♪♪ >> Hello and welcome to "GZERO World."

I'm Ian Bremmer.

It's often called a quagmire for U.S. foreign policy -- the Middle East.

But as relations between Israel and Arab states open up, the dynamics in the region are changing rapidly.

What should America's role be there?

And how can President Biden get out of the rabbit hole that has stymied so many U.S. leaders before?

We're talking about all that today with leading Middle East expert Vali Nasr.

Later, a Lebanese social-media project goes viral with a simple message.

The world sucks.

Make it better.

And then it's puppets.

>> After almost a year of -- >> Dad!

>> But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

>> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by... >> Here's a few landmark dates in the modern history of the Middle East.

1948 -- the establishment of the state of Israel.

1967 -- the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

1981 -- U.S. hostages held in Iran released.

The list goes on -- peace deals, then a return to fighting, oil gushing from the Gulf states, boycott, and seemingly endless conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

But one day you might not have marked on your calendar yet says a lot about where the region is heading today.

November 8, 2020.

That was the first flight of Israeli tourists landing at Dubai International Airport, a clear sign that the floodgates had opened following the Abraham Accords, objectively, one of the biggest foreign-policy achievements for the Trump administration.

>> Everybody said this would be impossible.

>> Normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

>> This is just a really positive development for the region and for the world.

>> But the accords were also a recognition of three realities that we're already playing out.

First, the Arab-Israeli conflicts that defined that part of the world in the 20th century -- for now, at least, they're not a headline.

Second, the plight of Palestinians has been largely ignored in recent years by Israel and Arab states alike.

And third, the growing power of Turkey and mounting regional tensions with Iran, each drawing new ideological battle lines.

Like the two presidents before him, Joe Biden is eager to shift focus and resources east, namely to China and the growing competition that it presents.

But there are some loose ends to tie up first, to say the least.

Decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, an early military strike against Iranian-supported militias in Syria, while trying to find a path back to the nuclear deal championed by President Obama and abandoned by President Trump, and Turkey, a NATO member that's only moving further away from its Western allies.

What will the U.S. role in the Middle East be under President Biden?

And what pitfalls await us all as power shifts in the region?

That's the topic of today's big conversation.

Professor Vali Nasr, great to be with you, sir.

Thanks for joining.

>> Thank you.

It's good to be with you, Ian.

>> So, you wrote recently in Foreign Policy that the Arab moment has passed.

What did you mean by it?

>> Well, I meant that the Arabs are not really deciding the geostrategy of the region.

They're not the strongest players right now after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the events of the Arab Spring.

The bigger players like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, lost their footing.

They've collapsed.

The smaller players, like Saudi Arabia and UAE, are not capable of carrying a significant military diplomatic weight in the region.

Saudi Arabia could not finish off the war in Yemen.

So they are heavily reliant on the United States in order to stay in the game.

But the way in which we used to look at the Arabs as being the center of gravity of the region, deciding its, you know -- the power balance in the region, and then everybody that was around them is no longer the case.

They're actually subject to other people as rivalries.

And Israel, Turkey, and Iran each are trying to eat up parts of it.

And so we're in a different game, and I have a feeling that the thinking in Washington and in the West generally is still stuck in a period where the Arabs were the center of the Middle East.

>> Certainly, historically, the United States has been pretty comfortable with an Arab-heavy Middle East in the sense that for the last few decades, anyway, the U.S. relations have been reasonably strong.

Do you think that this new period geopolitically is going to be considerably more destabilizing as a consequence?

>> Yes, it could be, because you actually have a massive Arab territory that is up for grabs, and the Arabs themselves are not capable of laying claim to it.

So look at Syria.

You know, the Saudis, UAE, Qatar, pretty much packed up.

The countries that matter in Syria are Israel, Russia, Iran, and Turkey.

Even in Libya, it's now increasingly becoming Turkey versus Russia.

And everywhere they're complaining about Iran and then they're complaining about Turkey.

So the suggestion is that the Arabs themselves cannot actually protect the territories that are broken up, and these outsiders are engaged in a scramble for Arab lands.

And so that scramble is going to create more and more instability.

We're seeing, you know, Israel and Iran going at it in Syria, you know, daily, sometimes weekly bombings by Israelis over Iranian positions.

We're seeing Iran and Turkey getting into loggerheads in the Caucasus in Syria and now most recently in Iraq.

And we're seeing, you know, Israel and Turkey also, you know, not on the best of terms when it comes to a division of power in the Mediterranean.

So if this kind of a rivalry goes unchecked, while the United States think it's all about Iran, we're going to end up seeing instability in places that we don't expect.

>> Does the United States think its all about Iran or does the United States increasingly just think it's not all about the Middle East?

>> Well, the United States is thinking it's not all about the Middle East.

In fact, now, this is the third president in a row who basically says, "We are overspending on the Middle East diplomatically, financially, militarily.

Our attention should be in China."

And, you know, President Obama had a strategy which was you cut a nuclear deal with Iran, which was the most likely reason we would have stayed in the Middle East with another war, in order to pivot to Asia.

And clearly, President Biden cannot afford to stay in the Middle East.

We have too many other things domestically and with China to be focused on the Middle East.

But in order to leave the Middle East, the United States has to find ways to reduce tensions in the Middle East.

And so there are two ways of doing it.

Either you say "we're going to get out of the way" and let the Iranians, Turks, and Israelis sort it out.

Doesn't matter what's going to happen, or that you have to try to find a way to reduce this degree of competition.

And you have to arrive at some kind of a balance of power politics between these four components here.

>> How do you assess early trajectory of this Biden administration on the Middle East?

>> So, I think they do want to reduce the importance of Middle East in terms of foreign policy priorities somewhere down below, you know, to number five, number six, but definitely not number one.

So the recalibration of policy with Saudi Arabia is a very powerful signal to the kingdom that you need to play ball with your adversaries in the region because we are not necessarily going to be bailing out every policy you want.

So we're going to treat you like every other country.

No more special access to the Oval Office.

And you need to finish the war in Yemen.

And we're not going to keep funding or supporting the continuation of that war.

So that's almost like telling the Arabs that you need to get along with your adversaries.

It's almost a repetition of what President Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic.

You got to find a way to live, coexist with Iran in your own region.

With Turkey, you know, the administration actually has not revealed its hand.

It hasn't come up with the way in which it's going to deal with Turkey.

Now, Iran has become much more complicated.

>> So I want to get into the Iranian deal and the role that Iran is likely to play here.

But first, let me go back to what you were saying about the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, for example.

Now, the U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia, the orientation in the early days of this Biden administration has been overwhelmingly on the human-rights side.

How do you feel about the prioritization of human rights and that lens for U.S. foreign policy in this administration?

>> Well, I think it's important because if you're going to go after Iran, you're going to go after Russia, you're going to go after China with Uyghurs, et cetera, you have to at least have a modicum of credibility.

And this had become a credibility issue for the United States internationally.

It wasn't just about the Middle East.

So the U.S. had to right that.

I mean, these are parts of the convoluted foreign policy of the Trump era that they were really hard on Hong Kong with the Chinese but then would give a pass to an ally on a very egregious thing.

So I think it's partly -- it's about, you know, putting American foreign policy on an even keel.

It is also essentially a deterrence measure.

In other words, that you're sending a signal not to do anything like this again, that if you want to be an ally of the United States, you have to act in ways that are not exactly similar to those countries that we're viewing as adversaries.

And thirdly, I think it is to downgrade the relationship not in a negative way, but I think because the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States had become abnormal for our foreign policy, that they could simply bypass the entire State Department, Pentagon, the institutions that they dealt with and just go to the president's son-in-law.

So I think the United States is basically pushing that down.

In other words, you're not special, right?

You're a leader of a country.

We'll treat you as leader of a country, and we're not going to treat you as above and beyond anybody else.

So I think that putting Saudi Arabia back in a box where where it was.

>> So we have to avoid, as you say, you know, taking too much of a foot back on Israel and the Gulf states because they have the potential to draw the Americans back in.

Then you've got Turkey, you've got Russia, and of course, you have Iran.

I want to end with Iran.

But Turkey and Russia, how aligned do you see them in terms of their orientation as outsiders whose countries at home are not doing so well right now, both strongmen leaders dealing with economic challenges that are real, one a NATO ally, at least nominally, though frequently a lot of people raising questions about, the other a principal adversary of the United States.

Talk a little bit about that.

>> So, you know, they both have now ambitions in the Middle East that they didn't have in an earlier era for different reasons.

I think for Erdogan, that idea of reasserting the Ottoman claims to the Arab lands is part of his whole view of himself and the way he wants the Turks to see him.

The Russians have different, you know, agenda.

It partly has to do with Islamic extremism.

Partly it's opportunistic, but also that's part of the Russian perceptions of grandeur.

But the danger here is that Turkey has become quite unpredictable.

It's become a major disrupter.

It's basically lashing out at all directions.

And it's difficult for Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, even Russia to think what is Erdogan's next step.

So I think managing that or at least being cognizant of how important that is, is important to the United States, and that's one of the issues that we have to think about.

It's not about Iran anymore.

Iran is a big player in the Middle East, but there are two other gorillas, and we actually don't have a handle on where Turkey is going in the Middle East.

If it comes to a blow, either with Israel, with Iran, with Russia in one of these, what does it mean for NATO?

Let's say, if in Libya, Russia and Turkey come to blows, you know, what does that mean?

Which is a very bizarre country, which is part of NATO but is also acting like a Middle East power broker now.

>> No, I mean, what the interesting backdrop here is, of course, it's both the most geopolitically fraught region of the world.

It's economically certainly really challenged by all of the momentum towards climate change.

And at the same time, the two most powerful countries in the world really don't see themselves as having a long-term strategic stake.

>> Absolutely, and although the Chinese are expanding westward along this line of Eurasian corridor that we still don't know exactly where the end is, there is talk of Turkey also being interested in some kind of a financial relationship with Beijing.

It has reduced its criticism of the Chinese crackdown on the Uyghurs.

It sees itself as being able to lean on China.

So how the Chinese might play this in the next 5 to 10 years is important.

I mean, we always think of China as just a Pacific power.

But end of the day, you know, for them, West Asia does matter, particularly also as they're escalating with India.

You know, that suggests that they're looking westward in a much more serious way.

>> But compared to the influence you're discussing of Russia, of Turkey, of Iran, I mean, the United States and China are not as central or strategic to the way you're thinking about the Middle East right now.

>> Absolutely.

I mean, the Chinese benefit for many of these countries right now is mostly psychological and financial, but the Chinese are not getting their hands dirty in the geostrategic realm.

>> Okay, so I want to end with Iran because, of course, to the extent that the Biden administration is really expending head space in the Middle East right now, it certainly appears to be a desire to remake what was one of the landmark foreign-policy agreements, breakthroughs, whether you like it or you don't like it, of the Obama administration, as you say, the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear deal.

Now, I look at Iran right now and I see a country that is under massive economic stress that would certainly have all sorts of incentives to get back into the old deal as it was.

>> Mm-hmm.

>> And I've seen lots of statements from Tony Blinken, the Secretary of State, and others that appear to be pretty aligned with that.

So tell me why that won't happen.

>> I think, you know, the expectations the Iranians had was that the U.S. basically in the spirit of undoing Trump's anti-multilateralism, just like he went back to the climate accord.

It was announced that it's coming inside JCPOA, and then, you know, would demand full compliance and the Iranians would demand full compliance.

So Iranians were looking for a quick way to go back to 2017, let's say, just before maximum pressure.

But that didn't happen.

It didn't happen because maybe there's domestic pressure on the administration, maybe the administration could not trust the Iranians would do this.

But also, the Trump years are also wasted years because some of the provisions of the deal will actually finish under President Biden's term in 2023.

So the U.S.'s worry is that if we went back in to restore the deal and we lift sanctions and went back to 2017, we basically will have no leverage to get Iranians engaged in further conversations about extending sunset clauses, et cetera.

And I do think that the Iranians have come to the conclusion that the United States doesn't really take their nuclear program serious enough.

It doesn't show urgency of going back in the deal and that they have to have something to really get U.S.'s attention for serious lifting of sanctions.

And they don't believe that they have that now.

So they've come to a resolution that JCPOA is not going to be restored anytime soon.

But in the meantime, they are keeping the pressure on the United States of saying "We're going to enrich more, you know, hitting missiles into Iraq."

And so the U.S. basically now has to come up with a diplomatic strategy of how are you going to get back at least into, you know, direct conversations and stop the process where it is.

>> Yep.

>> The other issues that are important, Ian, is that it's really how sustainable is the economic pressure in Iran, and this is a sensitive calibration because the U.S. may overread in that.

The question is, can the Iranians survive another year?

Can they survive another six months, during which time the size of their enriched uranium becomes a lot bigger?

I would say yes.

I think in their psychology, the greatest pain was at the beginning.

The massive shock of inflation, unemployment, hardship was already hit, which caused street riots and rattled the regime right after.

But right now, they don't see this as regime-threatening right away.

>> I'm getting the sense that if, gun to your head, as they say, if you had to make a call, you think that the U.S. and Iran will get back into the Iranian nuclear deal.

>> I'm an optimist on this, Ian, because I think the overall logic for both sides is that they want the deal.

The United States needs to go focus on China.

And the one issue that could get it into a war in the Middle East is Iran's nuclear program.

Obama understood that.

I think Biden understands that.

You can saber rattle, you can put pressure on them.

But in the end, if you want to reduce tensions, it has to begin with the nuclear deal with Iran.

And I think the Iranians, yes, they can survive this another six months.

They can survive it maybe maximally a year, maybe more.

But ultimately, they want these sanctions lifted.

They've said that multiple times.

Even the supreme leader said there's a priority to lifting of sanctions.

So both sides have to deal with pride, with nationalism, and with their domestic constituencies.

And I think one of the things the U.S. has to be very careful is that particularly what he says in public, he shouldn't corner Iranians.

If you want diplomacy to succeed, you have to leave a ladder for the opponent to be able to climb down from the tree.

So I think that's where we have to get the mechanics right.

But if we do it, I do think that there could be a resolution.

>> That's the final word.

Vali Nasr -- he knows a lot about the Middle East.

Thanks for being with me today.

>> Thank you for inviting me, Ian.

>> And now to another story out of the Middle East that caught our eye.

Do random acts of kindness still exist?

One viral social-media project out of Beirut is banking on it.

>> I feel that the world doesn't suck for me.

So I need to make other people feel that the world shouldn't suck for them too.

My name is Bob.

I'm from Beirut, Lebanon, and I work for The World Sucks.

The World Sucks is a social experiment channel that uses hidden cameras to surprise people, and the objective of it is to show you that the world doesn't suck.

My name is not really Bob.

The reason why you can't see my face is because if I'm going to surprise someone, we go up to somebody... ...a low-paid person and ask them for something free.

For example, we ask a taxi driver for a free ride, and then when he gives us the free ride, we give him money in exchange.

But then, in exchange, we have to -- we ask of him to do something nice for someone else.

Why?

To pay it forward so that we can get this chain of goodness going from people to people to another person.

I want the audience to be surprised the same way that I am surprised when I film this video to show them that humanity is there.

We might think that 50% of the people are good, but I can assure you more than 80% or 90% of the people are good, at least in Lebanon.

The response on social media was amazing.

There was so much support, so many people that wanted to do the same and that want to help.

There's actually a WhatsApp group for a thousand volunteers right now that are ready to help anytime.

>> Parts of Beirut are in ruins after a massive explosion.

>> The explosion was a horror.

What happened during the explosion was really catastrophic.

What happened after was a big sign of hope, because if you went to the streets and saw how many people were there to help, giving in Lebanon is something very, very normal.

People are giving free things even though they have nothing.

Many people all around Lebanon filming videos and sending it to the page, and we call them the Suck-scribers, like "suck," "scriber."

We call them the Suckscriber.

They film videos and they send it to us and they show humanity in all Lebanon.

So we hope to have it in the whole world.

That's why it's called The World Sucks, not Lebanon Sucks, to have people all around the world doing videos like this to be able to show how humanity is present all over the world.

So if anyone wants to join the cause, just send us a message.

We'll be more than happy to have you.

>> And now to "Puppet Regime."

Kids, they mutate so fast.

Meet the coronavirus empty nesters.

>> Being a parent during a pandemic is something we all know can be difficult.

But after almost a year of -- >> Dad!

My Zoom is broken!

Fix it, fix it, fix it!

>> Daddy's at work, okay?

Remember what we agreed -- when the camera is on, the lack of respect for your father is off!

>> Ngggh!

>> Where was I?

Now, we spoke to one couple that's facing a unique set of challenges.

>> As proud parents of variants, of course you want them to thrive.

They're little versions of you, you know?

>> But you worry, especially when they -- [ Sniffles ] When they grow up so fast.

>> Soon they're just out of control.

They don't call.

They don't write.

We have to follow social media just to know what they're up to.

Like our son in the U.K., all we get is stuff like this.

>> I'm not coming home, Mum.

I'm not coming home.

They're about to reopen all the pubs and the schools and everything.

I'm not coming home.

>> Corona Variant B.1.1.7, that is not how you speak to your mother.

>> Crazy.

And look at the stuff we get from our kid in South Africa.

>> [ Speaking indistinctly ] I'm ripped and I'm in Cape Town.

I'm gonna hit this place hard.

>> Honestly, even we can't understand him anymore.

>> And we speak almost all the languages.

>> That's true.

218 countries and counting.

>> And what about our pride and joy who popped up in Brazil?

>> Gah, we don't know what kind of people she's hanging out with.

>> Mom, Dad, don't worry.

I'm having a great time.

The president here just let me do whatever I want.

>> I just want to wrap her up in my protein spikes and say, "Honey, please be safe."

>> It's tough, you know, and there's, like, probably lots of other variants out there, too, you know?

>> What?

There are other kids?

Where?

With whom?

>> I just mean -- It's the science.

It's -- >> "Puppet Regime"!

>> That's our show this week.

Come back next week, and if you like what you see and of course you did -- we showed you the entire Middle East.

Where do you get that half an hour?

That's right -- "GZERO World."

Check us out at gzeromedia.com.

♪♪ ♪♪ ♪♪ ♪♪ >> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by...