A journalist and author of numerous books, including the latest, Saddam Hussein:
The Politics of Revenge, he also was a consultant for this FRONTLINE report.
For several years he worked closely with Saddam's government in posts which gave
him the chance for unusually close access to Saddam Hussein himself. Beginning in
the mid-seventies, he was a go-between for Western arms manufacturers doing business with Iraq, and he was part of Saddam's secret plan
to acquire chemical weapons and an atomic bomb.
An attache at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, 1963-1965, and later the
U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, he offers an overview of U.S. relations with Iraq,
the U.S. betrayal of the Kurds, and details how Saddam and the U.S. have both
used each other and misread each other over the past three decades.
He is Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdish Democratic Party and a member of its
Politiburo. In 1970, when the Kurds negotiated a power-sharing agreement with
Vice President Saddam Hussein, he was one of four Kurdish leaders who joined
the Iraqi government. In this interview he talks about his personal encounters
over the years with Saddam, the U.S. betrayal of the Kurds and the lingering questions
about U.S. support for them now. He also explains his concerns if Saddam
Hussein leaves power.
He was CIA Near East Division Chief, 1991-94. In this interview he grades
Saddam's security and intelligence operations, assesses why no coup attempts
have succeeded and the limitations of the Iraqi opposition. He also explains why
Saddam Hussein's regime is an issue the U.S. will probably have to cope with
"for very long time."
Since the early 1970s, he has been Saddam's conduit with
the outside world, and his main advisor on foreign policy.
During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Aziz was widely considered the most effective
foreign minister in the Arab world. Now Deputy Prime Minister, Aziz remains in overall
charge of Iraq's foreign policy, answering only to Saddam himself. In this interview Aziz
offers his personal views on Saddam's actions and leadership and articulates
Iraq's--and Saddam's--point of view on U.S.-Iraq relations over the decades.
He is SCIRI's top liaison with the West and, with the rest of the Iraqi opposition,
is part of the umbrella leadership of the Iraqi National Congress. He details Saddam's grip on the Iraqi
people, the United States's contradictory policies and broken promises to the
Iraqi opposition, and how the opposition can succeed in overthrowing Saddam.
He is part of a three-man leadership council for the Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National
Congress. He offers an overview of Saddam Hussein and Iraq the past three
decades, evaluates U.S-Iraq relations, and explains the threat Saddam still
poses and the strategy required for launching a successful attack against
A former CIA Near East Division Chief, he was the leading behind-the-scenes architect of U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East during the Cold War. In this interview, he summarizes the U.S.'s views
and dealings with Iraq and Saddam during the 1960s and 1970s and offers a pointed analysis of how
America should deal with Saddam Hussein today.
He is former chief negotiator for the Kurdish Democratic Party in its
negotiations with Iraq and the United States.
He is the leader and Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two
largest Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq.