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 |  |  This psychological profile of Saddam Hussein evaluating his personality and political behavior was prepared by Jerrold M. Post, a professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs. Post presented this analysis to the House Armed Services Committee in December 1990, on the brink of the U.S. going to war with Iraq.
Journalist Robin Wright's analysis of the history of flawed assumptions, lost opportunities, ineptitude and mistakes which since the end of the Gulf War has characterized the U.S. strategy in dealing with Saddam Hussein.
Dr. John Hillen, a Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, assesses the policy options that could guide America's long-term Iraq policy. He evaluates what must be confronted should Saddam Hussein ever acquire nuclear weapons. He also looks at the arguments and challenges for invading Iraq and getting rid of Hussein.
Here is one UN weapons inspector's story of what it took to determine whether an Iraqi facility - the Al Hakam factory located 50 miles from Baghdad - was producing animal feed and pesticides as the Iraqis claimed or, biological weapons.
Jonathan B. Tucker, Director for Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation Issues at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, offers a thorough, easy-to-follow analysis of the UN experience in Iraq: how the UN teams were set up and worked; the effectiveness of different kinds of inspections; and a good overview of Iraq's cat and mouse game and how it was largely overcome by the UN inspectors.
The August 1995 defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein al-Kamel enabled UNSCOM and the IAEA to discover Iraq's concealment activities at Al Atheer, a plant dedicated to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. This report is from the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies collection of material on Iraq.
Here is a "fact sheet" laying out the chemical and biological weapons UNSCOM believes Iraq is still hiding, as of October 1998. From the web site of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
A report detailing how the Iraqis have stalled and stonewalled to keep secret their nuclear weapons program and how the 1995 defection of Saddam Hussein's son in law revealed the true extent of Iraq's efforts to mislead UN inspectors. The author is David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).
Over 200 Russian missile-guidance instruments were dredged from the Tigris river in December 1995. The authors of this investigation contend they were part of an elaborate Iraqi missile technology procurement network which was taking advantage of nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union and Russia's lax export policy. Russia's investigation into the affair eventually was dismissed and the U.S. didn't protest. This article details the case and speculates on why the U.S. was unconcerned about this illicit Russian-Iraqi deal.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers a detailed rundown of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, showing the areas of nuclear bomb and delivery systems that were close to completion before the Gulf War.
The Federation of American Scientists offers maps and a detailed listing of known Iraqi special weapon facilities showing exactly what they produce, house, and what other military purposes they provide or provided.
This document tracks how western countries provided Iraq with material for
chemical and biological weapons in the 1980's and 1990's. From the Monterey
Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
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