Interview with Secretary of State James Baker.

Baker: We wanted to make certain that since we were operating under United Nations authority, we had sufficient authority from the Security Council to use force. Originally what I had in mind was language to effect generally of all necessary means including the use of force, something like that and, having explored that language with Shevardnahze on a couple of occasions and perhaps with others, I came to the conclusion that we were not going to be able to get a resolution that specifically authorised the use of military force. So I asked Bob Kinnet who was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and a very close member of my team and a very good lawyer to have the legal office of the State Department research whether or not the phrase just `All necessary means' would, under international law and law applicable to the United Nations, give us sufficient authority to wage war. And he came back with the answer that it would.

Q: Why did Edvard Shevardnahze prefer that formulation?

Baker: Well because I think that it was a little bit ambiguous. It didn't mention the word force, it didn't mention the word military. It was pretty hard for the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Afghanistan particularly to vote in the Security Council for a resolution that would permit basically the United States of America to use military force in the Persian Gulf and particularly to use military force against a client state of the Soviet Union.

Q: Why was there a deadline built into this resolution?

Baker: Because it was important that we be able to demonstrate that we had been reasonable in giving enough time to withdraw. We used to make the case, I recall, that he went in in two days or whatever it is, a certain number of hours. And it wasn't too much to expect him to leave in 2 months or 3 months whatever the deadline, I can't remember what it was, but whatever the deadline amounted to. It also helped us get the Soviets on board, it helped us bring other nations into the coalition because it was an imminently reasonable period of time and it helped us particularly with domestic political opinion in the United States. Which was at the beginning of all of this very, very much opposed to the idea of going to war in the Persian Gulf.

Q: Did you think that this UN vote--this is a moment of history?

Baker: I thought it was. I think it was a historic vote. It was one of few times frankly that the Security Council had met at the Foreign Minister level for one thing and it was really one of the very few times that the Security Council had authorised through a Security Council resolution, the use of military force multi means. Maybe the only other time being in the case of the Korean war. I'm not certain about that.

Q: How did you feel as an individual?

Baker: I felt good about the fact that we were able to bring the international community on board for what was right. We had really been able to cobble together a rather unprecedented international coalition. I had the feeling that the United Nations was working that day in the way in which the founders had intended. In terms of its security functions which had not been utilized because of the East-West conflict which led to a situation where if the Soviet Union wanted something we'd veto it and if we wanted something the Soviet Union would veto it. So I think a lot of people saw it as a rather historic day.

Q: How much did President Bush want it, that resolution?

Baker: Oh very much. It was after all the President's decision to go multi-laterally. That was not an easy decision. There were voices suggesting that we should do this under article 51. We knew we could do it under article 51. We had no problem with that. We knew legally we had the authority to do it under article 51. But we also recognised the importance of doing this in a way that it was not seen to be America and the West against the Arab world and that it was not seen to be a cowboy operation. That it was done in a way that would be supported particularly by the American people. And when the crisis first erupted and particularly in the aftermath of the Presidents decision to augment our forces back in early November, there was very little public support in the United States for the idea of going to war in the Persian Gulf. In fact, it was overwhelmingly opposed and one way in which we'd built domestic political suppor was to bring together an unprecedented international coalition. So the President it was an important vote as far as he was concerned because it proved the wisdom of this approach. It proved that the United States was leading the international community and doing something that was right and that was unprecedented.

Q: Whose initiative was it to suggest the talks with Baghdad?

Baker: That was something that the President had in mind for some time during the weeks leading up to our being able to obtain the necessary support for the use of force resolution. When I called him from the United Nations, following that vote, he said 'I've got an idea that I'd like to talk to you about' and we had briefly touched upon this possibility in an earlier conversation. And the next morning I met with him and Brent Scowcroft just the three of us, and the President suggested the idea of some sort of face to face meeting with Saddam Hussein that would permit us to be seen in the judgement of history as not having left any stone unturned in the pursuit of peace. He felt, and I strongly shared this view, that unless we could show that we'd done everything we could diplomatically and politically to achieve Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait we could be criticised maybe for going to war precipitously and that sort of thing. Obviously President Bush was not going to go to Baghdad and obviously it was not appropriate for us to suggest Saddam Hussein come to the United States. So he suggested that Tariq Aziz come to Washington and that I go to Baghdad and that was the genesis of that proposal.

Q: A lot of your colleagues, even talking to them now, regarded this as a James Baker plot to avoid the war?

Baker: Well that's really not correct, this was certainly not a plot on my part to avoid the war but I'd strongly supported the President's inclination to do this in terms of its impact on the judgement of history and I think it was the right thing to do as it turned out. I'll tell you this, the meeting with Tariq Aziz in Geneva permitted us to achieve congressional support for something that the President was determined to do in any event, but how much better that he could do it with the support of the peoples' elected representatives in Congress and really with the support of the American people rather than just, having to go off and do it. And I think Senator Sam Nunn who was opposed to the idea of using forces as early as we used it in the Gulf would tell you that congressional opposition to the use of force pretty well collapsed in the aftermath of my meeting with Tariq Aziz so it was clearly the right thing to do at the time, and probably the right thing to do I think when looked at in retrospect.

Q: But a gamble?

Baker: No because there was nothing we could lose - so what could we lose by doing it? Why was it a gamble?

Q: Saddam Hussein could have given you half a loaf, he could have said 'I'll go half way up the road to the border or...'

Baker: Well that would have made our job more difficult but I was going with absolutely no intention or willingness to negotiate down from the UN resolutions. Absolutely not and I felt extraordinarily strongly about that, so did President Bush. We could not -- having gone into the Security Council and obtained Security Council resolutions -- then ourselves negotiate down from those resolutions. That was just never a possibility. Now if he had said, 'Well we'll get out, it'll take, you know we'll pull out 50% or we'll do this', that could have made it a little more difficult for us but the President was determined to enforce that resolution and we were determined not to do any negotiating down from it. So, a gamble, no it really wasn't a gamble in my view. It was all upside. The only downside to it was that it caused some of our Allies to question our resolve briefly, briefly, only during the period of time that the meeting was being arranged and that sort of thing. In retrospect I think they would tell you it was the right thing to do.


Q: As you walked into that room to meet Tariz Aziz, were you thinking this is history, the next couple of hours really matter?

Baker: I really didn't, I mean I didn't feel it as being as much a part of history as for instance the vote in the Security Council that day. Although I felt that it was an extraordinarily important meeting, I didn't go in to that meeting thinking we were going to achieve a peaceful resolution of the dispute because I was unwilling, and I made this very, very clear from the very beginning of the meeting, I was unwilling to do any negotiating down from those UN resolutions. We just weren't going to do that.

Q: What did you say to him as you handed the letter and what did he do?

Baker: I said I have a letter from the President of the United States for President Saddam Hussein and I'd like to begin the meeting by giving you this letter. He said 'Do you have a copy of it that I can read' and I said 'Yes, I do' and I had the letter in an envelope addressed to President Saddam Hussein from President Bush and he took the copy and he read it. It took him maybe 10 minutes or so to read the letter and he said 'I cannot accept this letter, it's not written in the language that is appropriate for communications between heads of state.' He said, 'You may publish it in your media' and I said 'All right I'm sorry that you choose not to take the letter' I said but, I think I said, 'But we may not publish it in our media and it seems to me Minister that you're taking a rather large burden on your shoulders because you're the only person on your side of the table...' and it was at that point that several of my aides there in the meeting said they seemed to see his hands tremble a little bit. You know Aziz was under a fairly close watch at that meeting. He had Saddam Hussein's brother-in- law, Barzan, who was Iraq's Ambassador to the UN in Geneva sitting on his right and Saddam's personal interpreter there on his left. I'm sure that there was no chance whatsoever that he was going to in any way stray from his instructions.

Q: Did he understand the force that he was going to encounter?

Baker: During the course of the meeting, I made an effort to to point out to him that as President Bush's letter to President Saddam Hussein pointed out, we were deadly serious about this, that there was no given in opposition. That this was now a matter of the credibility of the United Nations, it was a matter of a resolution supported by the overwhelming majority of the international community. And that they had to leave Kuwait unconditionally and, if not, overwhelmingly superior force would be used against them. I said that they should not make the mistake of assuming that they would control the terms of the battle, as perhaps they might have assumed in their war with Iran. That this would be a totally different situation that our technological superiority was overwhelming and would be brought to bear in and he took all that in. He didn't buy it. He said something like - you haven't fought in the desert before. Your Arab allies will turn and run, they will not fight their brothers. You will be surprised at the strength and the determination and the force and the courage of the Iraqi military. Things like that. And it was not a particularly productive debate. I think as it turned out our assessments of what our overwhelmingly superior military forces could do were correct.

Q: How did you wrap the meeting up?

Baker: We'd been going about six and a half hours ..., at one point I said 'Minister I don't want to cut this off prematurely' I said, but 'I have said everything that I think is important to say, but I don't want to cut this off and if you don't have anything further to offer, then I'll stay here as long as you want to stay'. And he finally said 'No I don't have anything further to say' and so we adjourned the meeting and I had the feeling that he was sort of resigned to what was going to happen -- that his view was this is the way it has to be. And we shook hands at the end, in fact I think most of each delegation shook hands and I was certain at the time that we would be going to war and going to war very, very soon.