>>Good morning an welcome to Global Perspectives.

I'm David Dumke.

Today we are joined by Doctor Mehmet Gurses, who's the new chair of th Kurdish Studies program at UCF.

Welcome to the show.

>>Thank you.

David.

Thank you for having me.

>>So tell us a little before we start and as and talk about what's going on in the Kurdish Iraq right now and with the Kurds in Turkey.

Before we get there, tell us a little about the Kurdish people and where where things things stand right now.

>>The Kurdish people.

I think the best way to describe them would be, they are often, portrayed as the, the largest, stateless nation in the world, numbering somewher between 35 to 40 million people.

And they are divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

So any time we talk about any of these countries in one way or the other, we end up talking about the Kurdish issue or the Kurdish conflict.

They do speak, a language that is closer to the Iranian languages.

It is an Indo-European language family.

That means the language they speak is, very much different from Arabic or Turkish.

They are not necessarily politically recognized in Iran and Turkey, although in Iraq, since 2003, after the American invasion of Iraq, there is a Kurdish autonomous region in the northern part of the country bordering Turkey and Iran, and it has been functioning relatively well compared to other parts of Iraq since 2003 and 2005.

In 2005, the Iraqi Constitution, for the first time in modern history, Kurdish as a language was recognized by a state.

As of today, Kurdish is the second language of the state of Iraq.

In Syria over the past ten years or so, mostly working with the United States, the Kurdish groups, in north and eastern part of Syria, they have emerged as an essential key player, key partner to the United States in primarily defeating the Islamic State there.

They do have a de facto region, yet that is not necessaril recognized by the Syrian state or the international community yet.

>>When you talk about, of course, you know that the Kurdish issue was much more prominent in the Western media during the US invasion and occupation of Iraq.

And there was a lot of tal at the time about the prospects of Turkish statehood and eventually became this autonomous zone.

And the Kurds and the Kurdish militias were aligned with the US.

During the effort to oust Saddam Hussein and and defeat ISIS.

Subsequently, that whole the American intervention in Iraq, though, what did it do for the Kurdish people?

At the end of the day, you still have a homeless, stateless people.

There is autonomy.

And the more you read in the news, you know, Baghdad may not necessarily like that autonomy too much.

>>Yeah.

Now, the Kurds, when Iraq became, was, created as an independent state, in the 1920s and 30s, the Kurdish, reality within Iraq was not necessarily recognized.

Iraq became an Arab republic first an Arab monarchy.

And in the 1950s it became an Arab republic.

In the 50s and 60s, there was, intense conflict between, the Kurdish insurgent groups and the central government in Baghdad, and that lasted for several decades, lots of bloodshed and conflict until in the 1990s, during the first Gulf War, when the United States intervened and imposed a no fly zone, that no fly zone created a de facto Kurdish region in 1992 and in 2003, that de facto Kurdish autonomous region was recognized in the Iraqi constitution.

So the the relationship with Iraq as a government and Iraq as an Arab country has been a contentious relationship.

But in the last 20 or 30 years or so with the American invasion of Iraq and with the rise of the new Iraq, so to speak, the Kurds has emerged as a partner to the state of Iraq, and they are part of Iraq.

In the last 20 years or so has been generally referred to as the other Iraq.

To highlight it is relativ peace, stability and democracy, which recentl about ten years, ten days ago, they held their sixth parliamentary elections.

Despite some minor issues and irregularities.

They did, well in terms of holding those, fairly free and democratic elections.

>>But is statehood and independence still a possibility?

>>It is a possibility.

I think when we talk about statehood, we probably, we may need to ask some, broader and larger and maybe even tougher questions, because in the Middle East, in the last 20 or 30 years or so the very concept of statehood, the way we normally conceive that concept has been questioned as of today, when you look at the number of failed or severely weakened states ranging from Iraq to Syri to Lebanon to Libya to in Yemen, there are a half dozen states in the Middle East and North Africa that are not necessarily functioning the way a state should.

So when you put togethe the number of people in these, countries that are either failed or severely weakened states, we are looking at least about 100 million people that no longer live within or under a functioning state.

So the very concept of what a state refers to, what is a state?

I think all of these concepts, as we speak about the prospects of a Kurdish states in the Middle East, it interacts with those changing dynamics.

So perhaps if there is going to be a Kurdish state that Kurdish states may or may not necessarily look like the way we, conceive of the statehoo from the western point of view.

In 2017, the Kurds in northern Iraq did actually hold, a referendum of independence.

A majority of people, participated in that referendum, and a vast majority of the Kurds voted for independence.

A non-binding referendum I would like to highlight that.

It generated some serious backlash from the central government in Iraq, as well as the neighboring Iran and Turkey.

Eventually, that bid failed, but still the hope and dream of a Kurdish state, however it is defined and conceptualized or conceived, is somewhat part of the Kurdis hopes and dreams in the future.

>>Of course, you know when you talk about a stateless people that that live in a region that is defined by boundaries of other countries, there ar conflicts with those countries.

So it's not as simple as just carving out this part of Iraq for the Kurdish state.

One of the biggest challenges, of course, from to the Kurdish people is the status in Turkey itself and what that means.

What is the status of the relationshi between the Erdogan government and the Kurdish people?

Obviously, there's been a, a war of varying degrees of severity for quite some time, even before Erdogan with the Kurdish Worker Party, the PKK, against Ankara.

So tell us kind of where things stand right now.

>>Yeah, I think, you are asking a great question that, to properly answer your question because as you highlighted, the Kurdish, populated territories they overlap with one another.

So when we talk about a Kurdish issue or a Kurdish question in Turkey or in Iraq or Iran, we necessarily end up talking about the broader regional dynamics.

And when we talk about the size of the Kurdish territories stretching from western Iran to eastern Mediterranean, in total Kurdish populated territories, the areas are roughly the size of a country like Germany or Japan.

So we are talking about a massive, territory inhabited largely and not, exclusively, but mostly by Kurds an about half of these territories are within Turkey.

And also of the 35 to 40 million total Kurds Kurdish population worldwide.

About half, if not more than half, resides in Turkey.

That makes Turkey and the Kurdish question in Turkey and the Kurdish Turkish relations arguably the most significant aspec of the larger Kurdish question.

As you highlighted even before the rise of Erdogan to power starting in 1984, the PKK has been fighting an insurgenc against the Turkish government, despite some ups and downs, it has been going on for about 40 years.

That makes the PKK conflict in Turkey one of the longest lasting ethno-nationalis conflicts in contemporary world.

And part of the problem is when Turkey was, created as a republic after the collaps of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the modern Turkish elites wanted to forge a new Turkish identity a new Turkish national identity that literally did not make any room for Kurdishness or any other ethnic or religious sub-identities.

The complete-- >>For those who don't know, of course, the Ottoman Empire, including the boundarie of the Turkish Republic today, was not a monolithic population.

It was quite diverse.

>>Oh, absolutely.

Up until a hundred years ago Anatolia, about 25% of Anatolia was non-Muslim, primaril Armenians, Greek and Assyrians, and the Ottoman Empire being a multinational and multi-religious empire, it kept together those groups from different linguistic and, religious backgrounds.

But once Turkey becam a republic, a secular republic, and they wanted to center or forge a new identity that would be exclusively Turkish, it created a serious problem for the Kurds which at the time and still do make up the second largest ethnic minority in Turkey, making up about 20 to 25% of the total population.

So for for them, their identity, their language banned, their culture was banned.

That obviously created, a conflictual start from the 1920s and onward, which not surprisingly, it resulted in more than a dozen of majo armed rebellions in the 1920s.

But up until 1984, it was at least on the surface it was quite peaceful and quiet.

Until 1984.

The PKK began its armed conflict, which has transformed into a regional conflict because the PKK now has support from the Kurds in Iran, in Syria, as well as in Iraq.

So the Kurdish question an the Turkish Kurdish relations, we must look at it from the larger regional, at least, if not global, perspective.

>>Some critics of Erdogan of course, have said, you know, there's always a tendency on his part when his popularity is waning or there is bad news to pick a fight with one of the many perceived enemies around, Ankara.

So it can be different cast of characters.

But one of the constant has been a tendency to kind of restart a hot conflict with the PKK.

Is that accurate, or is this i this used as a political weapon for by Erdogan?

>>It's a it's a great question because me included several scholars of Kurdish and Turkish politics have recently highlighted that Turkey may have a Turkish proble rather than a Kurdish problem, because even before Erdogan which Erdogan has done in a way a better job in terms of weaponizing, or using Turkish people's fears to first to obviously, help his political career, who he has been in power since 2002, 2003, he has served even longer than the founding father of modern Turkey Ataturk, Kemal Ataturk himself.

Ataturk serve only 15 years until he died in 1938.

So I think the fact that Kurdishness has been, weaponized as a source of insecurity for people in 2011, 2012, when the Turkish government under Erdogan himself initiated peace process or a dialog with the PKK through it is imprisoned leader Jalen, there was three years of a mutually recognized ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish government.

Now, I would like to highlight the significance of that ceasefire, because that was the only and to date, still the only, ceasefire that was mutually recognized by both groups.

In the past, the PKK had announced, a dozen of ceasefires, but those ceasefires were not recognized by the Turkish government.

Between 2013 and 2015, during that short period of peace process, Turkey experienced significant democratization.

Turkey economically did, grow.

Turkey got much closer to becoming a European Union member.

Both democratization and economic development, were benefited from that process.

But in 2015, Erdogan, realizing that it was not serving him politically, he decided to end the, peace process.

And since 2015, up until today, unfortunately, we are talking about ten years and decade of bloodshed, which sadly has not served anyone's interest other than, President Erdogan's political career.

It has served him well.

>>Now this is a complicated situation because you have this ongoing fight in Turkey with the PKK, but at the same time, you have Iraqi Kurdistan, has had extensive trade with the Turkish Republic, and it's actually been very economically beneficial for Erdogan.

How do you explain this happening simultaneously?

>>Yeah, that that's amazing.

Up until 1990s, even late 1990s, the Turkish political and military elites would portra Iraqi Kurds as tribal leaders, meaning that they would even refuse to actually meet with them to shake hands with them.

After 2000, the Turkish government changed course.

The Turkish government, opened up a consulate in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdish region.

The Turkish businesses went into Erbil.

Turkish Airlines is flying in and out between Istanbul, Ankara, in Erbil, more so tha any other airlines as of today.

It has clearly worked really well for the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdista and for the Turkish government.

And I think as we are moving towards this really dramatic changes in the Middle East, because the Kurds are part of a larger, broader regional, politics, the Turkish government is in a way, at least recently, they have signaled at least that they may only maybe open to a potential second peace process with the PKK realizing that they are stuck with the Kurdish conflict.

They have invaded parts of, Kurdish Syria.

They are-- >>I was going to ask Syria next-- >>Exactly right.

>>All overlapping and simultaneous.

You're not talking about different.

It's happening at the same time.

So please.

>>It's the whole thing.

So the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is also the Kurdish conflict in Syria, in Iraq, as well as part of any potential change that may or may not happen in Iran because about 10% of Iran is Kurdish.

So I think the Turkish government, I mean, if you ask me it, conflict and war certainly is not benefiting anyone, especially between the Turks and the Kurds.

The Turkish recognitio of Kurdish existence in reality in Turkey will pave the way for much better relations between the Turkish governmen and the Kurds in Syria and Iraq.

That could be truly a win win for Turks and Kurd and potentially for the region.

>>So you also, in addition to being an expert on Kurdish issues, you are an expert in conflict resolution.

So I wanted to bring that into the equation.

So if you're talking about a Turkish Kurdish PKK peace process and potential agreement, who else is at the table?

Because they are connected to what's going on in Syria, in Iraq, in Iran do you include all these parties as a broader peace agreement, or is that too many, cooks in the kitchen, so to speak?

>>Yeah.

Another excellent question, but also a complicated one.

Because as you pointed out, there may be too many cooks in the kitchen because we are talking about the Kurds in Turkey and the Kurds in Syria, Iraq, and potentially in Iran.

And we cannot dismis the significance, significance of Iranian government as well as the Syrian government in Damascus.

Although in Damascus, the government no longer has control over the eastern and north eastern part of Syria under the control of the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces.

One good thing about the Kurdish conflict, it's kind of an irony when we say, good thing about the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, the PKK or the Kurdish political movement in Turkey is one of the most disciplined groups in contemporary world, meaning that we have one group that you could actually, deal with, unlike other places where you have sometimes a dozen of different competing groups that the government may us one group against one another, and you can't even tell who do you even talk to?

Even if you want to make peace.

In the Kurdish case, we hav the Kurdish political movement, and the PKK and the PKK's imprisoned leader, which still holds, tremendous amount of charisma for the Kurds, the Kurdish political movement, and obviously for the PKK, the group that he founded, for the use of the Iraqi central government, the Syrian government.

These are somewhat, important actors, but they are not as important as the Turkish government.

So if we are going to talk about a potential peace, between the Turks and the Kurds, it is Ankara.

It is the Turkish government arguably more important than any other actor.

Then we can talk about the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq of course, the Kurdish movement in Turkey and believe it or not, Europeans and Americans could actually serve to help the Turks and the Kurds to transform the conflict from what we have right now, which is not serving anyone's interest to turn it into a win win, both politically and economically for everyone in the region.

>>I wanted to as about the American role in this, because obviously Americans relied on Kurds and still do, in that region, battle against ISIS, against Saddam Hussein before it.

But the US is also very closely aligned with its NATO ally in Turkey.

So the US actuall is on both sides of this issue involved with both parties who are actual combatants.

What should the American role be?

And is the American role a disinterested one at this point?

Have they kind of turned their attention away, given conflicts going on in Ukraine and in Palestine and in Lebanon now?

>>Yeah, I think we probably should highlight the significance of Turkey as a state, as an essential American partner and ally.

And as you highlighted, a NATO member, when we talk about this, we obviously can learn from other, other conflicts in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, the conflicts that eventually ended in some form of political negotiations.

In those places, for instance, the state was not necessarily a strong state a capable state in some cases.

So American intervention or American direct mediation in those cases did make sense, and it benefited those partners to make peace.

In the case of Turkey, I think we have to be really careful, in terms of not directly meddling into this process because, the Turkish government and the state is not just another state.

It is a very important, state, one of the regional powers.

It's an American partner, and it's a disciplined state.

So a direct interference might, potentially backfire.

But then we have a very disciplined state active, a very disciplined insurgent group.

The United States can potentially encourage these two, actors that have been locked in a very destructive conflict over the past 40 years to somewhat start a process.

And during the process, the United States could indirectly observe the process.

Because when you fight someone for 40 years, there is every reason to expect that they will not have trust in one another.

So I think the United States should not ignore that conflict, because every other conflict that you just highlighted, whether it is the conflic in Lebanon, in Israel and Gaza, whether a potential confrontation between Israel and Iran in the future one way or the other, the Kurds will be either part of our warfare or peacemaking efforts in the future.

>>So we just have a have a couple of minutes left.

So I wanted to ask, yo know, we've been talking about the Turkish people and the different conflicts around the borders, but I want to want you to tell us a little about the people themselves.

You know, political Islam, for example, very grown in importance in this region.

How influenced are the Kurdish people on that or women or you mentioned series of democratic elections, how committed to democracy.

So tell us a little about the people themselves.

>>The people, the Kurdis people are majority Sunni Muslim people like, the majorit of other peoples in the region.

But I think what separates the Kurdish people from, other people with state and political power, primarily because the Kurds have been oppressed not by Westerners but but their Muslim brothers.

So it is the Muslim Iranians.

It is the Muslim Turks or Muslim Arabs who have oppressed them for over a century.

That has created a psychological rift between Muslim Kurds and the weaponization of religion in the hands of their state against them.

That said, the Kurds are for the Kurdish people.

Islam still is an important part of who they are, but that also has moved them away from supporting political Islam because political Islam has been the enemy to the Kurdish people for most of the part.

So the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi governments would usually refer to Islam politicizing Isla in the fight against the Kurds.

That has brought the Kurdish people to a point where Islam is their fate.

But Islam and politics, they try to separate it.

So it is a subtle for of secularization, so to speak, is taking place among the Kurds.

The Kurds are probably, I - My definition of them is is a muslim majority people, on its way to become a secular nation so that what brings them closer to the United States, both in Turkey, especially in Syria and Iraq, where the United States is actually, partnering up with them, they are probably among, the most pro-American, pro-Western Muslim majority peoples in the Muslim world.

Doctor Mehmet Gurses, thank you so much for joining us.

And welcome to UCF I should say too, the new chair of the, Jalal Talabani program Kurdish studies program at UCF.

>>Thank you for having me David.

>>And thank you for joining us.

We'll see you again next week on another episode of Global Perspectives.