>>Good morning an welcome to Global Perspectives.

I'm David Dumke.

Our guest today is an exper on Middle East affairs, emerging technology, space policy, among other subjects.

We are very honored to be joined by Georgia Tech's Dr.

Larry Rubin.

>>Thank you for having me.

>>So Larry you are part of the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech.

And you also run the Washington, D.C.

program for Georgia Tech.

You've been working on policy for a long time in the Middle East region and on American policy.

What have you noticed ove the last 10 to 15 years in this in the Middle East region, and how America's role in it has changed?

>>Well, that's, quite a big question, I think.

I hope we have a couple of hours to kind of cover this.

I guess there are a number of different trends that we've seen, but I think one of the dominant ones has been the question of perception of what the United States role in the region is and will be in the future.

Will it retrench in that way?

Will it withdraw from the region?

And there there have been these doubt for such a long period of time.

But at the same time, we've seen various administrations coming back in or being pulled back in from either Obama's pivot to Asia, the attempt and the being pulled in because of ISIS trying to broker some type of deal with Iran.

And then we have the Trump policies of not of of engagement, not engagement.

And, and what we see today is America first.

Yet at the same time, we see the United States coming back into the region and particularly taking a really, big role when it comes to the Gaza ceasefire and what might be unfolding there.

>>From Washington's perspective, has there been a tendenc to look at this region as static when when in reality you've had a change of leadership, you'v had a series of wars and turmoil and obviously something you study very intimately changing technology and economics as well.

>>Yes.

I think a lot of time where I think when policymakers look at the region that way, they might see this change, but they have to deal with the here and now a lot of times in that in that period and try to project into the future.

I mean, there are various bets that say the current administration, the previous one as well, are trying to make when it comes to where is the future of the region.

And of course, these investments in technologies and what also certain partners in the region might be thinking about for the future, if there's if it's about where do we invest and when it comes to these, you know, these massive AI deals for example, you know, where are they goin to see their future in that way?

And those things are not static.

But a lot of the parts that, you know, seem to be that way are or are sometimes these, these conflicts, if it's the Israeli-Palestinian and, and parts of the Israeli Arab conflict, those types of things are sometimes seen as by some members of the community in the foreign policy community as driving a lot of the key, problems in the region.

But as others want to say, no we need to look to the future.

>>So the Gaz war has been obviously something that's been a real game changer for the region in many ways.

I want to ask yo how technology has played a role in both the Gaza conflict and some of the conflicts that are extensions of it.

For example, the Israeli clash with with Iran earlier this year.

>>Right.

And I'll just preface this by saying I'm not a military expert in the day to day, any of these types of operations, but I think anybody would, would know what the importance is of the importance of, say, drone warfare, any type of operations that involve infantry or any, any types of these things and the connectivity that the soldiers on the ground have, has well, I want I don't want to use the word revolutionized warfare because it's used that way, but it's certainly changin and transformed transformed it.

You see it not just in this conflict, but all around the Ukraine.

We talk about the level of innovation that's occurring all the time, the Armenian, Azerbaijani conflict as well, those types of things.

You can see drone warfare playing and it's not just about drones.

It's about information processing, gathering and so forth.

And then going to this is all, in a certain sense, connected to having information and eyes above.

If it's not just from drones and surveillance and reconnaissance, it' also the role that space plays and something that I and we'll probably talk about in a little bit, but, that I've been getting mor interested in, and researching a bit more on this to kind of g deeper of what role is playing in terms of shaping, not just, warfare, but geopolitics in general.

And this is certainly one are you can't avoid things like the, air defense systems all coordinated through above and what that does and in various levels is, is obviously it allows for maneuver for any country.

But if you look at Israeli decisio making, in a certain sense, it and the defense systems that it has gives them a little more roo for making political decisions.

And, and with all the frill that kind of come along with it.

>>Hav policymakers caught up on this?

I mean, you're exploring it because you obviously saw that this was this was a game changer, potentially.

But you look at in the past, power was measure by kind of traditional armies.

And, you know, how many fighters you have and tanks you have and things like that is that way of looking at th region kind of obsolete because because I asked this question where, like large amounts of U.S.

foreign assistanc to Egypt and Jordan and Israel have been for that kind of hardware, not necessaril advanced technology in the past.

>>Right.

No, it's a great question.

And I think to get kind of to be part of this momentum from enthusiasm, one would say it may be getting to that point, but I don't think it is.

And here's a here's a counter example.

So maybe I'll try to kind of walk this back a little bit and say how it's it's certainly transforme or changed warfare in that way as a change in nature character that way.

But I mean, an example might be the overdependence that's, that's now coming ou of seeing of the, Hamas attack on, on, on Israel on October 7th, 2023.

That was largely, low tech in a certain sense, and overcoming a very smart border fence, high tech, enemy in that way, and had relied too heavily on technology and not having those those troops on the ground and those forces.

So that would might be a counter example.

At the same time, the way that war is waged by a stronger power in that way that's connected is certainl through these high tech means, and it allows it to a lot of other things.

Those are those are kind of some of the counter examples, but it's certainly changin the way the speed of of warfare, the way it's done and what the hopes would be, like any type of change in precision warfare and this goes back decades, is being more calculated.

Surgical and reducing harm to one's own troops, which is which is part of the, part of the idea.

But as well as, you know, in theory that they would sa is, is to civilians is as well.

>>Was it a surprise to to policymakers to see the speed at which, the, you know the Iranian threat was, was met by, by Israel?

>>I think it was I think it surprised, many people and I mean, I think most, I would say were shocked with the levels of success, the operations that many people have talked about that seem to come out of some, you know, Netflix series, which it kind of did.

There are a couple on it.

And people really didn't see this as, as, as something tha that could change that quickly.

And a lot of people say Israeli hesitation to attack was based on a concern or fear of what, say, Iran or Hezbollah might do to it.

But then th it turns out that they weren't as strong as many people had assumed or thought.

And this goes for a ver smart people in foreign policy communities, myself included.

I would I would have thought that as well, in part because it's hard to kno what the capabilities of states really are deep down.

And once you reveal them, then other states know them.

I mean, the same might go on with United States and China to some extent.

You're not really sure exactly what capabilities are there.

Once you reveal them, the other side knows what they are.

They may try to counter them that way.

There's also a lot of bluff you know, that might be that we have this capability or what does that mean?

So this is kind of this you know, this back and forth, the conceal and reveal phenomenon there.

But it does play into power dynamics there.

And I think this is what when it comes to assuming wha the the balance of power is, you don't really know what you know, what card somebody can play.

>>Well to that, to that point.

So there's the actual, you know, clash.

There's there's but then there's the long term implications.

So what are other players in the region seeing based on the clash between Iran and Israel?

What what does it mean for their own national security and their kind o foreign policies going forward?

>>Well, I think in part, they see certainly the power of having a very advanced, high tech, military of course, they would should take from the lessons of October 7th that you have to have still standing army and troops on a border.

And you can't, you know, you can't really rely just on these light borders there and surveillance, and assumptions about what your enemy may or may not do.

But certainly when it comes to the, you know, the major attacks, the shock of of that for how extensive it was, when it comes to what it really means, the investments that a state may needs to make on those, and that wasn't necessarily even so technologically sophisticated.

It was just intelligent operations.

But when it comes to it' Israel's prowess in the sphere, you know, the, in the, in the realm of, of space, surveillance technology, how important that is.

When it comes t what it can do, an air defense, that's certainly something that stood out.

And you see all of that, a lot of the Gulf countries.

And I think those, you know, the the Emirate and the Saudis have been taking have been watching this for a long period of time.

And there's a lot of cooperation that exists both publicly and as well as privately, both in the cyber realm and in, in other areas, too.

>>You mentioned space technology obviously is part of this, and the Gulf has been very publicly investing in space technology as well as elsewhere in the region.

They're also pursuing it.

What are the aims of their of the space programs in the Middle East right now?

>>Right.

So that's a that's a great question.

I think it's also depends on the country.

And and I'll say there's a number of different aims.

And I want to kind of backtrack, walk this back a second and say, this is as you kind of alluded to, one among many potentially big projects, you know, if it's about investing heavily in, in data centers, it's investing in huge infrastructure problems.

But they're connected, you know, they're connected as part of a big vision.

And I'll start by talkin about some of the Gulf countries of having and the wealthy Gul countries in particular, having, as we know, massive amounts of money, disposable and that largely com from a resource that is finite, you know, energy and realizing, as they have for a while, that they need to diversify their economies.

And the Emirates have gotten gotten onto this, a lot earlier than than the other than in, say, Saudi Arabia.

But Saud Arabia is also is realizes too.

So getting to your question, economic diversification and and this is a new phase of, of seeing how do we not only take advantage of this growing, this fast growing economy in domain space enthusiasts?

We'll talk about $ trillion industry in the future.

You know there are others that might joke and say the quickest way to become a millionaire is be a billionaire and then invest in space.

So there's kind of a back and forth there, but there's there is money and there has been there when telecommunications the question is, is, you know, how or what are they going to do with a lot of these, these companies that are now going up and investing in other areas of spac in particular, may be thinking about, resources, resource mining.

And then, of course, they're not just in terms of communications, but you've got other, you know, experiments, scientific experiments that are, that are along the lines of investments that might fall in the prestige category.

And the same thing with space exploration.

So that kind of adds to a second, motivation, not just the economi diversification, but of course, there is something about this healthy competition.

I'll say healthy because it's not competitive between wealthy Gulf states.

And we've seen it in other areas, Saudi Arabian and, and the Emirates in particular of of saying, who can, you know, who has the best program, who's got the best sets of fighter jets?

And, ye there is is still a real need.

And I'm not dismissing it for going back to the security conversation of really having control and sovereignty of one' own data and being in control.

So you don't have to rely on purchasing commercial satellite information.

You know, information from commercial satellites or the United States.

That type of intelligence too, is important.

And, you know, there's a whole slew of other other types of payoffs there, which would be not just, you know, if it's civilian purposes or uses of weathe data, agriculture and so forth.

So I'll I'll kind of stop there for now.

>>What role is the United States playing in as as these other countries develop their space programs independently what role is the United States playing as a coordinating with them at all?

To what extent?

>>Right.

Another great question.

I guess in the previous one, you know, I focused on those countries but there are a number of others that are there getting involved.

And this kind of leads into the the answer a bit.

I mean, a number of them have established programs, for example, some of them that date back even further.

I think the first official one, Israel in 1983, as a space agency.

And sometimes they have space programs in that way.

And there's just kind o a difference in terms of where.

But but basically the last two decades that these, these have come up.

So the United States is, has and is playing a role importantly for thinking about space, I think in terms of how to both relates with how the United States wants to cooperate or partner with its allies.

Space being among them, one of them, and also when it comes to looking fo the future of space governance.

And that's something in a different direction that people don't talk about all the time.

But this is a new future domain that will or a current one, actually.

It is really, really important for how with China, Russia, the United States and as well as India in the future will will govern and regulate the activities that go, go on.

Without going too muc into some of this conversation, our whole lives, everything's regulated in a sense of the timing that we do the payments that we, you know, we might have made this morning or the, you know, various aspects, of the transactions that we, whether we process are somehow connected in various ways.

And it's not just don't want to overemphasize the military side of things, but also just our day to day lives are driven by this.

>>So what are you seeing then?

You know, you'r talking about the Gulf countries developing these quickly.

And this road started started long before.

But are you seeing a very a disparity.

You have a place like Qatar.

You have a place like the Emirates that have very small populations relative to their wealth.

Largely because of the energy, question and-- >>Yeah.

>>And, and gas and oil.

Are you seeing a disparity now in technology where you're going to have some countries that are so advanced and some that are so, primitive and dated in terms of what, what they can do in terms of national securit and performance going forward?

>>Yeah, you will, there's no question about it.

Some have bigger, greater interest in it than, than others.

There's always a question of if you've got countries that are able to put a lot more money into it and have a greater need of its own security or economic diversification, that will see this as a higher priority.

But they've also got state.

You've also got states like anywhere else in the region, in the, in the world, that will need to find a way t contribute and to do something.

What's the value added of this state versus another?

Is that they're going to concentrate or focus the resources on building small satellites?

Or are they going to think about, developing launch capabilities and not everybody has them.

The only two countries currently that have them are Israel and Iran.

And kind of backtracking a little bit more about the, you know, the space, a lot of places, space agencies developed out of or may have developed out of the aeronautical, I mean, industries as well.

And it may have been like in the case of Iran and, and Israel and Israel further back about, intelligence, or and or about military, military use when it comes to missile and the developing those capabilities for, for launch.

So these are, these disparities are just some countries won't be into and this again, this is across the globe.

And I've been at Internationa Forum where you kind of have the if it's a divisions about global north global south stuff.

But the the haves, the people that are, you know, the countries that are really on the forefront, some of the leaders in space and the ones that aren't and what they are concerned about and I think this would go to the the Middle East as well, is that they're concerned of being kind of left out because the challenge with space governance currently is you really don't have a set of you know, enforcement mechanism like lots of our international institutions, but you don't really have solid treaties in that way.

You have the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

And then everyon trying to figure out how do you beyond a number of other ones, how do you understand space governance in the future if incidents happen?

And going back to the other question you raised about where the United States is, the other thing it's trying to do is to make sure that its partners and allies see space in the future, the way that it sees it.

And we have two kind of system.

But I will be hesitant to kind of say that they're opposed to each other because of unclear.

We've got the Artemis Accords.

The United States is, a lead and US led initiative on how to think about space and space resource governance in the future.

And then you hav what is not really equivalent, but more equivalent to the Artemis program.

About going to the moon is the, International Lunar Research Service.

And it is station.

Sorry.

It is about is it Chin and Russia led initiative there.

And so going back to the Middle East, there's this question of who' joins what in those initiatives.

And Egypt has joined the ILRS, as well as Turkey and the Artemis Accords members in the Middle East are, Israel.

The UAE was actually on the forefront of really developing this.

It's an interesting role to play, the UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and I'm probably forgetting one more.

>>So one of the, one of the things you're talking about, you've studied a lot of different aspects in the Middle East.

We've been talking about technology and things, but I also want to go back to kind of alliance networks and the importance of traditional kind of constraints on leadership right now, because all this change is happening.

Well, while still you have countries that, you know, leaders, regardles of their government structure, can only go so far on some policies.

Right?

Whether it's Palestine or any or any of a number of things.

And then the Alliance situation, you were talking about how Washington has kind of tried to do the Asian pivot, have done a number of things trying to get out of the Middle East, can't really how do you make sense of all this right now?

And I understand you're writing, you've been writing a book that's going to be published soon that kind of trie to make some sense out of this.

>>Yeah, well I hope it'll be published soon with, with some esteemed coauthors of mine.

So part of it, I think, kind of add your question shows a little less with the book does a little less with alliance, alliances.

But it's how states adjust, how these regimes adjust and the states adjust in the Middle East to big foreign policy change that might occur kind of in the broader regional or, or global level.

And, and the role that say domestic politics plays, I think it's sometimes forgotten.

Some people focus way too muc on domestic politics and things.

I think everything's driven by that.

And then others say it's al about the international system.

I think obviously it's a to me, it's obvious.

It's a combination of both.

And when it comes to alliances, I think sometimes you do have regimes or governments that that obviously that look to them to solidify their position in power or strengthen i that way, or how to figure out balancing this, the challenges in the international system.

And the most important one for these countries is the United States and where it is.

And kind of going back to the first one, among the first questions that we we talked about of where the United States is and where, more importantly, the perception the United States, because United States may not have left the region, but people think it's leaving all the time.

And I think in part it's reasonable to understand why this fear would be so important, whether or not it's real when it comes to actual troops on the ground and and the presence there.

And so those, those types of things have not necessarily and in certain ways it's encouraged other alliance networks to develop.

You know, we, people say what what is th what's the impetus behind, say, the normalization that occurred under the Abraham Accords?

Is it just that there's fear of retrenchment from the United States and or Iran's growing role and or looking to the future and the role that the Trump administration played of doing what was already occurring.

But the question is, why was that occurring?

It's clear that states still need these, these alliances, and they need them to, to feel more secure.

But again, they also we also know that they aren't they aren't permanent, they're not lasting.

And things can change, as we see in the Middle East very quickly.

>>You're also studying a region, of course, that has a number of failed states or close to failed states.

How does that play into a lot o the calculations and policies?

You look around the region, and you have more that are teetering or completely failed, than, than not.

>>Right.

I think unfortunately, it hasn't.

I mean, I think it's almost lik it's forgotten as we notice it blips, at least in our news for a little while.

Terrible things happen.

And then the, you know, the new conflict emerges.

States quietly have intervened when it comes to not tipping the balance very much.

I mean, we we don't hear much, but it occurs.

But it's happening all the time of many states intervening in, in East Africa of, you know, think about the levels of involvement that so many states had during the, you know, the the fighting in Libya and still unresolved, Yemen.

Is it the other example, Sudan, you name it, you know, Syria is another example too.

And then we know we're now seeing this transition.

The question is, of course, I think the biggest impact, the lasting one is always a reminder of this is when this is what can happen to you if, to, you know, your populace if if you revolt too much or guarantee.

And I think that's always been a threat of do you want this?

You know, the Egyptians say thi to say this, the United States a lot of times of saying, is this the type of thing you really want to see?

And, and then leaders can say, okay, look, what happened in Iraq is this way, is this what you want in this to happen is we remember, you know, in the in the 2000s of is this the type of thing you want to push reform this much.

Here's what you could get.

>>So you have such a, diverse field of, of study within the region and within global politics.

But you've also written extensively on terrorism.

So I'm asking with all this instability and all this rapid change, has that made the appeal of terrorism in the region greater or the threat of terror greater or less, less so than in the past?

>>I don't think it's changed that much in that way.

The you know, you've it's come in as we'll kind of say different, different type of waves and shapes and forms.

If you notice, people always say this is going to this can potentially cause radicalization, but you always have different way that people are going to latch onto this type of radicalization.

What what I think has changed naturally is with the breakdown of order and states, is that as a terrorist, organizations can, can move around a lot easier.

They're not going as controlled by states anymore.

It's harde to clamp down on some of them.

And so there's always a fear of any of these failed states or broken states and civil wars that terrorist organizations will have a safe haven.

And there's also the blurring of the line.

I'm not necessarily sure it's any different in the past, but it's the issue of the organization that is a terrorist, guerrilla, insurgent and a political actor.

And you might find Hezbollah.

And what's happened to tha with, Hamas is another example.

And where does that, you know, how do you now, the big question, Hezbollah has been an interesting one to begin with as it's been defanged.

But the question is, what does that mean for, you know will it fully be demilitarized?

And also what's its political future look like?

And then of course, the question is now that is the challenge.

Most challenging one, will Hamas demilitarized, as the administration says, and then would you allow it to participate in, in politic if it if it does, in that way?

>>So we're running short of time and a fascinating conversation.

But I want to ask, you know, people such as yourselve who have looked at this region a long time always like t anticipate what's coming next.

But we've seen such radical change.

Do you have any confidenc in your own ability to predict, some of the moves that different states will make in the coming year or five years?

>>Do I have any confidence that's a great question.

In my own ability.

I, I, I think it' clearly one of the hardest, as, you know, as, as, as, you know very well spending a lot of time thinking, about this region to predict and I think particularly now, and I'd say this more so in the past, it seems lik the easy period up to the Arab uprisings were such that and people wrote about this, the ages of the authoritarian stability and why.

And people try to explain how or why these regimes kept things in check.

And then you had the Arab uprisings.

The very beginning part was, was was shocking, to people and unpredictable.

But but later a kind of, you know, it kind of became a more predictable.

And then now I think there are some things that are clear, at least for the near term.

And, and it's unclear what's going to happen tomorrow that way.

But, you know, the with this new Gaza ceasefire that is holding, for one of the things, you know, we haven't gotte to the one of the hardest parts was the implementation stage of it.

And, and what will happen yet the big questions that we had before, when even the war broke out about, okay, what is the political horizon for the Palestinians in that way?

And that has to be part of a longer term solution of some sort, because I'm sure the implementation stage touches on any of those.

And and of course the willingness of the parties to get involved in the extent that they, they are the other thing, I think we can see a couple around the region, Turkey's role.

I don't think it's a surprise.

I'm not saying anything.

It will continue to grow and they'll play a much more influential one.

And and Turke seems to be in a good position for its own interests there.

And I think the, the Saudis and Emiratis, you know, may have gained some breathing room here when it comes to what they want to do and pursue, which is really look forward into the future and try to put this as much as they may care in their hearts about the Palestinian issue.

And I don't doubt that they do it sincerely, but they want to mov their societies forward there.

I could go around, bu I think I'll I'll end this here.

>>Larry Rubin, thank you so much.

And for helping u try to make sense of this, this, this unfortunately volatile region in a very, time of time of great change.

Thank you for joining us today.

>>Well, thanks for having me on.

>>And thank you for joining us.

We'll see you again next week on another episode of Global Perspectives.