>>Good morning and welcome to Global Perspectives.

I'm David Dumke.

Joining us from Washington today is Dr. G ön ül Tol of the Middle East Institute.

Dr. Tol has just written a new book called Erdogan's War.

She's an expert on Turkish politics and U.S. Turkish relations.

Welcome to the show.

>>Hi, David.

Thanks for having me on.

>>Well, it's good to have you back.

Tell us a little about the new book that you've you've published and why you wrote it.

>>Well, two reasons, David.

I've been I've been in D.C. for many years now.

And the approach in in Washington, vis-a-vis Turkey has been driven by two points.

And the first one is there seems to be a consensus where people think that whatever is wrong with Erdogan's Turkey, it has something to do with Erdogan's Islamist ideology.

So that's the assumption number one.

And assumption number two is that that Cold War mentality, you know, Turkey has always been a great U.S. ally.

And as long as Turkey behaves, quote unquote, on the foreign policy front, the United States should not concern itself with Turkey's domestic politics.

What happens inside Turkey's borders is Turkey's problems, not ours.

So those were the two assumptions that I found problematic.

And I wanted to challenge those assumptions with the book.

And the main argument of the book is that first and foremost, Erdogan's yes, many things happened in Turkey, the state of the country.

Right now, it's not.

Erdogan took an imperfect democracy and turned it into an autocracy.

And the main reason for that is not Erdogan's Islamist ideology.

Islamism is only one of the problems.

Erdogan is first and foremost a populist leader, and he picks and chooses different ideologies to match that political style, which is called populism.

And I also wanted to show that what happens inside Turkey's borders doesn't just concern Turks.

It's also a problem of the world because Erdogan's foreign policy is directly linked to the state of affairs in the country.

Erdogan was a great ally when he first came to power in 2002, and that was a time when he was carrying out reforms on the domestic front and he was trying to to put Turkey's democracy back on track.

And by 2011, that changed.

Erdogan became a problematic partner for Western countries.

And not surprisingly, that was a time when Erdogan had consolidated power in his own hands.

So the main argument of the book is that you really have to, as the Western world, you have to be paying attention to what Erdogan is doing, to Turkey's democracy, to Turkey's institutions, that Turkey's people to understand what he's doing on the foreign policy front.

>>You paint a picture in the book of a very opportunistic politician.

And of course, you know, politicians who who end up lasting quite a while, as Erdogan have, have to be flexible.

What makes Erdogan exceptionally flexible in this sense and more opportunistic than most?

>>That's a great question, David, because the first question that comes to mind is, of course, he's a politician, so he's going to do whatever it takes to stay in power.

That is true, although Erdogan is is a very lucky man because he can exploit the preexisting ideological and identity cleavages in the country, the roots of which go back to the Ottoman times.

Right.

So he manages to leap from one ideology to another very easily and without paying a political cost for all those U-turns, mainly because there are just so many divisions, preexisting divisions within the country between the country's Sunni Muslim majority, a Turkish speaking majority against minorities like Kurds or Alevi minority that is different from the country's Sunni majority.

So those existing cleavages have really made Erdogan's task easier in a sense.

And that's that's why he was able to adopt conflicting ideologies when he first came to power for instance, he framed himself as a conservative Democrat, and he managed to put together an ideologically diverse coalition, including Islamists, Turkish nationalists, Kurdish nationalists, even liberals, mainly because there was this great sense and frustration in the country that the institutions of the country were not working, that Turkish democracy was imperfect.

The secularist military was playing an outsized role.

So the pro-democracy coalition he put together, he put together rallied around him, mainly because people believed that he was going to realize the pledge that he had made on the campaign trail, which was putting Turkish democracy back on track.

And later, once he realized the goal of secularizing the countries, sidelining the country's secularist establishment, then he dropped that ideology, conservative, Democratic brand, to embrace Islamism, for instance.

And when Islamism did not serve his domestic political goals, then he made another switch.

And this time he embraced Turkish nationalism.

And again, he did all of these, you two, he made all these U-turns without paying any political cost because the country is so divided that he can always pick a different ally and align himself with new groups.

And that's how he managed to to capture the majority and stay in power.

>>Has he been able to retain a fixed base of voters and then just kind of build on that for each election, for each scenario?

So you have certain groups that come and go in his coalition, but you have a base there.

Who what makes who makes up this base?

So.

>>Yeah, you have to consider this, David.

He's been in power for a long time.

And for a leader who has been there for for more than two decades, he still has the backing of a 35 to 40% of the country.

And that is a big deal.

It is, especially if you consider the state of the countrys economy, almost triple digit inflation and a devastating earthquake, recent earthquakes.

So despite all those things, he still manages to win elections.

And that's mainly, again, due to the alliances that he cultivates.

But also he has a very strong base himself, a so-called diehard Erdoganists.

So no matter what he does, they don't abandon him.

They are, much like in this country, remember President Trump once he said that if I shoot someone here on the street, people will still be voting for me.

So there are these strong die hards Erdoganists who will vote for him no matter what.

And and the reason for that is, I think, to understand the main motivation there, you really have to look at other populist leaders across the world, including Trump in Hungary, in India, in other places in the world.

So there's this chemistry between Erdogan and his followers.

That chemistry allows him to establish this very personal link, emotional link with the followers, something that the opposition party leaders lack.

This main base is concerned.

They love Erdogan but besides that, they are the ones who there are conservative segments of the country and they think that Erdogan is a hero despite all the problems that the country is facing right now.

They still think that Erdogan came to power and lifted millions of people, mainly conservative segments of the country, out of poverty, and they've become middle class now.

So in their minds, they think that Erdogan, Erdogan ended any era of secularists, in their words, repression, because they thought that the system marginalized them.

They did not benefit from from any economic growth, from democratic open it openings because the secularist establishment was biased.

So this group of conservative voters think that no matter what Erdogan does, he will always remain a hero because thanks to him they can wear headscarves now in public institutions.

Now they are part of that middle class.

They live a middle class lifestyle.

And then there is another group who have always supported him, mainly because of those client listed networks, because being close to Erdogan opens doors, being a member of Erdogan's ruling, AKP opens doors for them.

So you could talk about those two different groups, one that's attached to Erdogan for ideological emotional reasons.

And the second one is purely interest based groups.

>>So I want to get into the recent Turkish Turkish election in a minute, but I want to ask you about the second reason you wrote the book, which was which was the presumption that Westerners have of not being able to do anything, not being concerned particularly about what happens inside Turkey's borders.

So how did you address this issue and what should Americans, be looking at in Turkey?

>>Well, this since I wanted to address an issue that was very prevalent in political science literature, and that was whenever political scientists talk about this new autocracy, right, the 21st century autocrats, the populist far right populists.

We always talk about autocratization based on the institutional structure of the country, based on the political dynamics inside.

Given the countries, the place of military, for instance, in the politics of that country.

But we fail to look at how foreign policy plays a role in autocrats efforts to centralize power.

So I wanted to address that issue, and that's why I looked at the way Erdogan used foreign policy to consolidate his rule.

And I specifically looked at Syria from 2002 onwards.

How Syria became a tool in Erdogan's efforts to slide line his critics, to sideline his political opponents and centralize power, and bit by bit how he managed to consolidate his autocracy.

Obviously, foreign policy is not the only factor there, but it played a huge role, which was something missing in the study of autocracy.

So I did that through looking by looking at Erdogans Syria policy and showed how he used the con - especially the conflict in Syria that started in 2011, how he used that to attack his secularist opponents, how he used the Syrian war to criminalize his opponents and centralize power in his own hands.

By doing that, I wanted to tell the Western leaders that the things that he does on the foreign policy front is the direct extension of his efforts to establish his autocracy.

And autocratic leaders, they are not very reliable Western partners because autocrats, as we've seen in Ukraine.

Right.

What Putin did did in Ukraine, autocratic leaders use foreign policy to consolidate their autocracies, which means autocracies become the problems of the world.

So an autocratic Russia is not just a problem for for Russian people or an autocratic Turkey's not just a problem for Turkish people.

But after a while they become a major problem for the world, and particularly for the Western world, because these leaders, they often pursue a very anti-Western, very militaristic, very aggressive foreign policies that undercut Western interests.

So that was the goal that I had in mind when I was writing the book.

>>So you didn't write about this specifically, but by the lessons you're just talking about, how do you explain Erdogan's decision, first of all, to to block Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, but then reversing himself and allowing them to come in?

What did he gain by that whole positioning and then ultimately reversing himself?

>>I think he overplayed his hand, David.

I think initially the goal there was he wanted to use that as a trump card against Washington.

There was something that he wanted from Washington, and that was the sale of F-16 fighter jets after Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 defense missiles.

Turkey's relations with NATO partners, and particularly with the United States, got strained and there were several - and due to Turkey's other foreign policy missteps, there were several sanctions slapped on on Turkey's defense sector by Western countries.

So there was there were a lot of problems between Turkey and and the Western world.

So Erdogan saw NATO's extension to include Sweden and Finland as an opportunity for himself to reverse that relationship.

And initially, I think he did it thanks to the steps that he had taken right after a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

There were a lot of critical voices on the Hill in the US Congress who said, you know, yes Erdogan is a problematic partner, but on the other hand, he's done some very good things to counterbalance Russia and to help Ukraine.

So the mood started changing right after a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But Erdogan, I think, made a mistake by using Sweden and Finland card to extract concessions from the West, not just from Sweden and Finland, but from other European countries and also from Washington.

And from Washington he wanted to purchase the F-16s.

These fighter jets are very important for Turkey's defense, although the Biden administration has always been willing to sell Turkey F-16s.

The US Congress, there are certain members who are very opposed to the sale, citing concerns over Turkey's policy vis a vis Greece.

Turkey's policy vis a vis Syria and other policies which they deem is not helpful for for NATO countries.

So that's why there was a pushback in the Congress.

So Erdogan wanted to push force the Biden administration's hand by saying if you don't provide jets, I won't approve Sweden and Finland's accession.

So I think I'm sure Erdogan's advisers thought that that was a brilliant move.

But I've always said that that Turkey was overplaying his hand, because I think it's with that move, it's changed.

Turkey changed the positive mood in the Congress that had emerged immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and eventually because of the pressure put on Turkey, Erdogan kind of reversed course, saying that he would allow Turkey already approved Finland's accession.

But recently Erdogan said that he would allow Sweden's accession as well, although he's now backing down on that a little bit.

Again, I think overplaying his hand.

But this is all about, I think, what he wants to do domestically.

He wants to protect the strong image Turkish economy is in, is in horrible shape.

There are a lot of problems domestically.

So he just wants to project that image as a leader, a Turkish leader who gets what he wants from from the world.

So purchasing F-16s was part of that image building process.

The game Erdogan wanted to play with Sweden and Finland accession was that he wanted to extract concessions, but then the whole issue came to a point where now everyone in Western capitals are frustrated.

>>Two questions here.

Is Turkey, is the Turkish US relationship strong and will it last?

And are the problems that you're describing completely personal to Erdogan, are they do they suggest a bigger issue in their relationship?

>>You know, right before Turkish elections in May, I hosted I moderated a panel discussion with two senators who follow Turkey very closely.

And that was one of the first questions that I put to the to those senators.

And I said, so does the United States have an Erdogan problem or a Turkey problem?

And they both said that, you know, we can easily see the United States cultivating a strategic, healthy, strong partnership with a democratic Turkey.

Obviously, that was music to my ears because I care deeply about Turkish democracy and human rights in Turkey.

But I doubt that view is shared by the administration, especially this administration.

I had high hopes from the Biden administration because Biden came to power promising to make foreign policy and to make democracy and human rights is a central component of his of his foreign policy.

But unfortunately, we haven't seen that, especially vis a vis Turkey.

The issue of human rights is not being brought up, and I doubt Biden has discussed those issues in his meetings with with President Erdogan.

So right now, I think Washington has resigned itself to the fact that this is a transactional relationship.

Right.

So, again, going back to the Cold War years where Washington does not care what happens to Turkish democracy, as long as it can work with Turkey on certain issues.

And in the foreign policy front.

So that is the view from Washington.

And from Erdogans point of view, he's more than happy to have a transactional relationship because he certainly doesn't want to talk about democracy and human rights.

So this works for for everyone.

And from I think the European Union is not any different either.

For many years, EU accession process became a catalyst in Turkey's democratization process.

But right now, especially since 2016, and that was when Turkey and the European Union signed a refugee deal.

EU also has cultivated this transactional partnership with with Erdogans Turkey, where as long as Erdogan holds those refugees in Turkey, he can do whatever he wants to to Turkish democracy, to Turkish institutions.

And that is very unfortunate because we live in a world where autocrats again are using these foreign policy issues to consolidate their autocracy at home.

And I think the Western world should see something, do something about that instead of giving a blank check to those autocrats.

>>Do you think the Western world expected that he'd lose his recent election, which which was close to went to a runoff, of course, but he ended up winning.

So I guess the first question I'd ask there, was it a free and fair election?

And second of all, if he has been duly elected under the democratic process, what option does the West have of dealing with Turkey differently?

>>Well, it wasn't it certainly wasn't fair election and it was partly free.

It wasn't fair because Erdogan used the state resources and the powers that he has to intimidate, to jail his opponents and the playing field was not even.

I mean, he he received 32 hours of air time in state media, whereas his opponent received only 32 minutes.

And adding to that, all the state resources that that Erdogan has used and he used fake videos, he has this monopoly over Turkish media.

So all those things made the playing field very unfair.

And in terms of elections being partly free, when again, here is the confusion.

I always hear from Western observers that, okay, the elections in Turkey are not fair.

If fair, but they were free.

So my question to them is, if the elections are so unfair, can you talk about elections as being free?

Right.

If the incumbent designs the institutions and the field in such a way that the the voters are not presented with a real alternative?

In other words, if the opposition candidates cannot get his words across, how is that election fair?

Because there is no real competition there.

So that's my in my view, the elections were were partly free.

And to your second question, does the West have another option because he won the elections, and I mean, do they have to work with Erdogan?

You're right.

I mean, it's and as someone living in Washington, I hear that very often.

Right before the elections, I talked to a State Department official and he and I was complaining about the fact that the US didn't - was silent about human rights abuses in Turkey.

And he said, you know, we cannot want democracy and human rights for Turkey more than Turks themselves.

But that said, flawed logic, because Erdogan is bigger than - Turkey is bigger than Erdogan.

Yes, maybe he won elections, but I think this is a time when the Western world must stop focusing on just democracy and start thinking about and worrying about liberal democracy.

Right.

That happened in this country.

Trump won elections so you could call the system here Democratic.

But we don't have we can't talk about a liberal democracy when you don't have a rule of law, when courts are politicized, when there are no separation of powers.

So that means if you keep focusing on just elections to measure the health of a democratic system, that is very wrong because that could bring the tyranny of the majority.

And that's what's happening.

So that's why this is my suggestion to the Western world.

You're right, He won the elections.

You are going to work with Erdogan.

But that doesn't mean that you should turn a blind eye to whatever he's doing to Turkish democracy or whatever is left off that.

So that means that the Western world should speak up when Erdogan engages in these direct assaults against democratic institutions and norms.

>>Let me let me ask you.

We just have have have one minute left.

Very briefly.

Were you surprised at the election results, given the state of the Turkish economy, given that there was a major earthquake, given all these litany of problems?

>>I was.

Because, again, I'm a political scientist and the literally the opposition candidate did everything that political scientists recommend for opposition leaders to beat autocrats at the ballot box.

He wasn't the most popular candidate, to be sure, but he managed to put together a coalition.

And the Turkish economy was was doing horribly.

And then there was a devastating earthquake where the government did not respond fast enough.

So there were all these problems together that really made the context ripe for an opposition victory.

But I think we turned a blind eye, myself included, to one fact, which is the authorities that have existential anxieties.

They it's very hard for them to vote out an autocrat based on policy issues because the existential fear is so strong that they want to stick with the devil that they know.

So in Turkey's case, Turkish society is a traumatized society, traumatized by the earthquake, traumatized by the economic problem of social problem, those that are millions of refugees.

So all those things generated so much anxiety among almost all segments of the country that people said, yes.

I mean, many of the problems are his making, but we just don't want to go for an unknown.

That is the opposition.

We just want to stick with him.

>>G ön ül Tol, thank you so much for joining us today.

You did a great job on your book and we look forward to having you again in another show.

>>Thanks, David.

>>And thank you for joining us.

We'll see you again next week on another episode of Global Perspectives.