♪ ♪ (theme music plays) RUBENSTEIN: Hello, I'm David Rubenstein and we're gonna be in conversation today with Bret Baier, who is the chief political anchor for the Fox News Channel and the anchor and executive editor of Special Report with Bret Baier.

He's also the author of Three Days at the Brink: FDR's Daring Gamble to Win World War II.

Bret, thank you very much for being in conversation with us today.

BAIER: Hi David, great to be here.

Thank you.

RUBENSTEIN: For those who aren't that familiar with World War II or the events around it, what actually was the Tehran Conference, which is the center of your book, what was so important about it?

BAIER: Well, the Tehran Conference is the first time that Roosevelt meets Stalin face to face.

So in, in that, it's very important.

Uh, but most importantly, it's the place where they map out what's called "Operation Overlord", the invasion in Normandy, which we now know as D-Day.

Uh, had that conference not happened, and had that not transpired, I think, uh, the war, it's very possible, may not have been won, uh, because that changed the tide.

Uh, it also was the, the time that Roosevelt, uh, really was, uh, was healthy and he was engaged and what came out of that conference affected the rest of World War II.

RUBENSTEIN: Okay, let's set the stage, there are three protagonists in your book.

Uh, FDR, uh, Churchill, and Stalin.

Let's go through how each of them got to the point where they were the person representing their country in Tehran.

So, let's talk about FDR, came from a wealthy family but, uh, he had some difficulties in his political career.

What happened in 1920, he was vice presidential candidate, what happened to him?

BAIER: Well, I mean, he was just unimpressive, really.

Uh, that's what I was surprised at in looking at the, the research.

I mean he was an attractive guy, uh, as you mentioned, came from great lineage, a distant cousin of Theodore Roosevelt, and um, had a lot of wealth, uh, but was kind of bland and not, not really, um, an effective politician.

Uh, it's not until he's stricken with polio at, at 39, uh, and he fights through that, everybody thought it was the end of FDR's political career, but, instead fighting through that, uh, with these heavy steel braces on his legs, uh, to prop him up to, to walk a little bit with help, to, to be up against a podium and deliver speeches, it enables him to have empathy, to become the leader that he is.

RUBENSTEIN: So, uh, 1920 he's the vice presidential candidate under James Cox.

They lose, uh, to Warren Harding.

They, uh, he then kind of figures out what to do with himself, doesn't have anything, uh, particularly, uh, noteworthy that he wants to do.

Is that, is that right?

He was just, um... BAIER: That's right.

RUBENSTEIN: Kinda wandering around, uh, looking for some career, uh, opportunity.

And then, gets elected, uh, Governor of New York.

Al Smith, uh, in effect arranges that.

Gets elected President of the United States in 1932.

Um, in those days people may not remember this but, um, you're elected in November but you're not inaugurated until March.

And so, he's got a long time to kind of get ready to be President.

So when he's inaugurated in March, he does a bank holiday, he begins the first 100 days of activity, um, and he's, you know, taking us out of the Depression with the help of lots of other people, no doubt.

Um, and then he gets reelected in 1936, is that right?

BAIER: That's right.

RUBENSTEIN: Fairly handily against... BAIER: Handily.

RUBENSTEIN: Against Alf Landon.

So, uh, after he finished his presidency, uh, towards the end of the second term, people are wondering, are you gonna run again?

There had been nobody more than two terms, uh, Washington had kinda set that policy, though it wasn't the law.

So when does he decide he wants to have a third term and did he really want a third term?

BAIER: You know he actually, wasn't thinking about a third term.

He was going to go to Upstate New York and he was going to, uh, work on his memoirs with his team.

Um, but the bubbling issues of potential war with what's happening overseas, um, s, he starts to think that he alone can be the person to steer the ship of state, uh, through treacherous waters.

FDR, uh, especially in his second term and definitely in his third, had a bit of a god-like complex, um, which is at times very strong and can be very powerful, but it's also a weakness, um, which you see at the end of his, uh, last term.

RUBENSTEIN: So and, and he decides to run for a third term with a more or less a slogan that says he kept our boys out of war and he'll continue to do so.

Something like that, is that right?

BAIER: That's exactly right.

He had no interest in going to the war.

In fact, Congress had passed a law to prevent them from even helping, assisting.

Um, and at that point Great Britain is the only one fighting this "David and Goliath" battle against, uh, against Germany.

RUBENSTEIN: And Churchill, let's talk about Churchill.

Uh, Churchill had been a politician from a very distinguished family like, like, uh, Roosevelt was but he wasn't considered exactly great Prime Minister material, was he?

BAIER: No.

In fact, he was thought of to be washed up, uh, and he was the lone voice in the House of Commons, uh, speaking out against, um, the effort of appeasement, uh, which is what Great Britain was deciding to do with Hitler.

Um, Chamberlain at the time was steering the policy and it takes some time before, um, Hitler's true colors come out to the population in Great Britain to realize that this is a major threat.

And it's fortuitous for Churchill, he is the lone voice in the wilderness, if you will, um, uh, saying you have to stand up, uh, to this threat.

And because of that, and when Chamberlain falters, uh, he essentially takes over that point of, of being the salvation, or at least the person who's gonna stand up to Hitler.

RUBENSTEIN: Chamberlain had said we could work a deal out, uh, so-called appeasement, uh, policy towards Hitler doesn't work out so he has to step down as Prime Minister.

The King says to Churchill, I want you to form a government.

And at the time people thought, Churchill you're so old, how can you be Prime Minister?

You're 65 years old, it's a teenager today, right?

BAIER: That's right, yeah.

Uh, he also wasn't obviously in great shape, he was a heavy drinker.

Um, a total character, wore his emotions on his sleeve.

Um, but in that time and in that moment, delivering those powerful speeches on the floor of the House of Commons steered the, the population in Great Britain and got behind, uh, what was a lonely battle against Germany.

RUBENSTEIN: And to set the stage, um, September 1, 1939, the Germans invade Poland and that's when England officially declares war on Germany.

So to set the stage, Churchill's there, he's at war, does he call Roosevelt and say, come and help me, I need your help?

And Roosevelt says, anything you want, uh, Winston.

BAIER: No.

Uh, Roosevelt is saying he can't because Congress is tying his hands, even though, uh, politically he doesn't want to get the US involved in war.

Um, they do talk.

Uh, Churchill asks, uh, repeatedly for assistance and, uh, Roosevelt attempts to do a few things, um, even taking planes up to the Canadian border, um, and trying to get some way to give, uh, Great Britain assistance, clandestinely.

Uh, but, in the end, uh, it's not until Pearl Harbor that the US gets into the war.

RUBENSTEIN: What does Churchill really think of FDR and what did FDR think really of Churchill?

BAIER: Well, I think Churchill at the time, according to his writings and his aides, was frustrated with the US.

He had, he looked to FDR as this, uh, lion, this figure that was, um, bigger than life.

And at, at the time obviously he was, um, but he wanted a, this partner in the war.

Um, FDR in his writings and his aides, um, looks at Churchill as, as emotional, uh, as somebody who's a fighter and has iron will, uh, but someone who, um, has to be handled carefully, uh, could be explosive.

Uh, but they establish a really close relationship and have amazing, um, interaction about, once they get in the war, how to win the war and then the post-war is really a lot of their discussion.

RUBENSTEIN: Let's talk about the third protagonist, Joseph Stalin.

Um, how did he rise up?

Did he come from a wealthy family like Churchill or, uh, Roosevelt?

Or, who were his parents?

BAIER: He didn't, he was a young, acolyte of Lenin.

Um, was from very poor, uh, upbringing.

Um, he, the rise to power was, I mean, he was successful, a good student, uh, but he was not, uh, somebody that stood out.

Uh, he was ruthless though and, uh, a lot of people described him as, um, essentially doing everything possible to, uh, get the message around what Lenin was preaching.

Uh, in that, uh, gets the eyes of the leadership in the Soviet Union and it's, it becomes this, uh, rise to power that is surprising there, uh, but for Stalin, not so much.

RUBENSTEIN: Okay, so, again, to set the stage, the United States comes into the war, uh, declares war against Japan and Germany after Pearl Harbor, uh, the Germans are attacking the British, uh, from time to time and Battle of Britain and so forth, and then the Germans are trying to invade Russia.

So, when all of these things are moving forward how did Churchill, Roosevelt, and, uh, Stalin communicate with each other?

They didn't have the internet those days and I don't know how communications were.

Were they able to actually talk to each other in a very secure way?

BAIER: Right.

It was by letters, uh, telegrams, and, um, they did not talk in person until Tehran, at least Roosevelt didn't, Churchill met Stalin before that.

Um, their letters sometimes were icy, uh, because Stalin wanted assistance, more assistance, he wanted early in the war another front because, uh, he was taking tons and tons of casualties, uh, inside his country as, as Germany's agreement, um, fell apart when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt looks at Stalin and sees the possibility, once they're in the war, uh, of getting Stalin and the Soviet Union to fight Japan.

And he wants that.

Churchill looks at him very, very skeptically and, um, really has, has a lot of thought about the post-war, should they win, and that was in doubt.

It literally was at the brink.

Uh, but he is very skeptical of Stalin's motivations.

RUBENSTEIN: So around the, uh, 1943 the war is proceeding, it's not clear who's gonna win in 1943, it's decided that they should get together the three leaders, but if you look at a map, it doesn't look like Tehran is kinda centrally located between the United States, England, and, uh, the Soviet Union.

So why did they meet in Tehran?

Because, again, Roosevelt as you point out in your book, he's got, uh, uh, polio, he can't move that quickly, it's not easy for him to travel.

Why did they mo, why did he go all the way to Tehran and why was Tehran picked?

BAIER: Well, I mentioned that the telegrams and the letters were icy, uh, in part because Stalin demanded that the meeting be there.

It was almost a home court advantage and he would not meet unless it was there.

So in the end, uh, Roosevelt and Churchill believed it too important, uh, not to go forward so they all trekked, uh, across the world in very dangerous times, uh, to go to Tehran.

In fact, FDR secretly gets aboard the USS Iowa and on the way over, uh, surrounded by other US war ships, as they're doing a training exercise, a torpedo actually is fired accidentally at the USS Iowa where not only the President of the United States, but his joint chiefs are sitting watching this exercise happen.

Um, they get on the radios and say this is not a drill, torpedo is heading towards the USS Iowa, they barely miss the torpedo, it explodes off the bow and FDR is clapping on the bridge because he thought it was a wonderful, wonderful sight.

RUBENSTEIN: Around the end of November of 1943, early December is when the Tehran Conference occurs, and so Roosevelt, uh, meets with, uh, Churchill in Cairo before and then they're, make their way to Tehran.

But, uh, is there any truth to the stories that were existing then that the Nazis were gonna try to assassinate any of the leaders then, in, in Tehran?

BAIER: So there was some skepticism about the intelligence but um, uh, the Brits believed it to be true, uh, that there was a Nazi plot to try to assassinate the big three leaders, uh, in Tehran.

And that, the, the Germans would come in in Red Army, uh, Soviet, um, outfits and, uh, parachute in and then find their way to, the British Embassy, it was going to be held there at first, to kill the leaders.

The Soviets then say our Embassy is more protected, uh, and you need, we need to have it here.

The US, uh, inside, in the internal deliberations wonders whether this was all a, a Soviet effort to get everybody there where all the rooms are bugged and again, it's in the home court.

RUBENSTEIN: But Roosevelt agrees, I'll go do, I'll live in the Soviet Embassy during the meetings and, uh, Churchill will live in the British Embassy which is right next door and Stalin's in the b, ber, in the, uh, Soviet Embassy as well.

So, um, they must have thought everything was bugged so how did they avoid, uh, being bugged?

Did they just whisper a lot or what did the Americans do?

BAIER: Yeah they, um, FDR is, um, sends messages essentially by what he's saying in these various rooms, uh, knowing that everything is being heard, um, they don't say any secret things out public because they do know that it's bugged.

In fact when they talk sometimes, uh, they said that, that Stalin would just pop up like a, a hotel clerk, you know, just out of the blue, uh, as they were talking about strategy for the next day.

RUBENSTEIN: And, uh, what was Roosevelt's impression of Stalin who he had never met before and obviously Stalin never met Roosevelt, what did they think of each other?

BAIER: Well, it was a respect, a mutual respect, um, again Churchill was the one that had the most fear or, um, worry about the threat of Stalin, not only then but in the future.

Um, Roosevelt felt like he needed to cozy up to Stalin, uh, again he wants, in Roosevelt's mind, to get him in to the war effort in an effort to fight Japan eventually.

Um, Stalin looks at FDR and says he wants more assistance, direct assistance in the war, and he wants another front, he wants the Normandy, uh, overlord to happen.

And, uh, Churchill doesn't want that, he wants the North Africa, uh, avenue to continue and to go that way, uh, but he is brought along.

In this meeting, um, at times FDR kind of shuns Churchill or, or makes fun of him, uh, at the expense of Churchill to try to get closer to Stalin and, in fact one point going into the room with Churchill, he says Winston forgive me for what I'm about to do.

And then rips on him, uh, to make Stalin laugh at Churchill.

RUBENSTEIN: Roosevelt called or told his staff it was his charm offense, that he was trying to charm Stalin.

But is it possible to charm Stalin?

BAIER: Not really.

I mean, Churchill believed he was un-charmable, FDR, again having the, sort of the thought that he can do everything, um, that he believed he could charm Stalin and, and win him over.

So, uh, not only in Tehran, but then later in Yalta, um, a lot of people are critical of, of FDR, looking back, wondering if he kind of, um, gave him the farm if you will, um, Stalin, including Poland, uh, in order to believe that he could work things out later.

Obviously after Yalta, FDR does not make a later, he dies.

RUBENSTEIN: So how many, um, meetings do they actually have at, at Tehran where they, they meet for three or four days and do they meet every day in the morning and afternoon or how did that work?

BAIER: The whole thing lasts three days and it is, um, from beginning to end.

They have long, long meetings, uh, some of them not ending fruitfully.

Uh, but in the end they come to the conclusion that they are going to launch "Operation Overlord" and, uh, start to talk about who's going to lead that.

Uh, the going bet is that it's going to be General George C Marshall, uh, who's on the trip, but FDR doesn't agree to that, doesn't say that that's going to happen.

In the back of his mind, he wants Marshall back in Washington and he wants to go with Dwight D Eisenhower.

RUBENSTEIN: So when you look back at it, um, the main thing that Stalin wanted to get out of the Tehran conference was to have an, agreement to conduct "Operation Overlord", the invasion of, uh, of Europe, uh, through France.

Um, so he really prevails really 'cause that's the ma, most important thing that came out of the conference.

Is that right?

BAIER: That's exactly right.

And he also wanted assistance, like physical assistance, uh, money, arms, uh, that sort of thing directly to the Soviet Union.

Um, he also eventually wants, um, the go ahead, the clearance, uh, for Eastern Europe, um, he doesn't say that publicly in Tehran, uh, but that is in the writings, uh, basically where Stalin's heading.

RUBENSTEIN: So, uh, what happens is, uh, for Roosevelt, what does he get out of it?

He really wanted, uh, a second front in Asia in effect, uh, he wanted the, the Soviets to support his efforts in Japan.

Is that right?

Did he get that out of Stalin in that conference?

BAIER: Uh, he got it nominally but nothing specific and, uh, so Stalin essentially agrees a long term, um, but does, is pretty vague in the commitment.

And, uh, what Roosevelt wants is that commitment and believes he can get it as this charm offensive continues.

He agrees to "Operation Overlord", agrees with Stalin, opposition of Churchill, um, but they believe that this is the moment, the seminal moment of the war and looking back, they were right.

RUBENSTEIN: So, uh, as a result of "Operation Overlord", the D-Day invasion which occurs on June the 6th 1944, uh, the Allies make a lot of progress and they know by, by March of 1945 they're gonna win the war, they pretty much know that.

They just don't know exactly when they're completely gonna get the Germans to surrender.

So they say, as you pointed out, that they're gonna have another conference in Yalta.

Uh, why in Yalta?

BAIER: Again, it's, um, Stalin's, uh, demand and, uh, this is something that's even more treacherous, uh, to get to.

Uh, but all of the leaders agree.

I mean Stalin's obviously steering the ship here.

Uh, they take this trip and not only do they get there but it's 100 miles in a car.

Um, FDR has been hiding, um, from a lot of people, his failing health, uh, but there was no hiding it on this trip.

Uh, he is really frail looking, uh, he barely makes it through the 100 miles and you can see in the pictures by the time he gets to the conference, uh, he looks, uh, very bad and is not of the same vigor as he had in Tehran.

And some people wonder whether that also led to some of the concessions like Poland, uh, to Stalin at the Yalta Conference.

RUBENSTEIN: So Roosevelt's main mission at Yalta is to get an agreement I guess on how the world would be shaped after the war's over.

Is that what he wanted?

Right?

BAIER: Exactly.

He wants a, sort of a world police force, he wants China included, um, he wants, uh, the main powers, uh, to be sort of the peacekeepers.

And, um, that is the, the structure for the United Nations.

RUBENSTEIN: And Churchill, what does he want out of Yalta?

BAIER: He has envisions of, um, of grandeur for Great Britain.

Um, you know, different places that, uh, possibly fall under, uh, Great Britain's, um, rule.

Uh, but he also wants to contain and, uh, deal with the threat he fears in Stalin.

Um, in Yalta, Tehran but then definitely Yalta, critics say FDR, um, you know, won the war but may have lost the peace.

In, uh, the beginning of the Cold War starts really at that moment.

RUBENSTEIN: And what Stalin really wants I guess is he wants to be able to make certain that Eastern Europe remains a buffer against, uh, Western Invasion.

So is that what he mostly wants out of Yalta is the right to get, uh, Poland and other countries in Eastern Europe to be within his domain?

BAIER: Right.

He wants a, uh, protecting zone, but he also wants, uh, the ability to occupy and take over, uh, those countries and eventually, obviously we know from history that's what happens.

RUBENSTEIN: So when Yalta is over, um, Roosevelt comes back and he gives a speech to Congress.

So does he say, look what great things I did and this is really a great victory?

BAIER: He says that, uh, he believes that his, uh, these efforts are going to lead to a peaceful nation.

It's actually really, uh, if you read the speech, it's, it's very compelling.

It was the first time he was in public rolled out in his wheelchair.

Uh, and, uh, for his failing health, again he digs deep and delivers really a powerful speech, um, about what the war was about and his vision, uh, for the post-war.

RUBENSTEIN: So about a month after he gives that speech, or a little bit less, he dies.

BAIER: He does.

And he goes down to Warm Springs, uh, Georgia, um, he is there with, uh, his longtime aide Lucy Mercer and, um, has a headache, um, and does not wake up.

Uh, word gets to Eleanor, uh, who's in, in Washington, uh, and soon around the world and, um, it came as a big surprise, uh, because even though he looked frail, he had not told the, the nation, uh, of his illness for a long time.

RUBENSTEIN: Lucy Mercer was his former mistress, um, he stopped seeing her for a while but then, uh, toward the end Anna, his daughter, thought it would help him if she came and visited him in Warm Springs and as soon as he died, she quickly left town.

BAIER: Exactly.

RUBENSTEIN: So the final conference of the war really, or post-war, is Potsdam.

Um, just to mention that very briefly as we conclude, uh, Harry Truman goes and now he's meeting with, um, I guess initially Churchill and then, and then with Stalin, um, how does, how do they, uh, get along?

How does Truman get along with Stalin and Churchill?

BAIER: Uh, icy, uh, and the most amazing part about the research is that Harry Truman is totally kept out of the loop, uh, totally out, he only met with Roosevelt once.

Um, he was not told at all about the atomic program, uh, the nuclear program in the US.

Um, doesn't have a brief on what was said and what was done, what was agreed to and what the post-war looks like.

And again, this gets to FDR's, um, strength in one side, weakness on another, uh, that he believed he alone could steer, uh, the US through this dangerous time.

Now Truman is taking that baton and does not have a lot of information heading into a very important meeting in Potsdam.

RUBENSTEIN: So it's hard for people to believe this, but today of course the Vice President of the United States has an office in the West Wing.

Harry Truman, when he was Vice President, didn't have an office in the West Wing, he didn't have an office in the Executive Office Building.

His only office was up in the Senate.

BAIER: Yeah.

RUBENSTEIN: He just didn't have anything to do with, uh, the administration practically.

BAIER: And they barely even talked, as I mentioned.

One in person meeting.

And ye, now you think about all the briefings that a Vice President gets even if the President is doing something else, the Vice President's briefed at every moment.

That was not the case.

And the fact that the atomic program, the nuclear program was not briefed to the Vice President, a President who eventually uses that to end World War II, is pretty astounding.

RUBENSTEIN: So, Bret, a final question, as a result of all the research and the writing you did, did you come away with more respect for Roosevelt and Churchill than you had before or a little bit less respect or about the same respect you had going into it?

BAIER: I had a lot of reverence and respect going in.

Um, I do feel like there is a string here in leaders and after looking at Eisenhower and Reagan, Churchill, uh, FDR, even Stalin but, but less so Stalin, there is this string of they've gone through some adversity in their life.

They've gone through some crucible, um, that has stiffened their spine.

And they use that in the communication ability to steer the US, uh, in a way that moves people.

Uh, I think FDR had that ability, uh, tremendously.

If you listen to some of those speeches and, and, um, at the time, it was very, very powerful.

I, I do think, as I mentioned throughout, that he had this weakness and it was, uh, a weakness that cost the country in the end, uh, to not, you know, have briefed Truman, to, to believe that he alone could, could warm and charm Stalin.

Um, Churchill had that same crucible and also the communication ability, uh, but obviously ends up leaving power and the rise of Stalin and the Cold War happens soon thereafter.

RUBENSTEIN: Bret, it's a very interesting story.

I wanna thank you for putting it together, I learned a lot from it.

And thank you for being in conversation with us today.

BAIER: David, thanks a lot.

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