Interview with General Wafic Al Samarrai, Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence

The other kind of poison is that which effects the heart and which have its effects in full bloom within hours. This, for example, what has happened with the former Foreign Minister and member of the regional command of the Ba'th Party. In 1979 he was gaoled and one tablet of this poison led to his death within hours. Very severe pain in his chest and his heart and then he died.

Q: Iraq's situation following the Iran/Iraq War.....

Samarrai: Iraq left the war with Iran heavy under debts. Iraq had ambitions ...Iraq looked to build a major military power and sturdy economy. Towards the end of the Iraq/Iran war the Iraqi army stood at one million and 300,000 soldiers and had more than 4500 tanks and more than 600 combat aircrafts and many pieces of artillery. In addition, this includes the popular army. When Saddam Hussein spoke he thought that Kuwait was the salvation from the poor economic state that resulted from the war with Iran . The economic status was good if not very good, but the financial state of the power..was not providing enough sources to re-vamp the army. Iraq was also heavily in debt and this put a restraint to his research in biological and other sorts of weapon. This is what is meant by the very poor economic state. But as for individuals, they were being able to manage quite alright.

Saddam Hussein always talk about great Iraq. Great Iraq meant that Iraq should become the strongest country in terms of the army, the economy and the politics and he always looked to expand.

Q: The Cold War ...

Samarrai: The Cold War between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Block.. Saddam Hussein thought that the end of this war did not serve his goals. Saddam talked about the fragility in the Soviet Union. In a meeting before the Kuwait invasion, before a group of selected intelligence officers, he said he did not accept France's policy nor the policies pursued by the Soviet Union. He wanted to take a tougher line towards the United States of America and the UK, of course.

Q: Signs that Saddam Hussein would invade....

Samarrai: Saddam Hussein was inclined to keep his secrets to himself. That's why his plans were never disclosed. Such planning, nobody knew of this. Only very selected few. As for us, the intelligence officers, who were well versed in this line of business, we concluded these plans. It was well known to us.

If you remember, the media indications gave a very sure sign of this. For instance, when the summit conference was held in Baghdad, Saddam blamed Kuwait and the Arab United Emirate for the sharp fall in oil prices as well as the depreciation of the Iraqi Dinar and he said on the 17th of July... in a public speech, Saddam said about Kuwait and its role, accusing Kuwait that it was fighting Iraq economically. He said, to justify this, that killing people was a lot more easier than fighting people and their ability to earn money.

Other statements were made. For instance, the government-owned Al Thura newspaper said "Sorry our people in Kuwait, we will not save you... we will not save you so.. we have not saved you so far from the rule of the.. of your Emir."

This is a very clear indication of Saddam's intentions. I think that since the Iraqi/Irani war ended, he started thinking of this matter. As for taking the decision, it was, I think, in the fourth month which is April.

If you remember that on the 2nd of April he delivered a very lengthy speech with media preparations and he also threatened to fire Israel with this weapon. On the same day, he criticised Bush. At that day escalation started. First, you have direct pressure on Saddam to shake his routine and, on the other hand, you had the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq. So the only way out was to invade Kuwait.

. Q: About Saddam Hussein.....

Samarrai: He was very nervous, hot tempered, always tense. He tried always to do something, he was restless. It's very important for you to know something about Saddam's character. We know him because he lived with us. He was a very evil person as early as his childhood. He lived in our district. He is very evil and he has been evil as early as his childhood. He always resorted to terrorist methods and tactics. Anyway he is a very persistent person. He has the capability to work continuously but quite often you see him very tense and tight, particularly when circumstances are pressing.

Saddam.. his psychological composition is built on suspicion. This makes other leaders quite reserved to put forward such proposals. Had you proposed to him "Why don't we take Kuwait?" He would retort "This is a scheme plotted with the West".

Q: His Arab Neighbors....

Samarrai: Generally speaking, he was not comfortable to dealings with all Iraq's neighbours. For instance, he looks at Syria and the leadership in Syria with very deep concern. He thought that intellectual threat came from Syria. He was neither comfortable with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, economically speaking. He thought and he felt that he fought for them and he did favours for them and they should pay him back. He had also a very antagonistic view towards Iran. So you can see he is not comfortable with any of his neighbours and he was quite evil. He often miscalculated situations and that's why we always suffered from this point during our war with Iran. He never thought or visualised that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will take a tough stand towards him. Even towards the very few hours before the invasion, he never thought that the allies will strike against him though we tried very hard to convince him of this.

We had reports, intelligence reports, that the Gulf States had very poor relations at the time with Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, we learned that there were very clear sensitivities in their relations. We also learned, and knew, that the relations between the Gulf States and Jordan were not at their best terms. He built his calculations on these factors and he did not expect that reactions will be severe.

Saddam, before invading Kuwait, improved his relations with Yemen, with Jordan and Egypt and he formed the Arab Cooperation Council. One of the main objectives of this was to prepare the ground for invading Kuwait or any other similar action.. and to guarantee that these three parties would not know the truth.

The relation between Iraq and Jordan was very strong but, in fact, Saddam was really watchful and quite cautious towards King Hussein.

Q: His views of western nations....

Samarrai: He thought that his relations with France were good. He was an enemy to Britain. He hates Britain. As for the United States of America, he thought that he could alleviate their reactions. He thought that the Americans were secretly working against him.. and that he was trying to benefit from his relations with other countries to formulate an alliance against the USA.

That's why you had the initiative on the 14th of.. of February-- after the air assault.

Q: Saddam's ambition...

Samarrai: I believe that Saddam did not, and would not have been satisfied with only Kuwait. Had his invasion of Kuwait been without reprisals, he would have continued to take the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia.

In his further plans, we had planned this in detail, i.e. to take the oil wells in Saudi Arabia, had we engaged in fighting and had we been able to carry on our plans.

Q: A U.S. green light.....?

Samarrai: I am not convinced that the USA was the party that gave Saddam the green light to go ahead in his plans but, on the other hand, I am convinced that the USA did not take a decisive and tough line to deter Saddam from doing this invasion.

The indications were very clear. They had the ability to deter Saddam. For instance, there was no ultimatum or warning issued in public or in secret that could deter Saddam.

The US reaction was very weak, cold. Because, despite the fact that American satellites were monitoring the movements of the Iraqi forces, and it was clear to them that there was massive army build-up, the USA did not issue a warning to Saddam Hussein. This really raised a big question mark.