Interview with Richard Haass, National Security Council Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Q: Could you sum up the approach the Administration were taking towards Saddam Hussein and Iraq in 1990?

RH: The Bush Administration came into office in early '89. That was six months after the end of the Iran Iraq War. Iraq had emerged as the most powerful country in a key part of the world to us. I think the feeling was at the time, let's at least try to develop a workable relationship with Saddam Hussein who, after all, we were able to co-operate with in limited fashion during the war against Iran. For about a year or so the United States tried that. The policy tends to be called constructive engagement. The idea was to put forward some very limited economic carrots and see whether we could maybe encourage them to behave moderately in the Gulf. After about a year, by the end of 1989, the conclusion had increasingly gone through the Administration that it wasn't working, that constructive engagement with Saddam just wasn't happening, and by the spring of 1990 that became even more widespread as a conclusion. So the real question was what to do about Saddam. Do we continue this extremely limited relationship or do we eliminate it? The Congress was calling for eliminating it; the Administration I think essentially concluded, let's at least keep the door open. Let's let him know that he's being tested, that we don't like what we're seeing, we don't like the fact that he and his people are obviously killing people, that - they're illegally exporting things that could potentially help the nuclear programme, that there's all sorts of corruption going on with our US economic aid, and so forth. So the feeling was let's - let's revise - at least review this relationship.

Q: So by the spring/summer of 1990, before the Kuwait invasion, the idea that the US and Iraq are having some sort of ..... ?

RH: By the spring of 1990 - any attempt at a sort of new relationship had essentially run aground. The Iraqis knew full well - I think there was a quote at some point where Saddam actually said to somebody, "what else can you take away from me?" There really was very little left in the pot at that point, and I think the consensus in the Administration was that we were right to try to develop a better relationship with Iraq but that, because of Iraqi behavior at home and abroad, it was simply impossible.

Q: When did Iraq first register on your radar with regard to Kuwait?

RH: Historically, there's always something ..... about Iraqi claims to Kuwait, and I've done some studying of the Gulf, I've done my doctorate on it. And ..... so I know something about it. But in terms of this particular job, it simply hadn't registered until July. I had actually been in Iraq and Kuwait as recently as May. It was not on the radar scope then. But it really was July when the crisis began.

Q: July 17th, he made a television address when he threatened Kuwait. Do you remember that?

RH: Sure.

Q: What happened? Do you remember it coming across your desk? How did you assess it when it happened?

RH: Again, - mid July or somewhen you did have Saddam Hussein getting much more bellicose in his public statements and in reports of his diplomacy the general take in the administration, and it was my take as well, was that this was - what you might - it was pounding the tom-toms. It was Saddam Hussein essentially trying to add some muscle to his diplomacy; he was clearly hurting economically, he was clearly trying to muscle OPEC to get the Arab oil producers to do his bidding in terms of reducing output and raising price. And when he started threatening Kuwait, which was widespread believed that they were perhaps over-producing, that this was again part and parcel of his economic strategy.

Q: The build up starts. When do you first hear of the build up, and again, what's your take on that?

RH: I don't temember when I first read of the build up. I assume it was probably essentially when it began. Every day you get tons of stuff in the in-box in government. The hardest thing about being a government official is often separating the wheat from the chaff. In retrospect the Iraqi military build up obviously jumps up. At the time it was one of 6,000 bits of information that was coming in to us. I don't remember when I first noticed it. When I did, again, the general feeling was, this is probably the 1990 equivalent of gunboat diplomacy. Rather than bringing gunboats into the harbor, like the British Navy might have once did, this was Saddam bringing his equivalent of gunboats up against the border, again to pressure Kuwait and to send a signal to the Arab oil producers that the time had come to follow the Iraqi line.

Q: I interviewed President Mubarak. He remembers very well going to see Saddam Hussein and he saying to him unequivocally, "I'm not going to do it. ..... the Kuwaitis, but I'm not going to do this" He reported back to you. RH: All along the so-called Arab moderates, Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, and others were basically saying, calm down about Saddam; don't take the man seriously. We've got him under control; it seems we're house breaking him for you. we're going to turn him into a good citizen of the Gulf, so don't over-react. And as recently or as late as July, 1990, that was essentially the message: don't you Americans over-react; this is just Arab rhetoric; we will take care of it in our own Arab diplomatic way, thank you very much.

Q: You were getting though DIA, CIA, all this intelligence information on this huge build up. How did you weigh this with what Mubarak was telling you?

RH: Intelligence provides you a snapshot of capabilities. Every day the snapshots were coming in ................ that Saddam was building up his forces along the border. We could say that. But the entire way in which it was perceived was one of being fairly calm about it. In part this was our - what we were hearing from the Mubarakh's of the world who were saying don't over-react - part of a simple ..... and assessment, that this was a form again of muscular diplomacy, where Saddam was pressuring his neighbors. And perhaps we're victims of our times, but it was hard to imagine that in 1990 somebody was going to bring 100,000 troops up to the border, threaten a country, go on, take it over, absorb it and so forth. I think our mindset was clearly one that this was a form of diplomacy, however muscular, however crude, rather than a form of military preparation per se.

Q: What was the significance of the April Glaspie meeting? From your point of view?

RH: The meeting on the 25th if my memory serves me right, had a big impact. Just before that meeting I had actually written a memo to the President saying, we're getting all this intelligence, obviously concerned. I gave him my analysis. I said there are several options. The most likely option I thought was simply that Saddam was bluffing and this was ...... of supporting his diplomacy. The second option is that he was going to take a bite out of Kuwait. Most likely to then trade it for what he wanted in the way of oil diplomacy. Third scenario was the one that he would actually invade and try to conquer all of Kuwait, which of course he could do if he wanted to. I said I thought the third scenario, the most ambitious one, was the least likely, even though I was concerned because he had put more forces on the border than were necessary for either of the first two scenarios, to simply threaten or to take a bite out of Kuwait. I finished the memo, I was sending up when suddenly the cable came. And what I did was I scribbled on the top of the memo, "What I've written may be a little bit OBE (overtaken by events), Mr. President, because things look a little bit calmer now. ....... just come in with a cable essentially saying, I think this situation's going to wind down; we Americans need to sit tight and not over-react". So my general feeling then was her meeting with Saddam was something of a breakthrough and probably the beginning of the diffusion of the crisis.

Q: Because everyone was concentrating on the signals she was giving to Saddam. Was that what mattered, or was it what she was bringing back that mattered?

RH: Well from where I was sitting, the input of the Ambassador was important because it was the best take I could get on Saddam. It was the best form of intelligence, if you will, that I could get. What she was essentially saying was, "this crisis is probably not going to happen, but this is a bit of very elaborate, however crude, Saddam-choreographed diplomacy." So from where I sat, it meant, this was probably peaked as a crisis and now was going to work itself out Arab-style. That was the biggest impact on me. The impact on Saddam - mixed. It was not as elegant or specific as one would have liked; on the other hand I think he got the message that the United States had important interests in that part of the world and that, while we did want to see those interests, if you will, protected peacefully, we wanted to see him back off. He should have left that meeting with no doubt about the American commitment to that part of the world.

Q: Would you like to have seen a harder message delivered?

RH: I think she's taken a little bit of a bum rap. Yes, we probably could have jacked up her message 10% in terms of firmness; on the other hand she could not have jumped on the desk and said, "Saddam, don't you invade or we're going to put half a million people there." One, it wouldn't have been credible. Two, it's important to remember that at the time the purpose of this meeting was to get a sense of what he was doing and the sense was that things were probably unwinding, that things were getting diffused. And secondly to communicate to him a sense of American fairness. We didn't want a war. What we wanted was Saddam to back off. So the idea that she was going to rant and rave was probably unrealistic. What we really wanted was not to screw up the diplomacy that was going on, and at the same time to communicate some fairness. Maybe she didn't get that mix 100% right; maybe she was a little bit too careful not to undermine the diplomacy. But by and large she had a tough job; I think she did it okay.

Q: 25th July. Where have you got to, if you're George Bush, by 25th July?

RH: I think by the time George Bush went back to the residence on July 25th, ....... in a sense it was a crisis that, while it probably might pass, had largely peaked, that it was on its way to getting resolved. That the Iraqi debacle was more political than military, it was to back up Iraqi diplomacy. It meant an intervention or an invasion by Iraq was unlikely, and that more than anything else the risk was probably over.

Q: Do you remember briefing him at all during that period?

RH: I don't remember briefing him. I think - the memo I sent up on the 25th, essentially trying to analyze Saddam's intentions, took care of things, and again, after the cable came in from April Glaspie on July 25th after her meeting, there is a sense that the air had gone out of the balloon a little bit, that again, this crisis had probably passed and so there wasn't a need to say, I need 10 minutes or half an hour of the President's time, 'cos the feeling after her cable came in is that this crisis was probably not going to become a crisis.

Q: When did your view on that begin to change? The build up was continuing..... When did you start to think--this hasn't gone away?

RH: My view of the crisis stayed with me every day after July 25th, but really didn't peak or get really serious until August 1st. The diplomacy was still continuing, the idea that he would keep forces in place or even continue to add them up didn't hit me as shocking, given his own style of diplomacy, which was obviously heavy handed. The idea that institutions, once they begin things, often continue doing things. So I wasn't shocked by that or particularly alarmed.

Q: Before I move on to the events of August 1st, the Kuwaits, the Ambassador has described to me how he was getting these daily DIA briefings. Did you want the Kuwaitis to take some of the symbolic pressure?

RH: What we were doing in the week or ten days or so before the war began, when we did get somewhat alarmed, is we were trying to balance a calming message with a firm message. Part of the firmness was to offer a small exercise to the countries of the region. If I remember correctly, it was a tanker refuelling exercise. The idea is we'd send some American planes over and we'd work this out of local countries. The only taker was the United Arab Emirates. As it turned out it was more than a week before the exercise could actually happen because I think the planes that were sent over had the wrong type of fuel connectors. I can remember ........... asked me, has the exercise happened yet, and I said, no, no, no. The Kuwaitis and others were clearly reluctant to do sometehing like that; they were scared of being provocative.

Q: And the relationship at the time with the Kuwaitis...How would you characterize the relationship at the time?

RH: It's important to remember that the relationship with Kuwait was scratchy. For along time Kuwaithad been often the most anti-American of the voices in the Gulf, and often criticized the Saudis and others for being too close to us. It was not about taking easy or cheap shots at us; the idea that we were going to put this great embrace around Kuwait when we hadn't had a particularly intimate relationship. That was a stretch, and the idea that the Kuwaitis would be uncomfortable about accepting a military execise.... their whole idea was a kind of equidistant between the super powers, Kuwait- do- it-itself sort of diplomacy.

Q: August 1st - a CIA oficer came to see you that morning. What was he saying to you?

RH: Well by August 1st it was clear that this was probably at this point more than simply muscular diplomacy, that the Iraqis were getting ready to do something, what exactly we didn't know. It might have simply been taking oil fields or the islands, it might have something more. We had no idea what they were doing. But by August 1st it was clear that they were up to more than simply flexing their muscles.

Q: Do you remember the conversation that you had that morning with the CIA officer. Was he banging the table and saying, "hey, they're going to do it."

RH: Briefings almost never involve people banging the table. In this case people come in with their charts and say, here is what's going on, here is the movement of forces, here's what we can pick up about the state of readiness, here's what we think. People who are responsible for warning places like the CIA historically tend to be the most sensitive to narrow warning - developments. People who are often responsible for general political analysis tend to be calmer 'cos they see things in a wider context. On the morning of August 1st a lot of the warning indicators were - had gone off. They simply suggested that the Iraqis were not just flexing muscles but looked to be preparing to do something. But none of those indicators could tell you what they might be preparing to do.

Q: So your take on it at the time, that morning?

RH: My take by the morning of August 1st was that the Iraqi military was likely to do something but I'd no idea what the full dimensions of it might be.

Q: What happens next?

RH: Actually the meeting on August 1st what happened was almost a rolling Deputies' Committee meeting, but really an expanding one. We must have had 15 or 20 people in the room ..... at the State Department that day. Bob Gates was out of town, so I was the main person from the White House. What it was was all the policy and intelligence people around the table saying, okay, what's the latest intelligence, what do we make of it, how certain are we that the Iraqis are doing something. What are our military options if they strike? Where are our forces? What should we do diplomatically? And I think what you have is a meeting that went from late morning to late afternoon, to probably 5.00, where people just generally massaged it. And by 5.00 the general consensus was, yes the Iraqis are extremely likely to be doing something, no we don't know what exactly it is they are likely to do, and we the United States had ought to send the Iraqis a signal.

Q: The meeting itself, was there a dramatic moment?

RH: To me the most dramatic moment was the end of the meeting where, after meeting for five or six hours over at State, I was essentially deputized to go back to the White House to meet with Scowcroft and the President and to convince them to take one last shot at trying to influence Saddam. So I hurried back to the White House, I spoke to Scowcroft, I described the meeting; I said, let's go and see the President. - He said, fine, he picked up the phone to the President's appointments secretary. We got in right away. He and I went in to see the President who was over in the residence at that point. I briefed the President on the situation as we knew it, I briefed him on all the details in the meeting and the idea was that he would take one last effort at communicating with the Iraqis. Well we talked about all the possibilities. Do we do it here, through the Embassy, do we do it through the UN, do we do it through Baghdad?

The feeling was probably through Baghdad but we had no illusions about how hard it would be 'cos by then, six or seven o'clock our time, was the middle of the night their time. But we also knew that, unless you got to Saddam, probably nothing else would do. So the feeling was that, we talked it over, and the President was literally about to pick up the phone and try to think of how to get through to Saddam, and I was going to call the Ambasssador and try to set it up. And just as we were talking about what exactly we would say to Saddam in this last effort to - get him to think twice before doing anything, that's when the phone rang. And it was Bob on the line for Scowcroft saying, "we've just heard from our people in Kuwait, shooting has started. This war, whatever it is, has begun." Scowcroft said, thanks very much, hung up the phone, described to us what had happened and clearly our conversation had suddenly just become .... And the feeling was, okay, let's get to work, let's see what we have, let's see what we want to do.

And the President said, all right then, so much for our calling Saddam. And the feeling was, let's get to work, we promised the President we'd keep him abreast, we'd fill him in as soon as we had anything, as soon as we heard from the intelligence people. So Ben and I went back over to his office in the West Wing and that was the beginning of that night, which became a long, long series of inter-agency meetings using this closed circuit secure television network that had been established.

Q: Did you know straight away that this mattered?

RH: I knew straight away that it mattered; I didn't know straightaway how much it mattered. - Until we had a full sense of what Saddam had done and the consequences, I didn't have a sense that this really was a .... It took probably 24 hours for that to happen. It really wasn't until the next - or maybe 12 hours - it wasn't until the next morning that I had a sense that this was not just another crisis, that this was a major thing by any definition of the word major.

Q: Why did he do it-- why do you think Saddam Hussein invaded?

RH: People call Saddam Hussein irrational. I don't think he's irrational. I think it was probably quite an intelligent move. He was extremely needy economically, largely for his own mistakes, but all the same the bottom line was he was extremely needy. Kuwait was extremely wealthy, it had a pile of more than a hundred billion dollars sitting there getting invested. It was extremely weak militarily. Saddam probably figured he could do it quickly, as he could militarily, and the Arab world and the world at large would bitch and moan for a couple of days, and then people would get used to it. And the world would essentially learn to live with it. And the United States, which had left Lebanon a decade before and so forth was not going to do anything. And even if the United States wanted to do something, the local Arabs would never do anything, they would never work with the United States and stand up to Saddam. I think Saddam took the pretty intelligent decision that he could proably get away with it.

Q: And, again, you must have thought long and hard about this, why didn't you spot what was going to happen? What do you think was the fundamental reason why you weren't able to say to the President, hey, this guy we've got to watch, he's really dangerous, he's going to do it?

RH: None of us harbored any illusions about Saddam Hussein. I think though that the reason we failed to predict what he did was simply because of its sheer brazenry and its magnitude. The idea that on a Sunday afternoon or something I was going to stroll into the Oval and go, by the way, Mr. President, Saddam Hussein is going to amass 100,000 plus forces and is going to walk into Kuwait and he's going to make this the 19th province of Iraq, and this is going to be major test of the post-Cold War world. It was too dramatic. Particularly when he probably could have had a lot of what he wanted short of doing that. Saddam, simply by being ... powerful, simply by being next door to Kuwait, it could have probably Finlandized and could have done what Syria did to Lebanon originally or what the Soviets did to Finland. He could have ..... pressured Kuwait into probably giving him a lot of what he wanted. Maybe we were - maybe we were victims of a mindset. Here it is, it's the post-Cold War world, people are talking about the end of history. Maybe we thought that the era had passed when countries, if you will, ............ with all their military force and simply tried to erase other countries off the map. Maybe it was simply too big of a thought for us to comfortably absorb. And if that's the case, I plead guilty.

Q: One final thing. John Kelly and the hearing, which I suspect was. How much did that matter?

Haass: John Kelly's statements of events when he was Congressman Hamilton, were perhaps more categorical than they ought to have been about what we weren't going to do about the absence of a military commitment. But I would say two things. First, no one should have doubted our interests and the fact that we didn't have a treaty commitment ought not to have been over ... In any case, I think all of these criticisms of John Kelly at the hearing of April Glaspie, her meeting, I think all of these criticisms are misplaced. I don't think there is anything any American representative could have credibly said where Saddam would have been rocked back on his heels and figured out that, if he did this, he would have half a million Americans, several hundred thousand others, a dozen or two UN Resolutions, Arab states going cheek by jowl with American, you know, ....., Christians, Jews, what have you, to resist him. I just don't think any diplomatic message could have persuaded Saddam Hussein that the war would have done what it did. It's that simple.

Q: And the Kuwaitis, could they have done something?

Haass: I don't think there was anything the Kuwaitis could have done to have dissuaded Saddam. Their military was so modest as to be non-existent. The entire history had been diplomatically posed as a kind of go it alone, play off everybody. The idea that a fellow Arab state and an Arab monarchy was going to put its future on the line and associate itself with the West and the United States and roll the dice against a fellow Arab and an Arab radical and a major Arab power - if you're Saddam Hussein that would have probably been one of the less likely outcomes. Indeed it's the reason I don't think Saddam was crazy. It probably wasn't necessary that he did what he did; I think he could have had a lot of his cake without having to have used military force. But it wasn't a crazy calculation. The idea that the Kuwaitis and the Egyptians and the Americans and the Israelis and all these countries were going to work together and resist him and do what they did, I don't think on a scale of probability of one to ten, that it was probably no higher than one.