>> Iran's breakout time, which is the amount of time that it takes for Iran to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon is now less than two weeks.

It was more than 12 months when President Trump walked into the Oval Office.

♪♪ >> Hello and welcome to "GZERO World."

I'm Ian Bremmer.

And today we are looking at international efforts to revive the Iranian nuclear deal.

After 11 months of complex negotiations, diplomats now say they are close to an agreement yet again.

It would effectively breathe new life into a deal that was left languishing after the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal back in 2018.

But ongoing conflict in Ukraine involving Russia, one of the deal's key negotiators, has threatened to upend progress.

I speak to the International Crisis Group's Iran director Ali Vaez.

He was recently in Vienna covering the talks.

Then combating propaganda in the age of social media.

How some people, yes, including celebrities, are trying to influence Russian public opinion.

>> You have the true heart of Russia.

>> Don't worry, I've also got your "Puppet Regime."

>> Hey, folks, did you miss me?

Of course you did.

Very strongly.

>> But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

>> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by... >> The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA for short.

It is the Iranian nuclear deal.

Enacted back in 2015, the deal was aimed at limiting Tehran's nuclear capabilities in exchange for some sanctions relief for its badly battered economy.

The world powers at the negotiating table included the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia, as well as Germany and the European Union.

At the time, it was hailed as a major success by all parties, especially the Obama administration.

They saw an opening with Iran as an opportunity to rebalance American power in the region.

Joe Biden, then vice president, played a big role in selling the idea to Congress.

But the accord wasn't viewed as a win by everyone.

Back on the day of the agreement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted, "The JCPOA was a historic mistake."

Critics complained that Iran's requirements under the deal were only temporary, that they did not actually prevent Iran from developing a nuke and didn't address the country's support of regional proxy groups like Hezbollah, seen as a terrorist organization by the United States.

Plus, it hardly reset relations with the U.S. -- Sanctions, after all, were still in place, as well as Iran's U.N.-censored ballistic missile program.

Donald Trump had more colorful names for the deal during a CNN interview while he was on the 2016 campaign trail.

He said that the Iranians had out-negotiated the Obama administration, even went so far as to call American negotiators a bunch of babies.

Putting an end to the Iran deal was one of the Trump administration's major campaign promises.

Not a surprise.

He actually first recertified the deal not once, but twice.

But then he did withdraw back in 2018.

President Joe Biden has made it a presidential priority to revive the JCPOA and progress has been made.

But times have changed, and recent geopolitical events are making negotiations more difficult.

For starters, there's that war in Ukraine, and Russia's place at the negotiating table has already caused real problems.

If Russia walks away, implementation of the deal becomes more politically challenging.

But Washington worries that Moscow may also use its trade relations to Tehran to skirt the heavy sanctions in place after Putin's invasion.

And then there's the global oil crisis, an event that gives the Iranians more leverage over Washington.

The Biden administration has led a big effort to increase global oil output with the Emirates, with Saudi Arabia and even Venezuela in order to drive down prices and placate American consumers.

Iran is in a better position to drive a hard bargain than they used to be.

But even if a new deal feels imminent, there's still the chance that a new U.S. administration in 2025 could withdraw yet again.

This week, I speak with International Crisis Group's Iran director Ali Vaez.

He thinks that a new deal is the best way forward if we want to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Here's our conversation.

Ali Vaez, thanks for joining me today.

>> My pleasure.

>> So is this new Iran deal happening?

>> Look, I've stopped predicting because it was supposed to happen a few months ago.

The U.S. is consistently talking about the fact that the window is closing on it, but from one week to another, it's constantly pushed back.

But, you know, at the same time, I would say it has become too big to fail for both sides.

They've expended too much political capital and time and effort into it.

And the alternatives for both sides is really not attractive at all.

But, you know, there is still plenty of space for miscalculation.

So it's really difficult to say.

I would say it's still 50/50.

>> Why can't failure be an option for the Iranian government?

>> Well, because it's true that their economy has survived, but their economy can't thrive under sanctions.

And then in the medium to long term, that becomes an existential threat to the system.

So that's why Iran wants to get out from under U.S. sanctions and is seeking sanctions relief.

They also know that if this crisis escalates, it would eventually result in the snapback of the U.N. sanctions, which means that Iran will once again be considered a threat to international peace and security under U.N. Charter's Chapter 7.

And now, with the P5's unity completely shattered as a result of U.S.-China Cold War and as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is actually -- there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

It wouldn't be easy for the Iranians to again get out of Chapter 7 designation.

>> Now, on the American side, we, of course, know that gas prices are very high and nobody is really happy about that.

And it's not helping Biden at all.

But at the same time, there are a lot of people that remain very critical of this Iranian nuclear deal and signing a deal on the back of "we've got to get something done to get oil prices down," I mean, isn't Biden risking taking some pretty significant shots on goal?

>> If the main driver for the policy was to bring down the energy prices, that would be correct, but I don't think that's the case.

The reason the administration is pursuing this agreement is because Iran is now closer to the verge of nuclear weapons than it has ever been in the past almost 20 years of a nuclear standoff with Iran.

Iran's breakout time, which is the amount of time that it takes for Iran to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon is now less than two weeks.

It was more than 12 months when President Trump walked into the Oval Office.

So the administration, yes, will pay a political price for restoring the agreement, but it would also pay, I would say, even a bigger political price in the run-up to midterm elections if it has allowed Iran to become a virtual or a nuclear weapon state under its watch.

>> Can't they just blame Trump?

I mean, the reason that the Iranians are out of the deal and are now developing their nuclear capabilities is because Trump decided to unilaterally pull out of the deal in the first place.

>> Well, they can and they will.

But, you know, the reality is that they've been in power now for almost a year.

And if they fail to restore the nuclear deal, it will be their fault.

It will be under their watch and they will be blamed of basically paving the ground for living with a nuclear-armed Iran.

And that's not a good look for a Democratic president.

>> Naftali Bennett, the Israeli prime minister, seems to be somewhat less hawkish on the Iran issue than Bibi Netanyahu used to.

I've heard that privately he talks about Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities as opposed to breakout as being the true red line for the Israelis.

Do you see a change in the Israeli position?

>> I don't necessarily think that the new Israeli administration is less hawkish.

It's not as proactive in fighting the deal, especially by direct interference in U.S. domestic politics in the same way that Prime Minister Netanyahu did -- you know, a very brazen speech that he delivered at the joint session of Congress in 2015.

That's not the case anymore.

But Prime Minister Bennett can't afford to be seen on the left of former Prime Minister Netanyahu, now the leader of opposition.

And so he has to come out in opposition to restoring the deal.

But the reality is that, as we have seen now by statements and comments by a lot of former Israeli security and military officials who served in the Netanyahu administration, they all now agree that a no-deal scenario does not serve Israel's interest.

And in fact, Trump's withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 was a strategic mistake that has basically brought Iran to the verge of nuclear weapons.

>> Which was not Netanyahu's position at the time that Trump decided to withdraw from it?

>> That's correct.

And it's still not to this day.

But again, those who don't have the political calculations of leaders like Prime Minister Netanyahu or Bennett admit that that was a mistake and basically that the nuclear deal is better than all the other alternatives for Israel.

>> So you come back into this deal.

First of all, there's not as much time left on it.

So it's a narrower time frame.

It's not longer.

It's not stronger, as the Biden administration was initially saying they would be working on when they first came into power a year ago.

And, of course, if Trump were to come back in 2025 or if almost any Republican leader were to, the likelihood the U.S. would once again withdraw from a second nuclear deal seems pretty high.

So given all of that, what are we really looking at?

>> So first of all, I don't think it's a short-term benefit.

You know, one of the key limits in the nuclear deal, which is the limit on the stockpile of enriched uranium, without which Iran would not be able to develop nuclear weapons and also on the level of enrichment, these two limits will expire in 2031.

So we're buying at least nine years, and that's not nothing in international politics.

And also, you know, it's true that in 2018, when President Trump wanted to withdraw from the deal, there was a hypothetical threat that Iran might develop -- might get close to the verge of nuclear weapons.

That has -- Now we've actually lived four years of the alternative.

And we know that it actually unleashed Iran's nuclear program.

It rendered Iran much more aggressive in the region, much more repressive at home.

It really did not advance any of the strategic objectives that the U.S. had in mind when it withdrew from the agreement.

That's all part of the historic record now.

So if the next Republican president wants to repeat that mistake, of course they can.

But Iranians have also now have what is known as inherent guarantees in the agreement, which is that they are preserving some of their advanced centrifuges, which implies that if we get out of the deal again and we renege on our obligations under the deal, it would take them even less time to get back to where they are today, which is, again, uncomfortably close to nuclear weapons.

>> How confident do you feel and why that if there is no nuclear deal, that the Iranians would actually develop a nuclear weapon?

>> That's a very good question.

Look, the reality is in -- with the trajectory of Iran's nuclear program, they are, as I said, now less than two weeks away from breakout.

In a matter of four weeks, they would have enough 60% enriched uranium, which is 99% of the effort that it takes to get to weapons grade that is sufficient for a single nuclear weapon.

I think you remember Bibi Netanyahu's red line at the U.N. in 2012.

>> With the bomb.

>> That was about 240 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium.

>> When he brought the graphic, the big graphic of the bomb.

>> The cartoon bomb.

And now, you know, the equivalent of that amount in 60% is 40 kilograms.

Iran, as of last week, had about 33 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium.

So this is not a stable situation.

Eventually, that breakout time will fall down to a matter of days.

It was what U.S. officials refer to as margin of error, which means that with the lower level of inspections that we right now have between one inspection of a site and the next one, Iranians can produce a single nuclear weapon.

Now, that's not an arsenal.

That's not a deliverable and functional nuclear weapon.

But it's too much of a risk.

And I think it's too uncomfortable for Israel and the U.S.

So there is a risk of military confrontation.

Iranians know this.

You know, the reality is that this is a program that has been deeply penetrated by Western and Israeli intelligence, as we have seen in the form of covert operations against Iran's nuclear program and scientists.

So there is a risk of escalation and military confrontation that could then easily spiral out of control.

And that's what I'm worried about, much more than Iran actually crossing the Rubicon and developing nuclear weapons.

>> Another thing I'd love to ask, because we don't talk about it very often, your view on why the Israelis should have, say, 100 nuclear weapons and yet it's unacceptable for the Iranians to have any.

What's your view on that?

>> Well, international relations is about double standards, right?

So the fact that Israel already has nuclear weapons doesn't mean that Iran, which is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should have the same rights.

And, you know, it's true that proliferation cascades have often been feared, but rarely have actually materialized.

Take the case of North Korea.

It did not result in a cascade of nuclear weapon proliferation in that part of the world.

But in the case of Iran, it's a very different situation.

We know that Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they all have looked into developing significant nuclear capabilities, not necessarily weapons.

But again, it's a hedging policy that could render a region that is already in too much turmoil even more unstable.

So, again, it's a risk that I don't think anyone should take.

And the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons, I don't think would provide Iran with any kind of blank check to pursue a similar policy.

>> Are the Iranians or others in the region thinking differently about nuclear proliferation because of what we're seeing with this horrible war going on in Europe?

>> Look, it's not a new lesson for the Iranians.

They remember Saddam Hussein or Gadhafi in Libya who basically gave away their nuclear programs and were invaded by the U.S. or NATO.

They have seen how President Trump treated North Korea, which was armed with nuclear weapons with respect versus Iran that was obviously complying with its obligations under the nuclear deal.

President Trump withdrew from that and reimposed sanctions.

So it's not necessarily a new lesson.

Again, as I said, I think Iran's nuclear calculus has been based on two main factors.

Number one is the fact that, you know, they know if they crossed the Rubicon and developed nuclear weapons, the strategic balance of power becomes basically a nuclear game on how many nuclear weapons you have, how sophisticated they are, whether you have second-strike capabilities or not.

And a lot of the dimensions of Iranian power in terms of size, population, depth of history, statehood, all of that would disappear in a balance of power that is dictated by nuclear deterrence.

And Iran's neighbors often have better resources and better alliances.

So it's a risk that I don't think Iran really wants to take.

Its policy has always been on hedging and providing itself with an option of going nuclear if indeed there is a threat that would justify that.

And the second element is, as I said, the fact that they do believe that if they dash towards nuclear weapons, they will probably pay a huge price in terms of a military strike before they're able to reach their objectives.

>> Since I asked you about Russia-Ukraine, I do want to ask about the Russian relationship with Iran.

Historically, they've been seen as one of the friendlier countries towards Iran, certainly in terms of their cooperation around propping Assad up in Syria.

And yet the Russians came out not so long ago, just a couple of weeks ago, and said, "We're prepared to quash any possibility of getting back into this Iranian deal unless you give us guarantees."

How's that viewed in Tehran and how much of a spanner in the works do you think that the statement by Lavrov, the foreign minister, Russian foreign minister, actually represents?

>> The Iranians were definitely surprised by it.

They asked for clarification from Moscow and they were disappointed because Russia is one of the sole allies that Iran has on the international stage.

And for them to deprive Iran from getting sanctions relief only because Russia is now subject of similarly Draconian sanctions did not make any sense to the Iranians.

My own guess is that this was a Russian tactical gambit to see if they can leverage the nuclear deal with Iran, to which they are a major stakeholder and a guarantor, as a way of punching a hole in the Western sanctions regime against Russia.

When it became clear that that's not going to happen and when they realized that there was a popular backlash in Iran against Russia, they decided to walk back these demands.

And in a matter of a week, the Iranians managed to convince Moscow to back off.

>> So you told me at the beginning of this discussion that, you know, you're sick of making predictions on all this, and I get it.

But having now heard all of your views on what's going on around the deal, it seems to me that if you had to make a call, you'd say you think it's going to happen.

>> Well, again, I think because the alternatives really range from unattractive to outright ugly for both sides and because they have invested so much into this deal that it's become now too big to fail, that the odds of success are higher.

I would put them maybe at 60% right now, but there's still 40% chance of miscalculation because both sides believe that the other needs to deal more and so is willing to make concessions on some of the remaining issues that by definition, are the toughest ones that have been left to the very end.

>> Ali Vaez, thanks so much for joining me today.

>> Absolute pleasure.

Thank you.

♪♪ >> The official Twitter account of Vladimir Putin only follows 22 people.

I'm not one of them.

Don't know why, but one of them is actor and politician Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Yes, it is.

Last week, he published an anti-war video message addressed to the Russian people to show them the truth of what's happening in Ukraine.

Even made a personal appeal to Putin himself.

Putin follows him, after all, asking him to end the war immediately.

>> And to President Putin, I say you started this war.

You're leading this war.

You can stop this war.

>> But Schwarzenegger is not the only one trying to change public opinion in a country growing ever more isolated by the day.

"GZERO's" Alex Kliment has the report.

[ Gunfire ] >> As Russia's war in Ukraine entered its second month, more than 80,000 people attended a pro-war rally in Moscow recently, headlined by Vladimir Putin himself.

Some of those in attendance told reporters that they had been bused in for the event.

But analysts at the Levada-Center in Moscow, Russia's last independent pollster, say that two thirds of the population do support Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

In a country where social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram have been shuttered since the start of the war, state television dominates and controls the message.

Still, some outside of Russia are trying to challenge the official Kremlin line.

Anton Krasun is a Ukrainian-born tech entrepreneur who has lived in Ireland for the past 12 years.

He created a platform called CallRussia.org, which connects volunteers to a database of more than 40 million publicly available phone numbers in Russia.

>> We want to appeal to human feelings like no matter what your beliefs are like, you know, everyone values human life.

The things that are happening in Ukraine is not a special operation, is not a crisis.

It's a war.

And civilians are dying.

Children are dying.

>> Volunteers from more than 50 countries have already signed up to help, including Nikita, a Russian émigré artist in Brooklyn, New York, who allowed us to film one of the exchanges.

Changing opinions like these in Russia won't be easy, according to Professor Maxim Sytch at the University of Michigan.

>> The problem here is twofold.

One is access to information.

And the second is unseating those deeply entrenched belief built on blatant falsehoods that are now intertwined in this organic world view for those Russians who support the war.

>> Sytch, who grew up in Russia and Ukraine, said those falsehoods include the idea that this is a special operation to liberate Russians in Ukraine from a Nazi government that is waging a genocide against Russian-speaking people.

>> For you to say no to war at this point, all these assumptions need to be challenged.

>> But that hasn't stopped Anton Krasun and his team of volunteers from trying, even if the odds are stacked against them.

>> We have a big duty to try to stop this war from Russia.

If there be no support from regular people, I think this war will be over.

>> For "GZERO World," I'm Alex Kliment.

♪♪ >> And now to "Puppet Regime," where Trump plans his big comeback tour with or without Mike Pence.

>> Hey, folks, did you miss me?

Of course you did very strongly.

That's why this season I am launching a comeback tour.

That's right.

All across this beautiful country, I will be reviving all-time favorites such as... Come on.

You know the words.

>> "Puppet Regime"!

>> That's our show this week.

Come back next week, and if you like what you see or you just want me to say Arnold more -- Arnold, you know you want me to say Arnold -- check us out at gzeromedia.com.

♪♪ ♪♪ ♪♪ ♪♪ >> Major corporate funding provided by founding sponsor First Republic.

At First Republic, our clients come first.

Taking the time to listen helps us provide customized banking and wealth-management solutions.

More on our clients at firstrepublic.com.

Additional funding provided by... ...and by...