Actually they are expected.

- No it's a society that harkens back to the worst days of the Soviet.

To Stalin, to the purges, to the absolute cold-blooded brutality that we thought had passed for Russia and its leadership.

- So what should the United States do?

And how important, let me first preference that, I'm interested in what you think we should do, big picture but let me preface that.

On the course we're on, my sense Putin has analyzed it and said I am on a winning course America is getting weary, it's not going to support Ukraine at the level it's going to make the kind of difference Ukraine needs to win it's getting support from the EU and it's simply insufficient, Ukraine has also suffered horrendous losses in terms of the number of troops that have died or been injured, and proportionately Russia is so much bigger than Ukraine that you know you can't equate one Ukrainian loss with one Russian loss.

On top that, my sense is Putin has no compunction about throwing bodies at the frontline which certainly affects the military, ability of Russia.

So what can we do differently, but the path that I see that he's on is that he is saying he can wait out the West and ultimately prevail he's Russia's making games, he knows Ukraine is weakening and if Ukraine does not get the support it needs, Russia will prevail if Russia prevails so I have a 3rd question, what are the implications for Taiwan for example, should that send a message to the People's Republic of China saying hey, we can take Taiwan anytime we want?

- Sure and you're quite correct in your assessment that after the initial months of failure in the lightning campaign, to cease Ukraine, Putin shifted tactics to one of attrition.

Putin believes three things about the rest of the world, it's not just the West, it's the north, the South, Muslim non-Muslim, it's the world.

The world is weak Russia is strong, the world is impatient, Russia is endlessly patient, the world is either unwilling or incapable of absorbing pain.

Economic pain, resource pain, it Russian is nothing but pain and will absorb it willingly, endlessly.

Therefore you cannot win by outright force you cannot, he understands that.

You win by attrition you just outlasted and outwait everyone else and along way you steadily damage the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine so that whatever the West coalition the world wishes to do Ukraine's ability as Ukraine to resist is progressively weakened and diminished.

Now how do you counter that?

You counter it by providing effective means for Ukraine to fight this war in a fashion that inflicts an unacceptable level of pain on Russia and the Russian military.

There is a risk of escalation and all of that or at least perceived risk of escalation while many of the redlines and systems and supplies involvement, training, that were held out over the course of the last two years have long been passed and there was in fact no escalation by Russia.

But we are at a point now where the tools Ukraine needs to be able to prevent a Russian victory and that's winning if you are Ukraine, preventing a Russian victory it is winning for us to deny a victory to Vladimir Putin.

We will get to Taiwan in a moment.

To provide those weapons now requires the political support within the United States Congress which as you and all of the listeners know is so much a matter of fundamental debate today.

So let's go from that debate to a big question which you did not ask, not just Taiwan.

Why does it matter?

Why does it matter to the US what happened here?

It's a faraway place of whom in Neville Chamberlain's famous words we know little.

Maybe faraway, but the consequences of a Putin victory in Ukraine will translate far more broadly than just Ukraine and its borders.

What will best signify, certainly to Pres.

Xi in China.

So the West and NATO were directly challenged by a land war in Europe, and they weren't willing to stay the course.

Taiwan, the Pacific, faraway what will they do there?

Maybe I do have a better opportunity to act aggressively towards Taiwan I don't believe Xi intends an outright D-Day style landing on the beaches and seizure of Taiwan.

I think it is more of a progressive course of diminishing options for Taiwan of constraining its policy choices and bending it more rather than less to the will of Beijing and to the party it's a progressive issue for him but he will be bold about it no question about it.

But what does Putin do after Ukraine if there's a victory there?

What is next to be threatened?

Is it Poland?

Is it the Baltics, if it's military it's devastated by the campaign, he's lost the bulk of his prime tank force, many of his weapon systems have revealed to be failures or less than successful.

He has had to rely on Iran to provide him drones because Russia does not have the capacity so it's a pretty significant statement.

- But he's getting them?

- He's getting them.

And they are good enough to be effective in this campaign.

We don't want to see Putin this dictator this aggressive irredentist embolden to go somewhere else to challenge somewhere else, or for states to adopt preemptively, a policy of concessions toward prudent, fearful that he might threaten them, might challenge them, no, this is not good for the United States, it's not good for the American people and it is inconsistent with their fundamental values.

- So when you think about it as your diplomatic roles, if Americans of a significant number of Americans and we are already at that point do not see winning in Ukraine or Ukraine winning as worth the cost, certainly if someone were to ask Americans if Putin were to invade a NATO country like Estonia, I would argue that 99% of Americans have never heard of Estonia, Putin is going to say even if the US is part of a pact that says if you attack any NATO country, all the NATO countries respond.

- Article 5.

- I would be really surprised if there were American support to bring troops, arms etc.?

- Now you get to the hub of the issue.

Which is if there is a next step, after a Putin victory in Ukraine, and is not so much whether Ukraine wins or loses that is morally important, there are brave people fighting for the independence they deserve to be supported, but it is the Putin victory that is the strategic challenge to the United States, if there's another threat against NATO, and Putin acts upon it, what is the US response?

The moment we do not respond to that kind of literal attack on a NATO state, then the alliance and all that it represents goes out the window.

And an alliance cannot be made transactional as if it's a real estate deal or a complex set of bank accounts that you have to endlessly balance or close.

It was never transactional to begin with except in one grand sense, NATO served fundamental US interests in achieving greater stability in the world which was in turn critical and good and vital for the US and for American people it was vital when NATO was established and it would I argue would still be vital today.

- So I'd be really interested in one of the developments, when Russia initially invaded Ukraine you had this bilateral support of Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate, everyone in the country seemed to be united, since that time and I do give Russian disinformation campaigns a lot of credit but not all of it.

There's clearly a very significant element of the Republican Party, and Republican people in the United States that are not interested in providing further support to Ukraine.

How do we address, how did that happen and how do we address that and what are the implications of that potentially?

- I think at a leadership level, both parties senior leadership certainly in the Senate have remained committed for all the reasons you and I have or could talk about, very confident in that.

In the critical importance of denying Putin victory, in Ukraine because of the knock on consequences for the United States and broader global interests.

At a different level than that leadership though, the attractiveness of the appeal why should we be spending billions in Ukraine when there are billions that need to be expended in my town, in my county, and my state here in the United States?

That's not a new argument, it's an argument that has been made for a century, certainly prior to the second world war, it was a very potent argument, we need to spend and focus on the United States, not on the outside.

And look at all the follies that have been engaged in in the name of external involvement, unfortunately, there are too many examples in modern American history of campaigns and wars treasure and lives lost for very little achieved, and it feeds the sense that the establishment, Republican or Democrat is committed to a course of adventurism of expenditure of lives of expenditure of treasure and that establishment needs to be fundamentally challenged.

- Ambassador, thank you so much.

- Thank you my pleasure.

- All right that was Amb.

David Satterfield the director of the Baker Institute, remember this is part one of our special two-part series make sure you watch part two I am Aaron Harber thanks for watching.

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