Did Rwanda come at a difficult time for peacekeeping?
I think it came at a very difficult time for the international community and,
especially, the United States. I think it was, initially, perhaps not
recognized as that difficult for the U.N. But the way it unfolded, it turned
into a watershed event for the U.N. The U.N. basically baled out, finding that
the international community had baled out even sooner.
What was the effect of Somalia and pictures on CNN on the U.S.'s attitude
I think the actual effect was to precipitate a basic review of the
circumstances under which we would get engaged in this type of operation. The
outcome of which was laid down on day one, which was to establish criteria
which would narrow the possibility that we would get engaged. This resulted in
a formal presidential determination or directive (PDD 25) in May of '94 ...
which set out a bunch of criteria--strong identifiable national interest; clear
exit strategy; and on and on. A set of guidelines under which the U.S. would be
prepared to get her own forces engaged and/or to authorize the U.N. to get
engaged and this crystallized a growing body of resistance to these type of
potentially dangerous humanitarian interventions, which was widespread in our
own military and, for that matter, on Capitol Hill ...
Why this great mood of resistance to peacekeeping in the Pentagon?
I think several reasons. The first question is: Why is it our responsibility to
send our own troops to get killed in every remote corner of the earth? That's a
legitimate question. Secondly, the feeling that the politicians and diplomats
would commit to the use of force when there were no clearly established
objectives, no clearly established exit strategy, which is to say, you didn't
know whether you were going in for 90 days or 10 years and a feeling that this
all had to be codified and that the military would have to have a much larger
voice in establishing the circumstances under which they would go in; and when
they would get out. I think, fundamentally, it reflects two things. A distrust
on the part of the professional military of the guidance that they had been
getting from the political side and, secondly, a very legitimate question is:
Whose responsibility? Is it in the modern-day world to deal with these kinds of
problems? Why us? The argument that we're the greatest superpower; therefore,
we're the world's policeman did not sell. On the other hand, one could say,
"Well, it won't be us but it will be the United Nations, and we will strongly
encourage and support them to take charge of these kinds of things."
... There had always been considerable suspicion, if you will, of the United
Nations in conservative quarters in the United States and there had been an
increasing distrust, partly, that was personalized. A lot of people felt that
Boutros-Ghali had dragged us into Somalia, kept us there longer than
necessary and the U.N. had dragged its feet on picking up its responsibilities;
therefore, was complicit in the disaster which ultimately unfolded there.
People were frightened of Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General, dragging the
U.S. into another conflict?
Well, they sort of said, "We're not going to let that happen again." I think
[that] was the attitude and by establishing a formalized doctrine, this
presidential directive for the United States, they would set a rigid set of
criteria, which, I believe, were tailored to make it very, very difficult to
launch the United States military into this kind of adventure again.
The officials in the United Nations say they didn't ask the United States to
help with an airlift when they considered putting troops in, because they felt
the U.S. wouldn't have agreed. Was there any chance of the U.S. airlifting
troops to Rwanda?
That's an entirely speculative question. If the U.N. had decided to make a
vigorous response and had made an urgent request to the president to airlift
them in, there would have been a very good chance that we would have responded
You think if the U.N. had asked, the U.S. might have agreed to an
Yes. I mean, you don't know if you don't ask. The fear would have been that
that would be the first step on a slippery slope. First the airlift and then
the logistics and then this, that and the other thing. But it would have been
hard to turn it down. However, both the U.S. and the U.N. would have had to
have painted a much more realistic, which is to say, bleaker picture of the
catastrophe, which was rapidly unfolding.
The U.N. would have had to have come up with some pretty grim reports of
what was going on?
Yes, with credibility. We would have to have had an acknowledgment in Europe,
in New York and in Washington that there was an unfolding genocide and that
something needed to be done most urgently. If the U.N. under those conditions,
had said, "Let's reinforce our troops, authorize the use of lethal force and
try to put this thing down," and called on the U.S. to play its own part, there
would have been a good chance we could have been persuaded or shamed into
Was any such appeal made?
Not to my knowledge, but then, perhaps, it was discussed in New York. The U.S.
has a mission at New York. Or it might have been discussed at higher levels.
But at your level in the Pentagon, you weren't aware ...
I don't recall of it. I don't recall such a request.
No request from the U.N. for airlift or ...
No, but it wouldn't be made at my ... it would be made through diplomatic
channels. Normally, what they do ... nobody likes to be turned down and
humiliated by a rejection so these things are discussed informally. My guess
is, if it was considered at all, if you would, feelers were put out and it was
decided that the U.S. might not respond, so why ask? There's another theory,
that the U.N. itself didn't want to get involved. Well, there had to be some
leadership somewhere--London, New York, Washington--that acts of unspeakable
atrocity are under way, that this is a genocide, something must be done now,
immediately, to stop it. The U.N. should take the lead. And if that had been
made clear to the public, then I think it would have been very difficult for
the United States to refuse a request to support a U.N. intervention. But there
wasn't any such reaction. Instead, I would say, everybody was in damage
control, "Let's try to evade the reality of what's going on," whether it was
Europe or New York or Washington. They didn't want to know the full dimensions
of this thing and, thereby, assume the responsibility of having to deal with
Why didn't they want to know?
Because everybody was partially traumatized by Somalia. I think it was a
failure of leadership throughout the international community--Europe, New York,
Washington. People didn't want to really grasp and admit that they knew and
understood what was happening, because they didn't want to bear the
consequences then of dealing with it. They did not want an intervention. So we
went into a two-month dance of what I would call diplomatic escape and evasion.
The people at the lower levels, the Africa specialists ... the people at the
White House, people in the Pentagon who were reading the all-source
intelligence on this (which is foreign correspondence, the reports from the
NGOs, the hate radio intercepts) had a pretty good idea of what was going on.
Although, even we, underestimated the extent of the killings and the rapidity
with which this thing was unfolding. But the higher echelons, whether it was
State or Defense or the White House, were not really interested in dealing with
the problem. That's my view of it.
I think the principal problem at the time was a failure of leadership and it
was deliberate and calculated because whether in Europe or in New York or in
Washington, the senior policy-making levels did not want to face up to this
problem. They did not want to admit what was going on or that they knew what
was going on because they didn't want to bear the onus of mounting a
humanitarian intervention--probably dangerous--against a genocide.
Consequently, instead of planning to move in and address the problem and try to
put a stop to it, at the point of a gun, the diplomatic community and the
political leadership went into what we in the military called, "escape and
evasion." And for two months they nattered on about, "Well, we're not quite
sure. There are apparent acts of genocide but we're not sure that this is
genocide. There are conflicting reports on casualties." I think much of this
was simply a smoke screen for the policy determination in advance, "We're not
going to intervene in this mess, let the Africans sort themselves out."
This, of course, had come in the wake of what everybody considers to be the
fiasco in Somalia. The death of the 18 American Rangers in Mogadishu had
occurred only six or seven months earlier and had totally traumatized the
Clinton administration on these types of foreign interventions and they were
afraid of bad congressional reaction, which there certainly would have been.
Public opinion was not prepared for another humanitarian intervention and there
isn't one American in 10,000 who's ever heard of Rwanda, and so it went. So
there was a definite policy by us against intervention and the timing of the
issuance of the presidential directive, only a month after the crash of the
plane, the death of the two presidents. I think is very interesting because
this codified by laying down criteria and rules that it would be very, very
difficult to get the United States to make a decision to use its own military
forces in humanitarian interventions in the future.
How early did the Pentagon realize this was a genocide?
There was never a formal recognition. Our lawyers are as good as the State's, but
nobody ever told the lawyers to go into a room and consider this matter from a
legal perspective. I think a common-sense understanding of what was going on
within two weeks of the crash of the plane. I think the Pentagon knew, but was
not about to open its mouth and say anything. It would, in fact, and properly
so, defer to the White House and particularly the State Department and its
lawyers to reach that legal conclusion.
But the Pentagon knew within a couple of weeks?
I think the people who were following the cable traffic, the press reports, the
radio intercepts, yes, I think we all knew it. Now, I think we did not know, in
fact, for many months after, the full scale that tens of thousands of people
were being killed. It was known that this was planned, premeditated, carefully
planned, was being executed according to a plan with the full connivance of the
then Rwandan government. This was known.
I would say within 10 to 14 days. The first week, there were a lot of
conflicting reports and the American press had got it all wrong, I would
So how did you know? How did you know in the Pentagon that this was
organized within 10 days?
I would say, the people who follow these things closely, whether in the Joint
Staff or in the Defense Intelligence Agency or the office of the Secretary of
Defense, I mean one has to use common sense and one's own brain and ... if you
see statements, which have been coming out for a couple of years by so-called
extremist elements in Rwanda, that they plan to do something like this, that
they were laying the basis for it, and these warnings had been sent up the
line, "Something really bad is going to happen and it's being organized." This
was known well in advance. And then, it's happening. Now we have hate radio
announcing the plan, calling on the massive killings, and we had reports from
NGOs and from the European press as to what was going on. Never mind that the
American press, which was poorly represented anyway, hadn't quite got it right
yet, at all, in fact. Never mind that the embassy perhaps didn't know what was
going on or wouldn't say. There was plenty of evidence around if you'd wanted
to use it.
You could also, however, selectively pick out evidence for an opposite case, or
at least, "Well, there are bad things happening, but it certainly hasn't met
the criteria of genocide, certainly hasn't reached the point where we need to
use international force, armed force, to go in there and intervene in what is
basically a domestic quarrel." Everybody was looking for a way out, rather than
for a way to, if you will, shoulder the responsibility for resolving this
crisis. And that's the main point of Rwanda. For the Rwandans, the main point
is a half million or maybe a million of them got themselves massacred and it
probably will precipitate generations now of ethnic warfare and perhaps destroy
Central Africa before it's over. But from the point of view of the
international community and humanitarian interventions, it's a watershed event
because it confirms what had developed in Somalia, which is it confirms that
those who are against intervention would, at least, for the next decade, I
suspect, or generation, generally prevail when the issue is raised, "Shall we
or shall we not engage ourselves in addressing this problem?" Whether it's
somewhere in the margins of Europe or in the Middle East or Africa or the Far
East, I think the answer generally from here on out will be, "No," or "We will
only do peacekeeping."
And the criteria the U.N. has got for itself now on peacekeeping operations:
cease-fire; acceptance by all parties of the cease-fire; the peaceful role of
the U.N.; and if the fighting resumes, we're out of there. This results in what
I call the policy of, "We will only go where we're not needed." So since Rwanda
it's been very much downhill for those who would advocate a vigorous
international response, preferably led by the U.N. to these kinds of crises.
President Clinton has apologized for not appreciating the gravity of what
was going on, letting it happen. Does that mean that next time, the U.S. will
intervene in a genocide like this, if there is one?
No, I don't think so. I think genocidal acts are occurring right now within the
Congo and we're not going to intervene, nor is the U.N. The U.S. now has its
presidential guidance which sets forth a rigid set of guidelines, which would
basically make it impossible to intervene. And the United Nations has also
adopted its own criteria which make it very unrealistic for it to be useful in
these kinds of crises because they're restricting it to a narrow view of
Chapter Six peacekeeping--the parties must agree to the intervention; there
should be a cease-fire; if the fighting breaks out the United Nations will do
nothing to attempt to stop it. So what we've got is a policy which I
characterize as, "We'll only go where we're not needed." If there's a serious
international quarrel, internal or border war, the criteria are such that the
United States and the United Nations and certainly nobody in Europe is going to
do anything other than watch and what is called active diplomacy and that's not
going to meet the needs. You're seeing it now in Central Africa where the
African parties basically are disdaining, in some cases very rudely and openly,
the proffered advice from the international community or the U.N. I've heard
several African leaders speak here in town with complete scorn about--and it's
their phrase--"the so-called international community."
Let me just wind back to Rwanda itself. If you realized that there was a
genocide going on, but the administration wasn't saying so, didn't that make
life rather uncomfortable at meetings?
Yes. And sitting at a congressional hearing and hearing the Department of State
representative, who I'm sure in his heart understood fully what was going on
and wanted to do the right thing, but being forced to waffle about acts of, but
not quite yet, formally speaking, genocide. That was a very miserable day for
me, probably even more so for my State Department colleague.
How did you feel?
How did I feel? I didn't feel personal shame because I felt that this was a
decision which ... Actually it wasn't any decision, the decision was made
before the crisis arose, "We're not going to get mixed up in it." I'd attempted
in the spring of '93 when the Clinton administration came in ... [for] each
foreign policy region within the Pentagon, we were asked to develop lists of
what we thought would be serious crises this administration might face and
forward that to the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Aspin.
I put Rwanda-Burundi on the list. I won't go into personalities, but I received
guidance from higher authorities, "Look, if something happens in
Rwanda-Burundi, we don't care. Take it off the list. U.S. national interest is
not involved and we can't put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists,
like important problems like the Middle East, North Korea and so on. Just make
it go away." And it was pretty clear to me, given the fiasco of the end of our
involvement in Somalia, that we probably wouldn't react.
Tell me about the congressional hearing.
Well, I had to go up to the hearing, to accompany, I guess back-up would be the
phrase, a Department of State witness. And then the Africa sub-committee, had
obviously already made its mind up that an act of genocide was occurring and
that something ought to be done about it. But, of course, the witness, the
State colleague, simply had to evade and waffle, "Acts of genocide may be
occurring but the evidence is not yet persuasive. We haven't had a formal
finding. Our lawyers are looking at it," etc., etc. I'm sure he was as
knowledgeable as I about what was happening and as eager to see the United
States or the United Nations do something about it but I think the Africanist
policy hands were tied by the feeling at higher levels of our own bureaucracy
and by negative feelings on the Hill.
So you're sitting there next to this State Department official and he's
Well, the committee kept pressing ... it was sort of the old, "If it walks like
a duck and quacks like a duck--what is it?" And the answer is, "We're not quite
sure. It may be anything but a duck." But it was very obvious what was going
on. It was the administration not wanting to get pinned down and, of course, if
you get pinned down, "Yes it is genocide," when you're a signatory to a
genocide convention, presumably you ought to do something about it and they
didn't want to do anything about it.
But did you think of saying, "Look, we know what's going on. It's
If I had been asked, I might have said that on the premise that, you know,
Do you now regret not being asked?
Not particularly because it wouldn't have made any difference.
Do you regret not saying anything?
No. Again, it wouldn't have made any difference. I mean, it was a miserable
day, miserable performance. It couldn't have got any worse, couldn't have...
Actually, it couldn't have been any better.
Miserable because I think it was sort of a formal spectacle of the United
States in disarray and retreat, leading the international community away from
doing the right thing and I think everybody was perfectly happy to follow our
Now when UNAMIR II was mandated to go ahead with a more effective mandate of
protecting civilians and with more troops--up to 5,500--something happened
about APCs. Can you tell me about that?
The United Nations asked for APCs--armored personnel carriers. The
administration agreed, in principle, to provide them and then, instead of
providing effective leadership to drive this kind of a logistical issue through
the Pentagon bureaucracy and getting them out there right away, it was allowed
to proceed in its slowest, most tortuous manner and, of course, by the time
they could have been there, it was all over. It was too late anyway.
But the point is, if there had been a sincere desire to do this, it could have
happened very quickly and whether that would have made a difference, whether
the force would, in fact, have gone in and undertaken this mission with the
APCs, I don't know. But there was a lot of recrimination back and forth. The
United Nations felt that we were not effectively honoring our offer and were
sort of dragging our feet. I don't think we were deliberately dragging our
feet, I think we were deliberately letting the process take its normal course,
which would ensure that they would not be there in time.
You think it was deliberate not to get them there faster?
I think there were people in the Pentagon who had not been directed to make
sure this happened and, therefore, were perfectly happy to sit back and let the
whole process unfold over a period of months which, of course, made the whole
thing pointless. Or perhaps, from their perspective, not pointless because it
stopped it from happening. ... There were a lot of people who I know worked
very hard to make it happen quickly, but there was not the top, high-level
pressure and attention to make it happen. Instead, they got all bogged down in
the issues of the exact terms of a lease; what color; who would paint them
where; what kind of stenciling would go on and all of the other little details.
And these things can either be resolved at a couple of meetings and then you
take action and it's wrapped up in a couple of weeks or you can drag it out for
months, which is exactly what happened. I say it was another indication of a
complete lack of enthusiasm at the higher policy levels for us, in this
instance, supporting the U.N. on an intervention.
Were people aware that while this was going on, people were dying?
I'm sure. Of course.
And. Where were the Belgians? I don't see the British Gurkha battalions either.
Where was everybody? Everybody was hiding and the next time we have the crisis,
which we are now having, where are they now? They're sending their diplomats
scuttling about Central Africa.
And your feeling about all this at the time was ... ?
That we were missing a grand opportunity and this was, I thought, this would be
a test. Had Somalia, in fact, traumatized us so we would be incapable in the
future, at least the near future, of doing the right thing and, indeed, we were
traumatized and we did not do the right thing. And I thought that was too bad
and I was very glad I was about to retire, which I did, the following month.
At the Pentagon, did you ever feel, "I should be doing more."
No, I felt I'd done what I could but I think the whole system ... and it's not
the Pentagon's failure, it's not the State Department's, it's everybody. Most
of all, though, it's a failure of the leadership of the Western countries. I
think really you'd say the reps at the U.N. ... to have those national leaders
united on dealing effectively with these kinds of crises. I didn't see that
leadership anywhere. Everybody is, "Well, if the Belgians have baled out, why
should we do it? Where are the French? Where's somebody else?" And there was a
theory that the United Nations was the sole surviving superpower to play this
kind of leadership role and that's now been rather thoroughly debunked.
How did people take the news of the death of the 10 Belgian soldiers in the
Well, there was horror and consternation at the deaths and, particularly, that
they died badly. But there was also consternation that they did not defend
themselves. They did not draw their pistols. I think it tended to confirm in
the minds of those people who were following U.N. peace operations that there
was a lot of romantic nonsense built into some of the ground rules and this was
another reason to steer clear of U.N. peacekeeping operations. That you would
be putting troops in mortal danger without the means to defend themselves. If
they were in mortal danger, which should have been clear to everyone, then they
should have been much more heavily armed, there should have been many more of
them and they should have had orders to fight to defend their charge and
themselves. And the general reaction was ... I heard one person say, "Well, at
least, you know, our rangers died fighting in Somalia. These guys, with their
blue berets, were slaughtered without getting a shot off." It was a miserable
failure on the part of the local commander, the U.N. operation in general and
it became another reason why a lot of professional military felt U.N.
operations are frequently feckless, the ground rules are wrong and you should
You were in the Pentagon at the time. What was your reaction to the United
Nations guarding VIPs with five or six soldiers, only to find themselves
I think it's the worst possible outcome ... it's more of the make-believe and
pretend aspects of these U.N. operations which is, you pretend you're going to
help but when the crunch comes, you run for it. In this case, you don't put
five people with light weapons out to guard important people who are going to
be killed by large, armed gangs.
How did you feel about the actions of the force commander on the ground in
those first 24 hours?
I think the first 24 hours were a period of tremendous confusion and I don't
have any criticism. I think the force commander saw sooner than just about
anybody else what was unfolding. I think he would have played a more vigorous,
helpful, possibly decisively, positive role had he been given authority
permitting him to do that.
One of the things that happened in that first week of April was that people
were drawn into U.N. sanctuaries like the school at Don Bosco, only for the
U.N. then to withdraw to the airport and abandon them. They were then
slaughtered. Were reports of massacres such as Don Bosco coming in to the
They were coming in everywhere. As I say, not necessarily through official
reporting channels, but there were reports to the U.N. and then back to
Washington. There were European journalists who were on the scene ...
Did you have any specific reaction to the U.N. soldiers, not only, as it
were, abandoning individuals they were guarding but abandoning whole groups of
people--up to 1,000.
Oh, my personal reactions. At a personal level everybody following this was
horrified. I think at the professional level, a lot of people were saying,
"Told you so, this would happen. They have an inadequate capability and no
stamina for this and the political leadership is lacking and what did you
expect from a U.N. operation. Of course they're all going to get massacred and
now it's happening."
So this kind of massacre seemed to prove the point in the Pentagon--don't
get involved in this.
Not under U.N. leadership and I would have to agree with that. Unless you drive
a large professional national contingent under the U.N. flag. For us, it's
[given] that they're going to call on the Americans to do it.
Was there ever a moment that could have been seized to get the Americans on
board and do something to prevent it?
I don't think so. I think it happened too fast
This must have been an extraordinary event to witness at the end of your
career in the Pentagon.
Well, particularly coming on the heels of the bold talk back in '92, '93, maybe
even a little earlier, the end of the Cold War, the sole surviving superpower,
the new world order and other myths of our time. It was a considerable
disillusionment, but one has to be realistic. It's not just a U.S. failure,
it's the whole international community. It's not just executives, it's
parliaments and congresses and it's the public, which I think is in total
confusion about the state of international affairs, certainly in the United
States. And in the absence of effective leadership to explain it to them, why
would the public rally behind sending the 82nd Airborne to a place they've
never heard of to sort out ethnic quarrels between people they've never met? I
think it can be explained. I think that's what leadership is all about and if
we're not willing to do it, then let's hope the U.N. do it but it was obvious,
even before that hearing but the hearing sort of crystallized it for me. This
announces to all who want to pay attention that, you know, the new world order
is finished and we're not going to play our role as the superpower in obscure
corners of the world anyway.
Do you believe the warnings signs of genocide were already there before
They'd been there for a couple of years. A lot of people chose not to believe
them and people like myself, who are not Rwanda experts, didn't know whether to
believe them or not. But there had been reports of plans for genocide. There
had been reports of the arming of militias, the organization, the preparations
if you will. And there had been some hate radio which was very frightening in
the weeks immediately prior to this.
When the genocide began, the United Nations Secretariat said, "Look, don't
blame us for not telling the Security Council what was going on. Superpowers
like the United States have got their own intelligence assets. They must know
what was going on." Did you?
Well, I think everybody knew what was going on but ... it's possible to know
without officially knowing. I know I've seen all of these reports and my
staff tells me what's going on, but I haven't really digested all of this and I
can only give it five minutes every other Tuesday. So I think at the higher
levels, they chose not to be well-informed and they chose not to think too much
about it and hoped too it would all go away.
Higher levels in the Pentagon, the White House and the United
Everywhere. Everywhere. If there's a failure here, it's a failure of the whole
international system and we're all in it.
President Clinton said in Rwanda that he and others had failed to appreciate
the gravity of what was going on and apologized for that and the lack of
action. How should we react to that apology?
Well, I think the apology was proper and overdue. I think failure to appreciate
is an artful excuse for not wanting to appreciate the facts which, indeed, were
presented to the White House and everybody else at the time. They knew. They
chose not to know and they chose not to act. So I think we had a lot to
apologize for, but it's not just the United States that owes the apology, it's
the whole international community. We all failed to act and the facts were
known in the capitals of Europe and in New York and in Washington. Within a
week to 10 days, they knew what was gong on. They chose not to absorb,
appreciate and therefore not to have to act.
And do you believe we have now learned the lesson of Rwanda, put this behind
I don't know what the lesson is. Some people think the lesson is never again to
get involved in these kinds of messes. Let whomever--the Afghanis, the
Rwandans, whomever--sort themselves out and let God sort them out afterwards. I
think the international community is in total confusion at this point. I don't
know what the lesson of Rwanda is. There is a lesson that if the international
community doesn't act, then tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of
people will die, but there are a lot of other places. We're not doing anything
in the Congo particularly at the moment and there are acts of genocide under
What was the atmosphere in the Pentagon about the Clinton administration
getting them involved in the peacekeeping operation. What was the big fear in
I think that, frankly, there was a concern that the White House was not strong in
military planning and affairs and operations. There was suspicion that,
particularly some of the early rhetoric, that had had a tendency to volunteer
U.S. troops for all sorts of foreign adventures and there was a very great
concern among the professional military that we would get prematurely committed
to ill-considered foreign adventures and people would die and get hurt and
there was a lot of skepticism and caution. Events in Somalia and the fact that
we bailed out as soon as the Rangers were killed and then the White House sort
of saying, "Gee, we didn't really understand what was going on," a lot of this
left a very... created a good bit of alarm and left a very bad taste and
anxiety in the Pentagon.
Is the White House right to claim that it wanted to do something early on in
Rwanda but was held up by the Pentagon, couldn't talk it round?
The short answer is, I don't really know. My suspicion is that high level
contacts were made and probably high levels in the Pentagon indicated they
would not be thrilled to get involved in an intervention in Rwanda. The basic
point is that they shouldn't be asking, but because of the deference the White
House has shown towards the military and I think their fear of criticism from
the military, I think they've lost, to some extent, the mantle of leadership.
With the White House the President is the Commander-in-Chief, he wants
technical military advice and judgment, yes, but he shouldn't be getting
political advice from the uniformed military. He should be telling them what he
wants them to do.
So if President Clinton and the White House had said, Look this is what we
want you to do in the Pentagon, it would have happened?
In my experience, and I had 34 years in the Pentagon, if after whatever
argument has gone on for however long, if somebody, the president or somebody
speaking for him stands up and says, "All right, this is the decision. Do it,"
the Pentagon will salute and go do it.
So if the White House had said, Airlift now Rwanda, it would have happened?
I do believe it would have, yes. The Pentagon is very good at following orders
if someone has the courage to issue them.