. . . At the beginning, my job was to take care of the maintenance of the
planes, like keeping the licenses up to date. . . just support. At the time it
didn't relate to anything about drugs, or moving drugs. . . . Every morning,
Carlos had to have his newspapers, every single one. So my role
was basically every morning like a paperboy. I had to go to the farm everyday
with the papers, and any other stuff that we need to send him. . . That was my
main role at the very beginning.
. . . We never said, "Be careful," or, "If you go this far, you going to be
dead," or something like that. You don't have to say it. It was implicit. We
knew that because of who the people were that we were working with, we had to
keep a low profile, basically. . . . And I had to keep silence of whatever I
was going to do. So my family, my friends, and everybody, I just had to
basically lie to them that I got a job and that was it. Not really lie,
but just don't go farther than that. Are you working? Yes. For whom? Flying
planes. So it doesn't have to be as specific. Just general for the whole
Well, after I became a pilot for the organization . . . some weeks after Lara
Bonilla, the minister of justice in Colombia, was assassinated. So that really
stirred the pot. The chief pilot was doing the drug flights, the dope flights.
I was doing my stuff. And everything was very quiet, really; if you can call
it quiet in that area, in that business. But it was okay until Lara Bonilla
The tension was mounting.
Well, because Lara Bonilla started a campaign against them. Of course there
was talk and it was going to happen, but we have to be careful. He knows that
we know all about him, blah blah blah, but nothing really concrete about
assassination. When it happened . . . Carlos was angry--not about the
assassination or the attempt--but because he was not warned by Pablo Escobar
about what he was going to do. We were caught with our guard down. We had to
run, really run, trying to hide Carlos. . . . He was already in hiding, in
Colombia on his farm. Everybody knew that he was there, but there were no
attempts at catching him or anything like that.
With the assassination, it was a completely different environment. The picture
changes completely. The police and the army sent an operation to the farm
trying to catch Carlos, as well as they did in Medellin and every single place.
He was very lucky. Carlos has been very lucky all his life with this thing.
Because he had four or five attempts of catching him and arresting him, as well
as against his life--kidnapping him. I don't know why he was very lucky, and
he always escaped. This one was one of those occasions that he was not at the
farm at the time of the raid. So a few employees were arrested there, and they
remained, probably, two years in jail, I don't remember. But . . . he was able
to escape. . . .
Well, we have to run and we have to hide in a place that was safe for Carlos. We lost contact with the rest of the people from Medellin for a couple of days. . . . The radio stations were closed, so they had to run with those radios to someplace else. We had to change all the frequencies. . . . We have to change everything: locations, radios, code, names, everything. So we lost contact with them for a couple of days.
Carlos had a friend . . . who was an M19 [Colombian guerrilla] leader. And
they became friends after the M19 tried to kidnap him one or two years prior to
this. They tried negotiations with the Nicaraguan government to have a Plan B,
like a safe haven. They didn't plan at the beginning that Nicaragua was to
play a main role at all. The only thing that Carlos wanted was to have a place
to hide until everything cools down. . . .
Right. . . . The deal, basically, at the very beginning was to let Carlos stay
in Nicaragua for a price. The main contact was Thomas Borges, who at the time
was the minister of interior, if I recall. . . . "La corporacion" was our
house in Nicaragua. It was like a commercial relation between Nicaragua and a
third country, or something like that. I don't recall exactly what we called
it. . . .
Right. And so, we opened a house there at la corporacion. And when everything
was ready, Carlos moved with the chief pilot to Nicaragua. . . . We had a
specific instruction in how to get there, issued directly by Thomas Borges, by
the air force. No one in Nicaragua knew at the time that we were doing that,
and it was a secret operation. And everyone in that group was supposed to
report to Thomas Borges--nobody else. The military sometimes, they were like,
what the heck is this plane doing here? They were asking questions. But they
always said, "This is a Sandinista operation, and it's a secret, it's a Thomas
Borges operation, don't ask."
Right, all the time. All the time. . . .
The main reason, from the Sandinistas' point of view, was money. . . . The M19
were the Sandinistas' friends, and they were supposed to be doing a favor for
them. But they request an amount of money from us to open a house for us, like
rent. The Carlos Lehder organization paid $1 million just to stay there.
For as long as we need, and eventually we will have to give them like a monthly
rent or something like that. We never got to that point, but we gave them $1
million. It was supposed to be in cash, and it was supposed to be a secret.
So it was supposed to be delivered directly to Thomas Borges and nobody else;
there were no mediators on the money. So our money went directly from our
hands to Thomas Borges' office directly. . . . How he dealt with that money, I
don't know. We never knew that.
US dollars--cash. . . .
. . . The first option that they grabbed was to leave Colombia and go to Panama. We were friends with Noriega. We had already our lab there. We pay him a little money, because they spent, I don't know how much. Because it was probably better than Tranquilandia, regarding installations, runway, supplies, everything. And the other good thing was that Panama, being halfway to the United States, you can go by either Mexico or the Bahamas. So it was a special place for them to be. . . .
That was the first option, to go to Panama. . . . Noriega was a friend of the cartel people, our "friend," in quotes. But at the same time, imagine if they hit that homerun of catching Escobar, the Ochoas, and the Mexican, Gacha, in Panama. He would be like a saint for the American government, and for everybody every place. So he was playing both ends, and at this specific time, he chose to play the arrest card. He was planning to catch them, as soon as they land in Panama.
For some reason, as was explained to us later for the pilots, the instructions
the control tower gave to their plane were not really what it used to be.
Because we went to Panama so many times, we started knowing the controllers,
their voices, and the way they instructed the pilots how to land, where to
land, where to park, everything. So the instructions were not clear enough,
were kind of shaky, and were kind of an order instead of an instruction. So
they said, "Something is not clear here." And Pablo immediately jumps and said
. . . "Do not land. How much gas do we have?" And the pilot said, "We have
enough to go to Nicaragua, or to return to Colombia, either way." . . .
Huge scale. Tranquilandia is well known by everybody, I think. Tranquilandia
has been shown in many documentaries, and in the news and everything. So
basically this place in Panama would be like four or five times better than
Tranquilandia, bigger than Tranquilandia, easier to handle than Tranquilandia.
The operation would assign flights, hours, like any other airport in the world.
. . .
Yes, he blessed that in return for money. How much, I don't know, because that
was part of high-level negotiations. We never knew exactly how much went to
Noriega. But he received a lot of money from them. Carlos never went to
Panama, because Carlos never liked Noriega. He never trusted this guy. He
said, "Don't trust this person, who has been involved with the US government
for many years, and has been on the CIA payroll for so many years. Don't even
talk with him." That was the reason why we went to Nicaragua, and the rest of
the group went to Panama.
Yes. Carlos is a very smart person. He is very intelligent. And as I said
before, his obsession is the papers. So he read every single line in every
single paper, so he was up to date with what was going on almost everywhere in
the world . . .
As I was saying before, when they were going to land already, something was fishy. . . . La corporacion, our house in Nicaragua, already had radios and all that, and we were in permanent contact 24 hours. . . . Pablo gave orders to the pilot not to land. So they abort the landing, and immediately they call Nicaragua, and they say, "We need your help. This is happening with our plane. We have to be careful. We need a place to be."
Colombian authorities were already warned about what was happening, so they
were already back in Medellin, waiting for the plane . . . coming back. So the
Plan B was necessary. . . . Immediately, Carlos contacted Federico and Thomas
Borges . . . and they get us permission to land. The agreement was that each
group has to pay what Carlos already paid. So it was $1 million for Gacha, $1
million for the Ochoas, and $1 million for Pablo Escobar, just for being there.
"Pablo, of course," they say, "Yes, no problem." We need to land some place.
So they were directly there, and that night at dinner was when we learned what
really happened in Nicaragua, and why they had to run to Nicaragua.
. . . That Pablo Escobar was really really really--not mad, not upset, not
pissed off--he was just really out of whack with Noriega. He was like, "This
guy is dead. No matter what, he is dead. He was ready to betray us, and after
all we had done for him, after the money that we invested in Panama, after all
the money that we invest in the lab. So this guy is dead, no matter what, no
matter how much, is dead. We already killed a minister, so we don't care any
more about anything. And this guy is dead." . . . Pablo was the main talker
that night. The Ochoas were very quiet. First of all, Jorge was
completely against the idea of going to Nicaragua. He wanted to go back to
Colombia, to any farm, any airstrip, it doesn't matter. He didn't want to go
to Nicaragua at all. The Mexican was quiet . . . but Pablo was really very
outgoing and talkative. . . .
We have to save whatever we have, and move it . . . The Sandinistas gave us a place . . . a hangar where we can park--not just the planes that we were using, the Carlos Lehder organization--but any other plane that we need, as well as a place to store the cocaine. And that was the beginning of what happened in Nicaragua.
Part of this cocaine has to be sent to the States. There was part of the paste still not processed. At the beginning, the idea was to go back to Colombia with that cocaine to process it. But then later on, Carlos has an idea. "Why don't we open a lab here? We have the Sandinistas' protection. We have airfields. We don't have to worry about airstrips or anything like that. We have everything here." So that's a good idea. They told him, "No problem." So that's another money to pay to the Sandinistas, on top of our monthly rent. That was the idea with that paste, and that paste stayed there probably until the very end. . . .
The cocaine that we had there was divided into two parts. One was supposed to
be carried by our plane, and the other one was for Barry Seal's plane. Barry
Seal was a friend of the Ochoas from before. He was a pilot that they really
trust very much. . . . The first load, Barry Seal's load, is the famous load
where the picture was taken, with Pablo carrying those things, and Ochoa
carrying those things, and . . . It was a complete mess. . . . Gacha carried
like two, no more than two. Pablo carried one, probably, and that was the one
that really caught him in the act. . . . But they were very happy doing it, and
congratulations to Barry Seal and good luck and take care, and all that. So
Barry Seal left. And after a couple of minutes, they authorized us to leave,
too. So we went back to Colombia, and Barry Seal went to the States. Of
course, it was known already that Barry Seal's plane had cameras. . . .
I don't know. The first thing that we knew that the load was caught by coincidence, in a traffic stop in the States. There is no coincidence in this business. So everyone is asking, "Who was not in the operation? Who don't we know? So who was in the Bahamas, who was in the airstrips, and everywhere. Who is everywhere? Where is everyone? The drivers? The persons who is going to stash the cocaine? The person who is going to pick up the money?" They located every single person to find out what happened, because there is no coincidence.
Every evidence was pointing to Barry Seal. Of course, the Ochoas said, "No,
no, no, that couldn't be, because he has been a friend of ours for so long.
No, no, no." . . . And after, I don't remember when exactly, but internally
we knew that that was it. And it was so clear, and the Ochoas were so
convinced of that thing, that they launched the operation to find Barry Seal,
and to kill him. It was so clear. Even though we didn't really have the
picture yet, even though we didn't have all that mumbo-jumbo that came after
the picture was introduced to the newspapers, we kind of knew what was going on
there. And after the picture, of course--there is nothing else that killed this
The Ochoas. . . . The Ochoas really trusted this guy with everything. He was in Colombia. He knew the families. He was treated like another part of the family, another member of the family. . . . Jorge especially had . . . a good time with him. He thought about him as an older brother, something like that. He really trusted this guy. He really liked this guy. So feeling betrayed in that way was a huge offense for him. So of course he had to go out. . . . Fabio wanted to do it personally. Jorge convince him not to, because of the risk involved. But Fabio really wanted to do it personally. . . .
After what happened with Barry Seal, the Nicaraguans got too nervous about what
we were doing there. . . . and said, "We need that cocaine out of here as soon
as you can." So we had to take that cocaine out. . . .
On Carlos, yes. The rest of the guys, no, because this was just one part of
the operations. Even though we were in a big mess . . . the flights continued
going out, taking off from Colombia, as any other regular day. Somebody else
was moving it. Not Carlos' planes, but somebody else's. So the operation
never ended, never stopped. Never.
I wouldn't say that he controlled the majority of the transportation
operations. What happened was that Carlos played a very special role in
establishing the business in the States, because he had Norman's Cay. He was
the owner of the island. Pablo sent that little plane that he had in his farm
in Colombia . . . with two or three kilos of cocaine, and Carlos opens his
island to do this. . . . So of course Carlos was a very big player in this. .
. . He was the person that really expanded the view of the business. Before,
they were sending a mule with something in their stomach, or one kilo here, one
kilo there. He opened this as a major operation. He was the one who really
creates the idea of being able to move thousands and thousands of kilos to the
States. . . .
. . . The Sandinistas wanted to get rid of the cocaine that they have . . . to
prove that they didn't have anything to do with that business. . . . We had two
little vans that we used to move around the city, in Managua. So we had to use
those two vans to move that cocaine that was left after Barry Seal's flight,
right to the house where they were. At the time . . . Pablo, the Ochoas, and
the Mexican were already gone. But we had to move out . . . to the house where
Pablo, and the Ochoas and the Mexican were living at the time. . . . And later
. . . our plane took the cocaine already processed to Bahamas, and then to the
States, and that load was safe. . . .
When they got there, Pablo and the Ochoas and all that . . . there were about five people with them. We assumed, at that point, that they were just bodyguards being brought by Pablo and the Ochoas to be part of their security. Then the time came when we were in the house 24 hours, because we were not allowed to go out. Later, we did go out, but in the very beginning we were in the house 24 hours, doing nothing else but wait for either the option to go back to Colombia, or wait until something happened. So we started talking about this. And the man who was the group boss started talking about it, making jokes, about what happened in Colombia. . . . So finally they get familiar with us, they start trusting us. . . . One day finally they said, "Do you want to hear the story about the assassination?" I said, "Yes."
Okay, this is the story. They were planning to kill him as soon as he was
leaving the ministry building, but they couldn't. So they have to follow him
for many, many blocks. The traffic was so heavy that they couldn't find a
place that was safe enough to shoot and run. Finally a guy who died that day,
the one who actually shot Bonilla--the other guys, they were two motorcycles
and two cars, total for the operation. They got to a point in Bogota, which is
very heavy at that time of the evening, like five or six o'clock in the
evening. The cars were stopped. They couldn't move. And the only motorcycle
that had the chance to do something, to shoot, was this guy. He turned to the
other people and says, "Okay, take care of my wife. I know that I'm going to
die. Take care of my wife." So he told the driver, "Go for it. We're going to
do it." He did it by himself, because the others were stuck back there. He
decided to run, and was shot. So as soon as this happened, the group that was
running the operation had to run, of course. They went to Nicaragua and stayed
They were Carlos' people, directly. The Mexican didn't care. He didn't know
exactly what happened, what the version was. When he heard, he was ready and
he said, "Good." Jorge and the Ochoas they were not very happy with the
operation. They thought that this is going to launch a huge, huge, huge
operation against us, so this doesn't make any sense. Pablo was the one who
carried over the whole operation. It was their people--his money--everything
Well, fear in that, in this business if you betray, you have to fear that
something is coming, and they're coming after you. . . . If you snitch on
somebody else, you have to be aware that you are dead--whatever happens, you're
dead. . . . At the same token, among the people that were working with Pablo,
there was a great feel of trust. "If Pablo said it, that's okay. Do it.
Don't worry about it. Do it." Not because of fear but because the whole
Medellin cartel trusts their judgment. . . .
Carlos never saw them as bigger or better or nothing like that, because he was equal among equals. He was part of the same group. . . . He always thought as friends, as partners, as people that he could trust, especially Pablo.
. . .
No, I don't think so. What happened was this. The people who were more
exposed to the public became the people that were feared by the society in
general. But let me give you an example. The Ochoas . . . were not that open
as Pablo in politics. . . . The Ochoas were very settled. A nice family,
very gentle people. They are very family-oriented. So they were not as feared
as the others. . . Fabio Senior is the clear image of a grandfather that is
very good person, an excellent talker, very kind, very gentle. So this kind of
image is the one that we give from the Ochoas.
Yes, they could be as dangerous as anybody.
Like Barry Seal, for example, to give you just one. Of course, for the Ochoas,
it was the last option. So the Mexican was the first option. You do
something? Get rid of him. So Pablo, sometimes yes, and sometimes not. But
for the Ochoas it was, "Let's think about it. Let's try to make a deal with
the person that made the mistake.. . . . As a last resort--there is no way--we
need to kill him? Okay, we have to." But that was their last resort. . . .
When Carlos said, "I'd prefer to be buried in Colombia than to be in jail in
the United States," he really meant it, and he really expressed the feeling of
all of them. That's basically what happened when Lara Bonilla . . . said that
he is going to reestablish the extradition, and he's going to send everybody to
the States. That is what really stirred the pot. . . .
This concept was expressed by all of them, many of the people that were
involved in the drug business at the time, as far as I know. Nothing happened
until we start taking the money out of the United States. One concept was
expressed by Carlos and Pablo, asking, "Who is using that cocaine? We are not
using that cocaine. It is the States." . . . And the alcohol thing and
Prohibition and all of that stuff for 12 years . . . They said that they could
live with the entire Mafia, because the Mafia invests the money back into the
United States again. That was okay. But when we, Colombians, part of a Third
World, we that are nobodies in this world are taking millions and millions and
millions out of the United States, that's when the United States started
thinking about the war on drugs. They were okay until the money started
getting out. . . .
Not really. I don't recall any occasion that they were worried about what was happening here, no. They were worried about the business, that they were losing the money they were losing the properties that the US seized. . . . They say, "We have to be careful." But they never, never said, "We don't know if this is right or not" . . .
But within the organization, for example, Carlos had a policy that if you were
caught doing cocaine, you were out. You are no longer part of the
organization. Doesn't matter who you are. You could be the lieutenant. You
could be a small soldier. You could be the cook. If you're caught doing
cocaine, you're out. That was one policy, because he said that cocaine
destroys your brain. Crack destroys your brain. Crack and cocaine were "No
way, Jose. You're out of here." If such and such is caught at it, don't touch
it. . . .
Yes, a lot. The American policy was a laughing matter all of the time, because
of this. On one side, you are launching a huge campaign against drugs. And
then the other side, there are so many people in this country that use that,
Hollywood, business people. . . So yes, they were worried about the
interdiction and all of that, but they were making jokes about Nancy Reagan's
saying "no", when in the meantime we are increasing our cocaine loads to the
States. We were doing, say, 30 tons a year last year. And now we've sent 60
tons. So where in the heck is that "no" policy that they were talking about?
That kind of stuff, and no specific joke or anything, no, I don't remember.
I was lucky to be caught, because basically if I was not caught at the time
that I was caught, probably I should be dead now--because I was going to a
point of no return. I was having so many problems, the plane that I crashed,
the load that the Mexican assumed that it was my responsibility and all of that
stuff--I was heading to a dead end. So basically, I was lucky. I was lucky to
be caught by the DEA. And I was lucky enough to have a second chance. Do I
agree with all of the DEA policy? Probably not. Do I praise the DEA?
Probably not. But I got a second chance because of the DEA.
For me--and this is a very personal concept--I knew that I was completely wrong in what I was doing. I said at the time that I was going to make good money, and then disappear. This is a concept basically for all of the pilots. I don't know the other people, but all of the pilots we were involved in this because we want some money and get out. We wanted to make a couple of good flights, that we can save for life, and then get out. And because of the business, today you have money, tomorrow you don't have any. And then the way you can get back on track is doing another flight. So something keeps you in there.
Then, after a while, if you go back to your regular life, you miss that craziness. I have seen many people that go back to the drug business, not because of the money, but because of the excitement that is behind that. We are humanly absolutely nutcases. And we feel a different kind of excitement during that kind of a trip flying and knowing that somebody could be down there and they're going to catch you--that you're going to spend the rest of your life in prison or you can be killed by somebody.
This is a crazy excitement that you look for after a while. And that's
basically what happens. It's like an addiction to this stuff. I have seen so
many people going back to this, not because of the money and not because they
don't have enough money, but because they miss that part of the life.
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