AMNA NAWAZ: For additional perspective on the latest developments, we turn now to two of our experts.

Alan Eyre worked in the State Department focusing on Iran and was a senior member of the Obama administration's negotiating team for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

He's now at the Middle East Institute.

And Miad Maleki was born and raised in Iran, until last year was associate director for sanction targeting in the U.S.

Treasury Department with a focus on Iran.

He's now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Welcome back to you both.

ALAN EYRE, Middle East Institute: Thank you.

AMNA NAWAZ: You heard Nick lay out the outline there of what we believe is in this deal.

Also, Miad, an Iranian official telling him that progress has been made.

What's your assessment of how close the two sides are to a deal?

MIAD MALEKI, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies: Well, I think both sides really want to have a deal.

That's very clear.

What I would say is the Iranian regime has never faced a level of pressure that they're facing right now since 1979.

So I would say they're way more desperate to get a deal than the U.S.

side.

And I think, on the U.S.

side, I think there is a realization that this is a leverage that we have, that we haven't had since again since 1979.

This is a time to get a deal if you want to get a deal.

But then at the same time, what we're hearing is Iran trying to go back to the playbook of dragging out negotiations, have the blockade lifted, and then get U.S.

engaged in negotiations that could go on for forever, understanding that the U.S.

administration is probably unwilling to go back to another round of its strikes.

AMNA NAWAZ: Alan, what do you make of that?

ALAN EYRE: I'm glad that both sides are at least saying that they're going to negotiate.

I think it is improbable that it will result in a detailed, comprehensive agreement that both sides will abide by over time.

But if it just gets the Strait of Hormuz open and prevents further hostilities, that's probably the least bad option.

So it's good that we have gotten this far, but basically this one-page document is just saying we agree to negotiate, so not a heavy lift at all.

The real work lies ahead of an agreement on a one-page document.

AMNA NAWAZ: So let me ask you about the phasing then, as Nick had reported, that Iran moves to reopen the strait, the U.S.

ends its blockade, all parties declare an end to the war.

Is that the right phasing, you see?

ALAN EYRE: Here's what's left out.

Yes, Iran is willing to reopen the strait, but they didn't say they're going back to the way it was before.

All indications are Iran has got this new system.

They have got the Persian Gulf strait authority.

They have got new lanes that go through Iranian coastal waters.

So the question is, sure, they're willing to let maritime traffic resume, get back up to 130 ships a day, but is that under the new Iranian system, which seems to be a vermilion line, if not a red line for Iran now, or, less probably, going back to the old system, which everyone in the world other than Iran wants?

AMNA NAWAZ: Miad, what do you make of that?

MIAD MALEKI: I would disagree on -- well, here's the thing.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian regime is affecting their own economy more than any other economies in the world.

It was a nuclear option that they deployed and is hurting them more than any other nations right now.

So the problem here is, if the blockade is lifted, Iran has definitely want to open up the Strait of Hormuz.

I mean, they're losing $435 million a day in trade, import, export altogether.

The problem here is, domestically, it would be a very heavy lift for this regime to agree to any kind of long-term agreement with President Trump administration.

What they have lost as far as layers and layers of the political figures, including the supreme leader, the fact that they have to give up their nuclear enrichment program, which they have spent hundreds of billions of dollars on, that is going to be a very heavy lift for them.

I think they're just going to go back to dragging their feet in negotiations, and we're going to find ourselves kind of Iranians waiting for the next U.S.

administration.

AMNA NAWAZ: So, Alan, this next phase is where all the more contentious issues live, right,what happens with the highly enriched uranium, what kind of freeze Iranians agree to on the enrichment program.

If it is a five-year freeze, as they have offered before, is that in the U.S.

interest to sign?

ALAN EYRE: Well, we're back to square one.

First of all, again, what is -- Secretary Rubio said yesterday, we're fighting to get the strait open.

The strait was open before the war.

And if we do get the strait open, either under a tolling or non-tolling system, we're just back to the same set of issues that existed February 26, plus a bunch of new issues, because both sides are less trusting of the other because of the war.

Now, yes, you don't need to prevent Iran from indigenous enrichment to prevent a nuclear weapon.

The key is IAEA verification.

If the IAEA gets back in Iran and can do the safeguards agreement, the additional protocol, have eyes and ears on the Iranian nuclear activity, everything else is dealable, how long the enrichment is, how much uranium they have.

But the key is having Iran live up to its obligations under the NPT.

MIAD MALEKI: It's almost -- from my point of view, this regime will not commit to something and then would kind of stay -- would be in compliance with it.

IAEA, I understand they can go in, they can have inspections done on some sites.

But you have robust intelligence agencies of not just the U.S., but many different countries, that fail to capture and trace Iran's underground nuclear operations.

I have doubts that IAEA has intelligence capacity to really watch out what this regime would be doing next on nuclear enrichment program.

So putting that aside, the five-year ban on the enrichment, they probably need 10 to 15 years to rebuild what they have lost in postwar.

Plus, they don't have the economy to throw another rounds of hundreds of billions of dollars in rebuilding the nuclear facilities.

So five years is probably the time they need before they reach the point of going back and rebuilding the nuclear program anyways.

So, a 15-to-20-year makes sense.

AMNA NAWAZ: We have heard President Trump say again and again, we're close to a deal, we're close to a deal.

In the few seconds we have left, do you see this happening in the next few days?

ALAN EYRE: He said it seven times in the last 21 days.

Each time, there's been some serious market manipulation.

I'm not saying he's doing it.

I'm not saying his people are doing it.

But, again, the reality is, we're not close to a deal, it will take long negotiation to get a deal, and you're not going to get a deal just by saying, we're close to a deal.

AMNA NAWAZ: Miad, we will give you the final word.

MIAD MALEKI: I think we're close to a deal if the Iranians kind of show some compromises on some of the assets they have.

But I agree with Alan that the gap is so wide that - - and Iranians having domestic political issues, I mean, I don't think they have one supreme leader anymore who would be willing to accept that -- drinking the poison, as Supreme Leader Khomeini did in the '80s after the end of Iran-Iraq War.

So they also have a political dilemma that no one is probably willing to go to Pakistan or Geneva and give away the nuclear enrichment program.

AMNA NAWAZ: Miad Maleki, Alan Eyre, we will have you back again in another 24, 48 hours, see where this turns next.

Thank you both.