Interview with Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Senior British Commander

Billiere: Well, the short answer to that is that they should have been very formidable, if you consider the situation that existed at the time. First of all, you were faced with the fourth largest army in the world, the fifth largest air force in the world. They'd been fighting for eight years, and must have had an enormous amount of battle experience, and they were used to operating in that terrain, which of course, to our western European forces, was alien.

I don't think we ever thought we weren't going to win. But, we were going to win at a price. And the question was how big was that price going to be in terms of lives. And how were we going to minimise that price, keep the live, loss of life down to a minimum.

And of course, he'd had already used chemical weapons. And so there was a lot of concern that we were going to suffer heavy casualties. I never actually went along with the estimates that were quoted back in the United Kingdom, but I certainly thought casualties were going to be in the region of, shall we say, a thousand to fifteen hundred British dead, which was a lot. And, to be perfectly honest, from my point of view, I didn't think that we should be losing a lot of British lives in that war. That was my private feelings at the time.

And I was bloody well going to make sure that every step should be taken to minimise the loss of life of Coalition forces. And in my case, British forces in particular. Fortunately, Norman Schwarzkopf had the same view. He'd had a very bitter experience in Vietnam where a lot of American lives were lost, and he all his generals were not going to have an unnecessary loss of life.

So we thought we were faced with really formidable forces, and that is why we built up such enormous forces in response and we were not prepared to commit them until we got them all in position, and that we got all that we needed to make sure that we had a sledge hammer to crack a nut. And there's no apologies for that.

Q: You know about casualties....you've had friends killed......

Billiere: When I was a second lieutenant, I went out to Korea. And I saw casualties in substantial numbers. I saw a third of my own platoon killed or injured - more than that actually. And I saw that casualties could be avoided with good leadership, good management and careful planning. I've felt ever since then, there could never be any excuse for any commander squandering the lives of other people, however justified the cause.

Q: What do you say to those who say--'These military chaps, they're just flaming up the strength of the Iraqis, because they want to make what they subsequently did look good'--?

Billiere: Good luck to you. All I would say is that we had more forces than we needed to do the job, and that was not a mistake, it was a judgment in the right direction and, of course, we had more forces than we needed, we had less casualties than we would other wise have had.

Q: Were you concerned that the Americans ultimately weren't going to fight?

Billiere: No, not at all. I mean I saw Norman Schwarzkopf every day of the week, at least once a day for an hour and possibly more. And we were always working in harmony because we were regularly talking, communicating with each other and I understood his problems. He understood my problems.

I think it was a considerable concern in my mind and in his that there wouldn't be the political resolve to go ahead and see through the political threats that we were putting across in the United Nations.

And, of course, you can't go on hyping up a force to attack something and then never do it. Because in the end you'll have lost the will to fight. And you'll have probably lost the political backing that is necessary if you are going to fight an effective war.

So, once the ball is rolling towards recovering Kuwait by force, one was very concerned that we'd be called off at a point where it would have unbalanced us shall we say.

Rather like a car. You get into top gear and suddenly you say, hey, hang on, we want you to stop. You slam on the brakes or you go into reverse. And then to get going again is an even bigger job than it was to get going in the first place.

Q: You were one of the people who probably saw more of Norman Schwarzkopf than almost anyone else. Recall any conversations where Norman Schwarzkopf spoke about the pressures he was under?

Billiere: He didn't have to speak about them, you could see it. We would be having a major conference and this dreaded red telephone, I think it was red, would go, and on the line would be Washington.

And everything stopped. The war stopped. Everything stopped while Norman Schwarzkopf had to answer some question that very often was a triviality about the latest press report, or why some bit was reported differently between his headquarters Washington's analysts. And that level of interference, I believe, was a very difficult thing to manage. And Norman handled it brilliantly because of his intellect. But I believe with a lesser man it would have put pressure on him which might well have affected his ability to control and plan and direct his own forces.

A commander on the ground should be looking forwards, not backwards. And I think Norman had to spend far too much time looking backwards.

Q: How formidable a force was it that was assembled?

Billiere: It was an extremely formidable force. I mean it was the largest concentration of aircraft ever collected together for combat in one operation. And indeed the largest numbers of aircraft ever used in combat.

We had something in the region of 750-800,000 people involved out there, of which about 535 ,000 were American and 45,000 British. We were the second largest contributor after the Americans, apart from the Saudis, of course, whose country we were in.

It was indeed a formidable force. And certainly it was going to win that war. I mean, there was never any doubt about that. And this was an objective that Norman had set himself. Of course, the problems it raised was the logistics of getting all this deployed.

Do you know -- when the British Forces arrived out in Saudi Arabia, in order to get into their war positions, they had to motor the distance between the Channel ports and Berlin? The whole of the advance across Europe, before they were in position, to get themselves into position to fight.

The actual airlift the British used out there was greater than the entire British contribution to the Berlin airlift. Monumental logistic thing. A hundred and, about 146 ships taken up from trade to move the British forces out there. And the Americans of course, proportionately that much larger. And what's move they had to be used twice, move twice the distance.

Q: The British assembled a formidable land force. But it took a lot of effort. Were you surprised that the four divisions in Germany melted down to one division in the Gulf?

Billiere: I think everybody was really surprised. I think a lot of people had been saying that we were under-resourced in Germany and that the equipment wasn't properly maintained. But I don't think that anybody really thought that it was going to boil down to the fact that all we could really put in the field with effective armor that was going to be capable of fighting and sustaining the logistic demands--that it would come down to one division.

Mind you, having said that, that one division, was very well equipped and was absolutely first class. And you know, if, the rest of BAOR had been equipped and maintained to that level we would have had a very, very effective fighting force in Germany.

Q: What had to be done in order to equip that one division to the level it was equipped?

Billiere: They had to cannibalize all the armor from the other divisions. A lot of the personnel from other divisions. A lot of the other military equipment you know, gunners and so on, from other divisions from within the corps and effectively Germany would have been unable to hold the line if the Russians had attacked. Because what we didn't know, was that the Russians were in an even worse state than us, and could never really have launched an effective attack. But here again, you know, it's all very well being wise after the event, and at the time the judgement and the intelligence was that they might attack. And they could attack. But we had to take that risk.

Q: So if the Russians had attacked these four divisions, would they have been up to it?

Billiere: I think because the Russians weren't up to what we thought they were up to, they'd have certainly have given a very good account of themselves and in actual fact I think the Russians would have failed first. And I mean, we've only got to see that with the way their armor and their equipment behaved in the Gulf War when pitted against ours. It was all very second rate.

Q: To what extent were you worried-- Mrs, Thatcher was, very worried about the serviceability of the Challenger--she was terrified that a British division would get bogged down somewhere with all the engines broken down.

Billiere: Oh, it was a major concern. And indeed John Chapel, the then CGS, had been sent for by Margaret Thatcher to give an assurance that the equipment would work. And he gave her that assurance, up to certain percentage level. I think it was about 80% or something, which is a reasonable percentage to expect. And my job was to see that it did work and to ask for the resources.

And I have to say, that I received the most superb support from the Ministry of Defence, from the Army side of the Ministry of Defence. Anything I wanted to make sure those tanks worked, I was given and we had a red star delivery system which Paddy Hine set up so that when tank equipment, tank engines were required out, they got priority on the aircraft, even greater priority than mail and it's very seldom in, I'm glad to say, in British service history, that mail is down graded in priority. But that gives you an idea of the importance that was attached to seeing that those, the equipment for those tanks was available on demand.

And of course, the other thing--and this isn't known you know, generally. Vickers themselves sent out a lot of civilian crews who operated in the front-line areas, helping our REME people carry out advance repairs so that the tanks didn't have to be back loaded and the engines didn't have to be back loaded.

Q: An enormous determination?

Billiere: Oh yes, and great commitment by Vickers. You know this is something that we've never actually acknowledged since the war, what British industry did to see that their equipment was going to work in the field, on the day. And they were prepared to put themselves right up in the battle zone to see that it did work and give expert advice and help.

Q: What's the lesson for the British Army of the Gulf War? In terms of preparing?

Billiere: Two things. First of all, it's no use having ill-equipped badly maintained divisions, brigades, whatever it may be. If you've got a brigade, we've got to be able to afford to look after it and maintain it and equip it properly. Just the same as if you've got a car, and if you've got a big car, an expensive car and you can't maintain it, then you might as well go for a smaller one. But make sure you can look after it well.

And the second thing, and I think this is even more important actually, your equipment is only as good as the people who are operating it. And if we ever lower the standard and quality of manpower in the British services, then it doesn't matter how much money we spend on equipment, it will never be used to its best effect and above all else we must maintain the quality of man power that we attract into the Services and then keep them there.

Q: But you were giving your analogy of a car--?

Billiere: Yes, absolutely that. We got to know a very expensive shop window with nothing to back it up, I'm afraid, in the back office.

Q: Did you think that the Iraqis were going to use chemical weapons?

Billiere: Let's just look at the facts as they were. The Iraqis had chemical weapons. We knew that. They had biological weapons. We knew that. They had used them. We knew that. And they were going to be fighting what Sadam Hussein had called "the mother of all battles". So we would have been very neglectful to have assumed that he wasn't going to use chemical weapons with all this evidence to support it.

And so, I certainly thought he would probably use chemical weapons, if the conditions were right. We did not however think that chemical weapons would in terms of inflicting casualties, be an overwhelming, contributor towards the Iraqi cause, because the use of chemical weapons is highly sophisticated.

It's very limited. It depends on weather. It depends upon where your own troops are. It depends upon getting the kit, getting the weapon systems into the right area and having a delivery system. It isn't just a question of firing off a few other shells with chemicals on board. A lot more complicated than that.

So we knew we'd have problems, but I think we all expected that he would use them somewhere along the line.

Q: If he had used chemical weapons in a devastating way, what retaliation would the coalition have made?

Billiere: Well, I think we'd have certainly stepped up the bombing into Iraq in a much more ruthless way. But what was threatened, inter-government, I don't know. All I would say is that there was a nuclear capability available and Saddam Hussein must have taken that into account when he decided whether or not it was going to be worth using chemical weapons.

And bearing in mind the limited effect chemical weapons would have had against troops that were properly protected, and ours were properly protected, I think he must have come to the conclusion that the gains were far too small for the risks he'd have to take.

Q: Were you ever involved in any discussions of possible use of nuclear weapons?

Billiere: No. That was not really necessary, I think it was political thing. Clearly, the capability was there and one saw that that was available and ready to go. But, no, I didn't discuss the use of nuclear weapons. There was no need to.

Q: You report relentless pressure to move the British division away from the Marines. What were you saying to Norman Schwarzkopf?

Billiere: Well, you see we'd committed ourselves. When the small forces that were required to deter further aggression were deployed, we were put with the American Marines and we were delighted to be put with them. They are fine forces. And it was a great privilege to work with them and we learnt a lot from them.

But when the aim changed, from one of defence to one of use of force to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait and we increased our contribution very substantially by sending out a whole armed division instead of a brigade, which to us was an enormous contribution, then it was very important to see that first of all, and this is really what my job was, to see first of all it was used where it was going to be most effective.

And secondly that it played a role of sufficient importance to back up the sacrifice and contribution that the British nation had made. And it was my assessment that to then have continued working with the Marines, would not have met these objectives.

And so, I wanted it moved to an area where it could be used effectively and where it was going to make a major contribution. And that meant going with Fred Franks' Corps and in the main thrust.

Q: Were you worried also that the British Army would take disproportionate casualties by being with the Marines?

Billiere: I was not prepared to commit the British Army to a role for which it was not ideally suited and where it might also take additional casualties because it wasn't properly suited. And it was not properly suited to that role on the east coast where the distances were far too short for it to deploy properly. Where its mobility was going to be impaired by the pipelines and interference of that nature. And where we were working with a force that had never been stationed in Europe.

Now Fred Franks' Corps answered all those questions at a stroke. And so it would have been quite wrong for me to run the risk of additional casualties working with the Marines, when we could have a role that we weren't suited to, when we could switch to the Central Corps and do the role that we were suited to. And what casualties we had there would have been, shall we say, our fault. I mean, they would have been part of us fighting a battle for which we were trained and equipped.

Q: But, to sum up --to be part of the main attack-- you were concerned that the Marines were going to take enormous casualties, and that the British Army ...

Billiere: The advice that my advisers gave me...their assessment was that there would be excessive casualties on the east coast. Because it was a frontal attack and it was going to be across, straight into the Iraqi main defensive positions. And to have gone ahead committing a British division that wasn't even suited to that type of warfare, to that, and to take unnecessarily heavy casualties. If I'd agreed to that, I wouldn't have been doing my job and I think I should have been removed from command. My job was to see that the British forces were employed on tasks for which they were equipped and trained and where they were going to be most effective contributors towards the whole of that war.

And, it was therefore an important part of my job so far as the British division was concerned, to see that it was deployed in the right place.

Now Norman, as you know, was actually not at all keen on this. And I can see exactly why he wasn't. I mean, if he moved us from that flank, he'd got to put additional American forces in there. He'd got to take them away from another American division and break it up in order to send them across to the Marines.

And furthermore, the whole of the British division instead of being in position, which they virtually were during the work up phase, had got to be moved across the whole of the front. So there were a lot of good arguments from his point of view, as to why they shouldn't be moved.

And I think, you know, this says a lot for Norman's character. One of his great strengths is that he was a diplomat, as well as a soldier and why he was so successful in holding that coalition together, is that when he saw that another nation had an over-riding need to do something that didn't meet his military priorities of the moment, he was prepared to give way to that nation in order to keep them on side. And he did it not just with the British, with a lot of other nations as well.

And the move of our division, although he stood out against it, and tried to avoid it happening, and we had to put a lot of pressure on him, in the end he gracefully agreed that it should happen.

And I think that says a lot for the man that he can get this balance right between diplomacy that is necessary to keep a coalition force together, on the one hand, and develop a military fighting capability with that coalition despite having to let diplomacy give way at times to military correctness.

Q: Do you have a twinge of regret that the British army wasn't able in the end, to drive up the road with the Marines and be in Kuwait City?

Billiere: None whatsoever. It was an absolutely right decision. I would take it today. I've never had a single thought about it being correct from the moment I decided that was what was going to happen.