
Emna Ben Arab
Season 2022 Episode 11 | 28m 19sVideo has Closed Captions
Emna Ben Arab, Professor and Author, discusses foreign policy and political discourse.
Emna Ben Arab, Professor and Author, discusses foreign policy, political ideas and political discourse analysis. Currently an assistant professor at The University of Sfax, Tunisia and has authored numerous articles on a range of topics related to jihadism, foreign terrorist fighters and extremist propaganda.
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Global Perspectives is a local public television program presented by WUCF

Emna Ben Arab
Season 2022 Episode 11 | 28m 19sVideo has Closed Captions
Emna Ben Arab, Professor and Author, discusses foreign policy, political ideas and political discourse analysis. Currently an assistant professor at The University of Sfax, Tunisia and has authored numerous articles on a range of topics related to jihadism, foreign terrorist fighters and extremist propaganda.
Problems playing video? | Closed Captioning Feedback
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Learn Moreabout PBS online sponsorship>>Good morning and welcome to Global Perspectives.
I'm David Dumke.
Today we are joined by Emna Ben Arab, who is a professor at the University of Sfax in Tunisia.
She's also a former member of the Tunisian parliament and a commentator on events in Tunisia.
Welcome to the show, Emna.
>>Thank you, David, for having me on your show.
>>Emna, in 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fell from power in the face of widespread demonstrations, largely peaceful.
At that time, Tunisia was was seen as a beacon of democracy and kind of emerging hope.
How is Tunisia viewed today and what's going on on the ground?
>>Well, the situation is not really as good as people expect.
So President Saied was elected in 2019 against a background of despair and disappointment, the time was eight years after the revolution and still instability and uncertainty prevailed in Tunisia.
All the indicators then and now are flashing red.
And added to this is the state of political crisis that forestalled progress and hindered a smooth democratic transition.
So Saied, as someone with no political or public service experience was elected for his anti-establishment positions and for his populist agenda, actually he promised to give people the power to govern themselves toward a better future and to help them recover their stolen money.
Actually, the slogan chanted by thousands during the revolution, “The People Want ” is being used by Saied as the embodiment of his political platform.
But soon it became clear that he has a political project of his own, a project that is hostile to political parties, that is hostile to a strong central government, national parliament, and it aims to give exceptional powers to the executive.
And this was materialized in the new constitution, the 2022 Constitution, which created an executive with exceptional powers.
It created a weak parliament and left no room for checks and balances.
Also, I mean, few weeks ago he came up with the new electoral law for the December 17th parliamentary elections.
This law, again, like the constitution, is by no means inclusive, its aim is to undermine political parties as voters will select individual candidates endorsed by 400 people.
And this, of course, will open the door wide for corruption.
And it already started opening the door wide for corruption because people started submitting their candidacies.
And this law also will hurt women chances to be candidates given the Tunisian conduct.
So what is of concern, David, now is that we have a highly personalist president alone.
He's running the show.
His populism offers no credible path for the future, no visibility to where the country is heading.
And given the unprecedented poor financial situation, the unprecedented poor economic performance.
I think Tunisia risks sleepwalking its way into another uprising, and this time it might turn ugly.
>>You're describing President Saied and some of his the background, how he got to office and ran his campaign and some of the moves before there.
But you mentioned at the start of that about the disillusionment of the Tunisian people.
Obviously, some of this disillusionment was before even president Saied took office.
What what goes into that and what do the people want with frustration and disillusionment?
>>Right.
The situation, as I said, is very delicate.
Before Saied, there was a decade long rule of that party.
And, you know, one important point of the pre-Saied period is that a political Islam was considered as the alternative to authoritarianism.
This was an experiment that has cost Tunisians so much time and many opportunities to take a different trajectory.
So during this period, instead of addressing the root causes that brought about the the revolution, Tunisian politicians and political parties spent time and energy debating religious identity question.
Islam versus secularism.
Who's Muslim and who's not?
And all the finger pointing it involves.
And this paved the way for an ideological polarization which reinforced the already existent regional and socio-economic polarization.
This weakened the democratic tra extreme violence, including political assassinations and the emergence of terrorism as a real challenge.
And this of course, contributed to turning people away from politics and eroding trusting politicians and democracy.
And also, apart from the political side, during this period, everybody put politics ahead of the economy.
The only choices of prioritization, political reform over addressing the socio-economic challenges was an error whose consequences are being felt today.
Today there is unprecedented unemployment rate, poverty rate, the same thing, budget deficit, etc..
So, I mean, was a failure on all sides, political as well as economic.
>>And Ennahda, of course, is is the Islamist party for those of our viewers who are not aware of their place in Tunisia.
But I need to ask you the question, because when they came to power, as you mentioned, they won through democratic means.
So I'm wondering, you know, you you've you just described it as kind of a distraction as and a way that Tunisians didn't face some of the real issues of economics at the time and stayed kind of focused on identity politics and religious affiliation and how that affects politics or the proper role of that.
What is the legacy of the Ennahda party?
Do they do they change Tunisia society or governance?
Or is it just a blip?
>>Actually, they tried as soon as they took power they tried to change Tunisian society They tried actually as soon as they won the first elections, they started talking about the new or the sixth Salafi.
So for them, it was an opportunity to to hit secularism.
Tunisia has always been a secular state, but, you know, Tunisians, especially Tunisian women, civil society, a mainstream media, all of them resisted their attempt to constitutionalize, for example, Sharia law, do to do away with some of women's gains.
So there was a resistance from Tunisian society that was well understood by Ennahda, especially after what happened in Egypt, when the the brother, the Muslim Brotherhood, were removed from power.
>>You you've been, of course, just discussing Tunisia's secular nature.
And one of the one of the principles of that was also gender equality since Tunisia won independence from.
From France.
So I'm wanting to ask you, is is gender equity still a very important variable in Tunisian society as well as government?
>>I believe that Tunisian society still gives importance to gender equality.
And as I said, the first thing that the Islamist party tried to do when it took power was to reverse the policies that have been enacted in favor of women in the last few decades and expunge achievements of previous generations of women by saying they wanted to do what the Constitution allows.
The idea that women are complimentary to women, to men, sorry, not equal to them.
And this, as I said earlier, did not gain traction among women, media, mainstream media, civil society, etc., who took to the streets to protest against it.
But, you know, you are you are right that Tunisia has one of the most progressive status code in the region and even beyond.
I mean, Tunisia is the only Muslim country, along with Turkey, that strictly prohibits polygamy.
Tunisian women have the right to abortion since 1973.
They have the right to equal pay for equal work protection from domestic violence, etc..
But there still a lot of work to be done.
Tunisian society is still highly patriarchal, especially when it comes to women's role in public life, where women enjoy the same rights as men, but only on paper.
Before.
Before the revolution, women were systematically promoted to higher positions in work and in politics with equal confidence.
The choice usually goes for a woman, and this promotion was through a quota system that was put in place, although the system was very often criticized.
It helped the visibility of women in public life.
It created opportunities for them to climb the professional and political ladder.
And this contributed to changing the mindset of people toward women, of being equal to men, and as competent and hardworking.
>>Well, you were you were one of those women who were very visible as a member of Tunisia's parliament.
So I wanted to ask you, what what motivated you to run for office in the first place?
>>Actually, I was politically engaged with the Democratic constitutional rally, the one major party at the time.
And I had ambitions for my country and for myself.
I had a vision about the course my country should take, especially in areas I consider of utmost importance and the development of my country, such as education, youth and women.
And the most obvious way to impact decision making in these areas and in policymaking in general is to run for parliament.
So parliament gives you visibility and a voice to do that and to be at the service of your community.
And it was also a challenge for me as a woman to demonstrate that women are no less competent as political actors than men.
>>Did you personally feel any any glass ceilings over you as you as you entered parliament or kind of when you were describing some of the patriarchal type behavior?
Unofficially, that's not official policy, but is unofficially there.
Did you experience any of that?
>>Yes, I did experience some of that.
But as soon as they realized that I can be, as I said, as vocal, as competent, as hard working as any of the men in Parliament, things started to change.
>>So Emna, you you are very familiar with the United States.
You earned your Ph.D. in the US.
You have have had meetings, extensive meetings with members of the US Congress and other American officials.
You were a fellow at the Bush Center.
So you're very familiar with US politics.
So a couple of questions here.
One is, what's your assessment of US relations with Tunisia?
>>Actually, the bilateral relations between Tunisia and the US are longstanding.
The US has always supported Tunisia, and Tunisia has always considered the US as a good friend and as an effective partner in the US war against terrorism.
Today, Washington is showing a lot of interest in Tunisia, and I think this is due to its interest in spreading Western type of democracy in the region and to its eagerness to prove the compatibility between Islamism and democracy.
Democracy is seen here as simply an exercise that involves fair elections and institutions, regardless of economic performance.
And in Tunisia, this proved a failure.
I think the US can play a constructive role in Tunisia by taking the general context and of what people want for themselves into consideration.
I believe that imposing a particular system or a political orientation could be counterproductive.
And this applies not only to Tunisia, but also to the whole Arab world.
>>So were American expectations after this, you know, I don't like the term myself, but Arab Spring, as it's described in the US, the expectations of Washington did not necessarily meet the realities on the ground, not just in Tunisia, but in Egypt and elsewhere.
as you just explained.
You've obviously talked to Americans and American officials.
Do they understand that they are not seeing that they're only seeing a picture they want to see as opposed to a picture that it actually is?
>>It seems so because I think the US does not see or does not show a real understanding of the situation in all its dimensions.
And sometimes we have the feeling that the US government is under the influence of a would be Islamist party lobby in the US would be some other think tanks which theorize or for the takeover of what they call moderate Islamism.
I believe, David, that it's unfair that Tunisians pay the price for an experiment that the US has always wanted.
Putting in place political Islam as an alternative to authoritarianism.
It should be reminded here that the US applauded the advent of Ennahda as a new ruling party applauded its deeply flawed constitution.
That led us to what where we are today.
And it turned a blind eye toward their unprecedented incompetence and corruption.
So the US in a way watched the descent into chaos of a country that was built from nothing over a period of five decades.
And today, what is really a bit strange is that the US is threatening to cut aid to Tunisia and to put pressure on the IMF to withhold the badly needed loan.
I don't think this is the right position to take because this will impose greater hardship on the Tunisian people and is likely to hurt the prospects of economic recovery and social stability.
So I think the US should keep the conversation going with Saied and his government while asking for accountability and making their positions clear as to the political process and the known democratic standards.
I think for its credibility among Tunisian and Arab populations, the U.S. should show some consistency in its foreign policy, and the U.S. and this is common knowledge, really.
The US tends to turn a blind eye to profoundly authoritarian regimes when its interests are involved and act otherwise when it's otherwise.
>>You know, Washington was very supportive of the Ben Ali government before its - its fall, and that was documented, and I'm sure Tunisians are well aware of this in the in WikiLeaks communiques from the US ambassador at the time.
>>That's right, yes.
The United States gave support for Tunisia during the Ben Ali era or I mean, and it turned against the regime for no obvious reason.
At the time, corruption was the elephant in the room, but the country was doing well, at least economically speaking, financially speaking, at a level of social stability.
But for reasons that are not clear for Tunisians, the United States turned against the regime very quickly and applauded the advent of Islamism and and the Islamic of the Islamist party.
And that become the ruler of the country for for many years and the result.
We see it all today.
It's the collapse of of of the state of the very, very difficult situation in terms of the economy and also in terms of social instability.
>>You mentioned earlier that a lot of Tunisians believe that the US was actually favoring Islamists.
Could it also be that I mean, that is obviously one theory out there and I understand the visuals that Tunisians saw or Egyptians or others saw, but does anyone believe in Tunisia or Egypt or elsewhere that some of this could actually just be the US got it wrong and was naive about who they were dealing with and who they were talking to?
>>Yes, that's that's one reading of the situation.
But, you know, the overwhelming majority of people believing in conspiracy theories believe that the United States was behind what happened in Tunisia and in Egypt.
And they are their argument is supported by the role that the United States played in Libya, in Iraq and Syria.
So for the rank and file Tunisians and Arabs in general, the US has as an interest in destroying Arab countries.
It started with Iraq, Syria, Libya and for them, Tunisia is a kind of experiment.
The United States wanted to see whether political Islam could be viable, could be the right alternative to authoritarian regimes in the region.
>>Thank you for that explanation.
I want to we only have a couple of minutes left, so I want to go back to more of a positive discussion.
I've heard you talk recently and one of the things you've you've prescribed for Tunisia is to return to the correct path of democracy.
So I want to ask you, what does that mean, first of all?
And number two is, is that truly what the people want?
>>Well, when I talk about the return to democracy, I did not mean and I do not mean a return to the pre the pre-July 25th brute force of President Saied that was that was a difficult period that was a period in which the country witnessed so many I mean so many so many problems.
But what I mean by a return to democracy is first, a constitution that allows for the separation of powers and the checks and balances between all three branches of the government, which is unfortunately not the case also with this new constitution.
I also meant by democracy putting in place an inclusive, gender friendly electoral law that guarantees the broadest possible participation of all Tunisians, which is, again, not the case today.
And third, democracy must be built in concordance with the construction of a strong economy, because an essential characteristic of democracy is that basic necessities like food, health, education, housing are provided for all.
So for Tunisians, their recent experience with democracy did not deliver prosperity.
That's why democracy is no longer a priority for them.
And this is clear.
And the steady drop in support for democracy among Tunisians from, let's say, around 70% in 2013 to only 46% in 2018.
And I'm sure this drop has continued.
>>Are you optimistic about the future, pessimistic, or somewhat optimistic?
>>I'm not really that optimistic.
If things If - if the right people do not take things in their in their hand.
I mean, today I mean, you see the government it's a government in which there are ten women.
But just like Saied, all these women and the rest of the cabinet have no experience whatsoever in public life, in politics.
So you cannot run a country with people with no experience, with no with no real decision making, because the government has no decision making power.
It's the president who decides everything.
And the president, as I said, is a populist with no experience, neither in politics nor in public service.
>>Well, there's a lot of experiments going on worldwide about having competent public officials.
So Tunisia is not alone in that.
Emna Ben Arab, thank you so much for joining us today.
We really appreciate your your comments.
>>Thank you so much, David.
>>And thank you for joining us.
We'll see you again next week on another episode of Global Perspectives.

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