How do you define who the enemy is?
He is vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former
assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, 1981-1985.
Right now the enemy of the United States and the world is instability. What we
need to do is to preserve stability in the world. That stability is threatened
in a number of ways. You have the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. You have countries that don't keep agreements like the
non-proliferation treaty. You have countries that don't respect the waters of
other countries. You have people who defy the laws and standards that are
generally accepted by mankind. They wipe out people because they happen to be
a certain race, creed, color or religion.
But what we have to do right now is maintain stability in the international
environment. The military is one of those devices that we have to do that. We
have no peer competitor right now. Our situation is unlike any we had at any
time in the twentieth century, when you have the British and then the Germans
became a peer competitor. We don't have any peer competitors. Could we have
some in 10 to 15 years? Sure, we could, but we don't have anybody right
Many people say the most likely candidate would be China, but the fact of the
matter is, it would take the Chinese a long time. They'd have to spend an
awful lot of money to be able to come up anywhere close to us, and we would
have plenty of warning to take the steps that we needed to if that happen.
It's an absurd comparison to say that the Chinese military is bigger than the
United States military. If you want to attack China, that becomes relevant.
But why would we want to attack China? What you need to worry about is the
power projection capabilities of the Chinese. They have a few submarines.
They try to convert an old Russian aircraft carrier. But these things don't
happen overnight. Look who surrounds the Chinese. They've got the Vietnamese
on one side. They've got the Russians on the other side. They've got the
. . . China, the theoretical peer competitor, is trying to join the World Trade
Organization so that they can open up their society and be part of this
international system. If the Chinese have a choice, if they want to continue
developing economically, they're going to have to join the world, and its going
to change them politically. If they change politically, they're not going to
be the same type of threat. If they don't join and change politically, they're
not going to have the money to modernize their military in such a way that they
could become a threat.
If the US got rid of 2MTW--the policy by which we are prepared to fight two
major regional conflicts simultaneously--do you actually think we could survive
with four to five divisions? Do you think that the force could be reduced?
Very definitely. If we got rid of two major theaters of war, we would put much
more of the army into the reserves. You would cut the active force, and you
would have the divisions in the reserves if worse came to worse and you needed
to call them up. You would put most of your heavy forces in there.
You would also skip the actually production of this next generation of weapons
systems, and go with the ones you have, as well as keep on doing research on
your next generation. And if you saw the beginning of a crisis, you could call
up these divisions. . . . A problem with the major theaters of war is that army
divisions are too heavy to get there. That's why the army is trying to become
lighter, which is something they should have done ten years ago, they had taken
a look at the situation in the world. Even a medium-weight army division still
has more firepower than any other division in the world. They were still
thinking of fighting the Red Army rather than dealing with the forces that they
would have to face.
How many divisions do you think we can safely deploy and still be able to
survive and be safe in the world?
Are you talking about total army divisions and the active reserve mix? That's
very important. What you have right now is basically the equivalent of about
15 divisions, if you count active and reserve. I would get rid of two active
divisions and keep the same number in the reserves, but increase their ability
to deploy. What you would then have would be 13 divisions that you could call
. . . We still have 100,000 troops in Europe. Why? No threat to western
Europe exists any more. The Soviet military has a hard enough time in
Chechnya. There's no way that they could threaten western Europe. Finally the
Europeans are waking up and doing something they should have done ten years
ago, which is to take more responsibility for their own defense. One reason
they didn't do that before is that they said, "Oh, the United States is here,
and isn't really demobilizing. So why should we do it?" As they begin to
develop their own defense identity, you can cut back to maybe 25,000 troops in
Europe. That's 75,000 you can put in the reserves or take out of the force
that you wouldn't have to have in Europe all of the time. So what you should
do is go down to about eight divisions, and make sure that the five that you
have in the reserves are fully capable.
You need to adopt what Senator McCain called a couple of years ago "a situation
of tiered readiness," where you have certain units that are really ready to go
on short notice, and others that are not so ready, but that you can bring up.
Right now we're trying to keep all ten active army divisions in the same state
of readiness without making these gradations.
So is the problem the wanting to have a Cold War-type comfort zone?
Yes. What you have in the Department of Defense are four very powerful
bureaucracies that want to continue to do what they do best. The army likes
heavy divisions. Over the last ten years, while nobody seemed to be paying
attention, they got heavier. The navy is still building aircraft carriers,
rather than the so-called Cruise missile ship or arsenal ship, which they
should be building. What you need is a platform that can use an awful lot of
Cruise missiles, not more and more big aircraft carriers.
The navy is building a new generation of submarines, when the submarines
they've already got are the best in the world. The navy is actually retiring
them before they reach the end of their useful life. You have the air force
that continues to build new fighter planes that are bigger and faster. The F-22 is a wonderful machine. If we had dogfights with the Soviet MIG-40 now,
yes, they'd be great. But not only is that not what they are liable to do.
They can't do very much on the ground, which is where you're going to really
need them to provide close air support.
So what you've basically done is allow the services to continue to do what they
do best. I don't blame them. Any organization will continue to do what it
does best until somebody comes in and say, "Hey, you've got to move." They'll
do what they do best until you really come down hard on them.
Some outside groups have looked at it--the National Defense Panel, and the
Hart-Rudman Commission. And if you look at the their members, you've got some
hard-liners. The National Defense Panel has several people on it who are
retired military. Several people worked with me at high-level positions in the
Reagan administration, and they said it doesn't make sense. Then you come
along with the Hart-Rudman Commission, which includes, among others, a former
secretary of defense, and they're saying it doesn't make sense. What you're
basically saying is that these bureaucracies have been pretty much left on
their own for ten years. They've continued to do what they do best, because
nobody has really wanted to confront them.
Is there a necessary trade-off between investing in manpower and new weapon
Any organization in the Pentagon has to deal with the same things--to make a
balance between what it spends on today and what it invests in the future.
That's the so-called "readiness versus investment." Look at the Pentagon's
investment strategy. They're spending an awful lot of money on new weapons
systems that are already improving on what's already the best in the world.
And so you're spending $200 million on an M-22. The Marines are spending over
$80 million on the V-22 helicopter. You can buy a Blackhawk helicopter for $6
million or $7 million. The navy is going ahead with the FAA team E and F, when
the FAA teams C and D are already the best in the world.
So you're spending an awful lot of that to deal with a threat that no longer
exists. And that means that you are short-spending on things like spare parts
and ammunition. Now you have a situation where, because you're so concerned
about the future, you're not taking adequate care of the present, and you're
not getting the most out of your defense dollar. You're going to have
problems, but the problem is not the amount of money. It's where you're
putting it and how you manage it.
The Bush political campaign advocates skipping a generation of weapons;
putting money into R&D, basically not recapitalizing certain legacy items,
and trying to get a jump on the twenty-first century. And the Democratic
candidate is saying, "You're going to shortchange the force and make it so that
we're not ready to fight." It's almost seemed like the tables have turned
They certainly have turned if you look at the politics of defense. In Bill
Clinton's campaign, he talked about how he was going to cut the military and
free up money for other things. He took as his benchmark the five-year plan of
the Bush administration. If you take a look at what George Bush proposed for
spending through the end of this decade and you look at what was actually
spent, Clinton spent more. The Democrats don't want to be considered soft on
defense. . . . They want to show they're just as strong on defense as the
If you take a look at the debate between Bush and Gore, what you have is a
situation where I think Bush is right. We don't need to continue developing
this generation of systems and put them into the system, because the ones you
have are already the best. Nobody is even close.
The Democrats are trying to say that you would put our troops at risk because
they wouldn't automatically have the best systems. That is a philosophical
debate. I think the Bush people are more correct, and what Gore and his people
are ignoring is that you're already very good.
What would the military like to happen? They would like to have the Gore
position. They don't want to worry about the future. They want to get the
stuff now, because they don't know what's going to happen in the future. So
you have a situation in which probably the military would be more sympathetic
to the Gore position.
But are there programs that the army could also cut back on? . . .
During the last decade, the army squandered an awful lot of money in building
Cold War-type weapons. The Crusader, for example, is this huge artillery piece
that couldn't even fit in any of the air force's transport planes to get there.
They have heavied up their M-1 and A-1 tanks, and have spent money converting
them again to make them better than they needed to be. Now, as they make this
transformation which is ten years too late, they're going to have some
financial problems, because they're going to be competing with the other
But in one of the great ironies of the drawdown of the 1990s, the army, navy
and air force all cut their manpower by exactly the same amount. That says
that you haven't transformed your thinking to the new era we're dealing with.
. . . If all of the services cut their men and women on active duty by exactly
the same amount in a changing world, we're going to have problems.
In terms of where we should spend our money--is it a military problem or is
it a civilian leadership problem?
The leadership must come from the president and the secretary of defense to
change the military, because if you leave the service alone they will do what
they do best. And I don't blame them. If you are a career officer in one of
those services, you've got to believe in that mission and in the essence of
that service, or you wouldn't have stayed.
Basically, what's happened during the decade of the 1990s is that the civilian
leadership abdicated their responsibilities because it was too hard to make
these tough decisions. For example, the arsenal ship was something that should
have been pushed. When the chief of naval operations tried to push it, he met
resistance from the submariners, who wanted to put the Cruise missiles on
there. He met resistance from the surface people, who wanted to put it on
their cruisers and destroyers. And he needed the backing of the people at the
secretary of defense's level or even the president.
Let me give you another example of how civilian leadership abdicated. When
Senator Cohen, who became Secretary of Defense Cohen, was in the Senate, he
said that the F-22 fighter plane is exactly the wrong system for the end of the
Cold War. He wrote a wonderful op ed piece about why we shouldn't be doing
that. He becomes Secretary of Defense Cohen. Some of his former colleagues in
the Congress agree with him, and they try to cut it. What happens? Secretary
of Defense Cohen gets the chiefs together. They go over to the Hill and say,
"We need this. You shouldn't have done this. You didn't consult us on it."
He knows that he has a crisis. Even if he gets all the money that they're
expecting to get, you can't buy three new tactical aircraft. The Congress gave
them a way out. Then he goes and gets the president to threaten to veto the
bill. If they're cut, the F-22 stays. The army chief of staff, for some
reason other than the fact that he wants everybody to support him, signs the
letter, saying, "We need the F-22," knowing that if he does that, he's not
going to get enough money. So, yes, there's a problem. You had a chance. And
nobody is stepping forward to make these tough decisions.
We've just had the biggest increase in the military budget since the Reagan
era. Does it concern you?
It concerns me that we're throwing more money at the Pentagon at this time
because that validates the fact that, over the last ten years, they haven't
done their job. Admiral Bill Owen, who was the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has basically written a new book about this whole subject. He
argues that if you give them more money, that's going to show them they were
doing the right thing, when in fact they were doing the wrong thing. They were
basically going on in Cold War model, and developing these weapon systems
whether in fact you need them. They were using a strategy that's no longer
The Democratic Party is terrified of being considered soft on defense. They're
willing to give the Pentagon the money, because we have a budget surplus right
now. You really don't have to take it from any place else. It's easier to do
that than to confront the hard questions.
General Shinseki announced army transformation about seven months ago. What
do you feel about his attempt to change the army?
I think General Shinseki is on the right track. The army, as it exists ten
years after the end of the Cold War, is too heavy. It's so heavy that it can't
get to where it needs to go. It needs to become lighter in the sense of what
these divisions carry and whether they can fit into the planes that are going
to fly them. So he is on the right track. And the real challenge for General
Shinseki is, will there be enough money now for him to do what he wants to do?
Because it's going to mean buying different type of weapons systems, and
spending more on investment than seems to be in the army budget.
The estimates are $40 billion to $70 billion. Do you think that is money
That's money well spent. But I would say to him is, "You've got to make some
trade-offs. I'll let you make the army lighter, but it's got to be smaller. I
want you to cut a couple of divisions. I want you to use the money you save
from that to modernize. I want you to make some hard choices about your
weapons systems. Do you really need all these Crusaders? Do you really need
the Comanches? Do you need the Wolverine and all these other systems that you
An interesting thing happened this year. In order for the army to do this,
they knew they had to cut some things. The chief of staff did not seem to have
the political clout to take on the armor or the artillery barons. They kicked
it up to the office of the secretary of defense. The office of the secretary
of defense made some suggestions. They were cut in the army budget, but then
those people went over to the Hill, trying to get Congress to restore some of
those weapons systems.
I would make them cut out the weapons systems they don't need, and cut the size
of the force. Then I would also make the decision to take some of the forces
out of Europe, which would decrease the strain on the army.
He's arguing that he needs Wolverine, and he needs Grizzly. He's cut the
Crusader order in half and asked for it to be lighter, and he's keeping the
Comanche order. Do you agree with those decisions?
Basically, I find it very hard to make a case for the Grizzly and the Wolverine
in this new medium-weight army. In the environment that we're talking about,
I'm glad that he's cut the Crusaders. The great irony is he's cut the
Crusaders, but he hasn't saved that much money, because they had too many of
these heavy Crusaders. So he's really not saving any money when he cuts the
Crusaders because he's got to transform them at the same time.
But the real key to getting the money for the army is to cut the size of its
active force. If he doesn't do that, it's going to be very hard for him to get
the money in the current budget environment.
When you say that there is no peer competitor and we're the most powerful,
who, then, are we escalating against? What is our situation in the world in
terms of arming?
Basically, when the United States buys new weapons, it develops weapons that
are better than the ones that the United States already has. It's not against
any likely competitor. And so what you're saying is, "I've got to buy an F-22
because it's better than the F-16. We need an F-22 to compete with the F-16,
which is our plane, and which . . . we sell around the world."
The Navy needs an FA-18 E and F even though the C and D is already better than
any other naval aircraft in the world. You have to ask yourself, who is the E
and F going to fight--C and D? It's the same way with our submarines. We're
building a new generation of submarines even though the Soviets, for all
practical purposes, have stopped building submarines, and nobody else out there
is building submarines.
If you forget about the rest of the defense budget and you compare what we
spend on procurement research and development, it's $100 billion. The total
budget of the Soviet Union and China, even if I cost them out in western
standards, is about $100 billion. So that's for everything that they're
spending combined. And that's just our investment budget.
Critics say that peacekeeping operations or a small-scale contingency force
diminishes the war fighting capability of the force, stretching the force too
thin. Is that how you see it?
We need to be involved in certain peacekeeping operations, using two criteria.
One, when the humanitarian situation just violates every norm that any human
being has--genocide for example, and ethnic cleansing--and when it has some
connection to our strategic interest. In other words, if the humanitarian
situation may not be that bad, but it does have some strategic implications,
like the Balkans. We need to be prepared to do that. We can do that without
stretching our military. Everybody says we're over-committed. We have 100,000
troops in each theater, in Europe and in Asia. We have about 30,000 people
deployed around the world. That's out of a total force of 2.4 million. We use
a lot of reservists in these missions. If you can't figure out how to put
30,000 people some place out of a force of over two million, you don't have a
readiness problem; you have a management problem.
You could say, "When we put them in there, their readiness to fight these major
regional contingencies gets degraded." Then you're arguing that these Cold War
standards you have for readiness will not be met. I have no doubt if you took
our forces out of Kosovo for example, they'd be more than a match for the North
Koreans. . . . You could argue that the forces in Kosovo are not doing the
same type of training that they used to, or that our forces flying into the
Persian Gulf are just sort of monitoring things there. Are the North Koreans
training very much? I don't buy that argument at all.
The problem I have with the peacekeeping operations is the political leaders
are not explaining to he American people why they're doing that. And the
military leaders are confusing the troops because they don't like those
operations--they don't see them in their self-image. And what happens is when
those youngsters go over there, they tell them, "Well, you're not ready."
How would you like it if you were in Kosovo--as we had a situation a couple of
months ago--where the parts of the units that are in Kosovo get a report that
your divisions are no longer ready because we have a brigade here. That's
demoralizing. I'm trying to do something good. I can see the good I'm
accomplishing, and somebody comes out with a report because you haven't been to
the tank range in the last month that your division is no longer ready. Even
if you disregard the standards that they're using for readiness, you do have a
The military doesn't know what it's really supposed to do, because it has one
vision, and now it's being used differently. No wonder it's having trouble
recruiting. Do you want to join an organization in which they tell you you're
going to do one thing? You actually end up doing something special.
Fred Kagan defines the problem as our need to decide what we want to do as a
nation. Is that the central problem?
When you have a military force and you design it, equip it and train it, you
have to ask yourself, what do you have it for? What is the threat? If you
look at the world of the twenty-first century, what you see as the threat to
our vital national security interests are instability or chaos in the
international system. And so what you want is a force that can to deal with
those situations that cause chaos, whether it's a humanitarian-type of
situation where people are killed because of their race, creed, color,
ethnicity, or whether a nation violates the borders of another nation or
acquires weapons of mass destruction and threatens their neighbors. That's
what you really need to have the military for.
That military is going to have to deal with a whole gradation of situations.
Somewhere we would call it peacekeeping or small-scale contingencies, for
example, just to stop slaughter. Somewhere you have to go and separate the
warring parties. And you have to have the capability to be able to fight a
large conventional war if the situation should get out of control, such as in
the Gulf or the Korean peninsula, for example.
So that's actually to design your military. If you design it only to deal with
the high end and not the low end, you're going to be spending money on the
wrong things, and you're not going to be equipped to do what you need to do.
Conversely, you can't design it just for the low end. You always have to have
in your bag of tricks or an arrow in your quiver that has to deal with the high
end. Our problem has been that, in the last decade, we have focused only on
the high end because that's what we got accustomed to do during the Cold War.
And that is something that the military feels most comfortable with.
What is the future of war?
If you look at the world in the twenty-first century, the chances of military
force being deployed are much greater for the small-scale contingencies or the
peacekeeping contingencies rather than the large war. In the 1990s, since the
end of the Cold War, the military has been used primarily in these so-called
small-scale contingencies. What they try to do is take a force that was
designed for large contingencies, and adapt it. And it hasn't worked well. And
because it hasn't worked well, we've wasted an awful lot of money, and you've
demoralized an awful lot of the men and women in the service.
What were some of the lessons of Task Force Hawk?
During the war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, the army made a futile attempt
to get its Apache helicopters into Albania, so they could be used in Kosovo.
That's a metaphor for what happened to the military, in general in the army,
particularly in the 1990s. The Apache is a very sophisticated aircraft. But
you have built up such logistics for it, that by the time you got it there, it
was no longer capable of doing or no longer needed to do what it, should have
done. And you ended up with not having the appropriate weapons to stop the
real problem of people being run out and killed Kosovo, because it took so long
to get it there.
That's a metaphor for how heavy the army is; if you can't get it to where you
want to, it's no good. And I'm sure if this was a war with the Koreans or we
had to fight with the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe, this would have
been a heck of a situation, and you'd want to be that heavy. But you didn't
really need to be that heavy in Kosovo.
Recently the army opposed changing 2MTW as a military policy. Why?
The Pentagon reviews its strategy every four years. In its last quadrennial
defense review, there were some documents floated earlier on that, which
basically said, "Do we really want to keep planning for two major theater of
wars? Because what we're ending up with is this unbalanced force. And maybe
what we ought to do is, rather than saying two major theater of war,
simultaneously sort of back off a bit and say, 'We'll handle one and be able to
hold in the other.'"
The army argued vociferously against it, saying that we couldn't be a great
power if we didn't do that, and that we would send the wrong signal to the
enemy. And we actually went public with this, through leaks to the press,
because if you adopt that strategy then I can't justify a ten-division heavy
division army. And they raised such a ruckus about it that the civilian
leadership and the Pentagon backed off, because they did not what to have a
confrontation with the army over this situation.
Will things change in the next quadrennial defense review?
The next quadrennial defense review will take place in 2001, when there will be
a new administration. That will really be the chance to change the direction
of the Pentagon, because a new administration will come in with a mandate--or
at least permission--from the Congress of the American people to make certain
What you're going to need is a president committed to taking on the vested
interests in the Pentagon and in Congress, and a secretary of defense really
ready to take the hard choices. That did not occur in the decade of the 1990s,
and the real question is, will it occur in 2001? And if it doesn't occur in
2001, it won't occur for four years or eight years in that administration,
because when you come into office is the time to make significant changes.
Ninety percent of the changes that any administration makes in defense are made
in the first year. After that it's very hard, because you've got congressional
elections and you have to deal with the Congress and the vested interests. But
if they come in with a plan and they move quickly, they can really make the
changes that are necessary.
In 1947, 1948, we had a significant a deep change in national security
strategy. Do you think we're at a similar turning point now?
You have a window of opportunity in 2001 for two reasons. Number one, you have
a new administration with new people who can bring a fresh perspective and who
will not be tied to the decisions of the 1990s. The second is that you
have some breathing time because there is no peer competitor. There is nobody
out there that can take advantage of the changes that you would make and to
threaten the national security interests, so this is the really the maximum
time. We don't know what it would be like if we have an eight-year
administration, or what the world will look like in ten years.
The defense budget, at this point, is basically untouchable. There's nobody
really in Congress who speaks up and says that it's time to cut. Are you sort
of the point man, way out there alone in the wilderness?
I think I understand the reasons why we don't have the debate that we should.
The Democratic Party, which would normally be very critical of the Pentagon,
doesn't want to embarrass a Democratic president. And so they more or less go
along with what he wants, and the president does not want a confrontation with
the military because of the baggage that he brought to the office.
The Republicans, many of whom would be very suspicious of some of these weapons
systems, want to keep the Democrats on the defensive on this issue, so they
don't want to join the debate. I suspect that after the next election, you're
going to go back into what you might call the liberal Democrats and the
Eisenhower Republicans, and both are going to make some of the same points that
I've been trying to make. You see whispers of that in the Bush campaign, by
saying skip a generation of weapon systems. I do think if you had a Republican
president, particularly if the Democrats controlled the House, then you would
see them say, "Wait a second. Why is he spending all of this money on defense
and not enough on these other areas?" So I suspect that after the election,
you'll have the more traditional debate. But right now when you say these
things, people will tell you privately that they agree with you, but nobody's
going to come out publicly.
How would you rate General Shinseki's chances of success?
I think he has more than a chance of succeeding. But I have been very
disheartened by the reaction within the army so far to his changes.
What do you specifically mean?
What you have is, basically, by making the army lighter, you're going to take
on some of the barons in the army--the people who control the branches, the
artillery and the armor--who like a lot of the systems he is trying to make
smaller or get rid of.
And you see that basically as resistance to the change? . . .
Very definitely. There's always resistance to change, especially when you're
changing the essence of the service. If you want it to happen, you can't have
the chief of the service out there by himself. He's going to need allies
within the office of the secretary of the army and the office of the secretary
of defense who are willing to take on these vested interests. And I haven't
seen anybody really charge up the hill with General Shinseki so far.
Isn't the world a more dangerous place then it was before?
The world is a more unstable place than it was during the Cold War, but it's
not a more dangerous place... If you look at NATO expansion,
if you look at the expansion of European Union, all of the Warsaw Pact
countries, which were [Russia's] main allies, have basically joined the West.
The situation in the Balkans, for example, wouldn't have happened during the
Cold War. But it's not a threat in the sense that the Soviet military charging
through the plains of West Germany was. So the world is more unstable, but
it's by no means more dangerous than it used to be.
Back in 1991, Colin Powell said he's running out of demons. But aren't
there rogue states?
Back in 1990, Powell recognized that we have to downsize the military. But in
order to keep it at what he thought was the appropriate level, you need
specific enemies. He identified six states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba and
North Korea as rogue states. Now, what are the characteristics of these
states? Well, they are states that resort to terrorism. They are states that
don't accept the usual norms of international weapons. They like to get
weapons of mass destruction, for example.
Now look at these six rogue states . . .and see how much they spend on defense.
They're spending like $14 billion combined. Now, people will say "Well, yes,
but they don't pay their people as much as we do." But give them our pay
scale, and they're still not going to get up very, very, very high. So what is
the military capability of that? It's not anywhere near, for example, like a
Soviet military. Do you have to watch, and be prepared to use force against
them? Sure. But if you look at our military and you say "It's one-third the
size, or two-thirds the size it was in 1990," compared to those countries, it's
still a much, much greater capacity.
But anybody with a shoulder-fired missile can be a hero?
These countries are a threat to some of the things that we hold dear. But
you're not going to deal with them by building a new aircraft carrier or a new
fighter plane. What you need is good intelligence to stop the terrorism before
it starts. What you need to be able to do is get the rest of the world to join
with us in putting sanctions against these people.
What you have to do is be prepared to use force quickly and decisively if they
should violate any of these rules, and we're prepared to do that. We have
37,000 Americans in Korea. We've got another 60,000 in Japan. That's 100,000
to add to the South Korean military that you could deal with if need be. But
if somebody brings a bomb and plants it on the subway in Washington or New York
or Boston, that's a completely different type of threat. If somebody upsets
our information systems, like cyber warfare, that's different. That's a
different threat, and that's not handled by the Pentagon.
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