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This is part of an April 2003 draft of a postwar plan written for ORHA, with an introduction by Jay Garner in which he notes: "History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post-hostilities activities."

Among its key recommendations: the need for an integrated civil-military approach; the importance of quickly setting up an interim government; and the necessity of "internationalizing" the reconstruction period. "Key to internationalizing � and therefore reducing the chance of a backlash/intifada is removing/reducing the levels of the U.S.-led coalition 'invading forces' as quickly as possible," the plan advises.

The document also notes that Iraq's oil revenues alone will not be sufficient to pay for reconstruction, and predicts an extended period of instability in the postwar period: "The most probable threat will come from residual pockets of fanatics, secessionist groups, terrorists and those [who] would seek to exploit ethnic, religious, and tribal fault lines for personal gain. The threat from these groups would manifest itself in high impact tactics such as car or suicide bombings, sniping, and 'hit and run' raids. A high level of such attacks will have an adverse impact on the creation of stability, a prerequisite for self-sustaining peace."

Editor's Note: This document is a draft. Parts of the sections below are incomplete. It has not been edited by FRONTLINE.

INTRODUCTION

"The object in war is a better state of peace -- even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."

Liddell Hart

1.   History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post hostilities activities. Therefore, at the heart of our thinking has been the imperative to avoid a strategically barren victory: that is military achievements that, however impressive in their own right, nonetheless fail to alter the political context in which they occur.

2.   This Unified Mission Plan describes the way in which the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) intends to set about empowering the Iraqi people to shape their own destiny, once they are free from the persecution by Saddam Hussein and his brutal and corrupt regime. It is a Civil-Military Plan for an environment which will see an evolving transition from military to civil primacy, throughout which civil and military actors must be viewed as equal partners. Using classical strategy terms, it seeks to marry the Ends and the Means by setting out the manner in which the latter is applied to the former, in other words by describing the Ways.

3.   In this challenging endeavor, there are a number of fundamental principles which will guide our efforts and must remain uppermost in our thoughts.

•   Unity of effort, civil and military.

•   Commitment to stay and commitment to go.

•   Iraqi's oil and other resources belong to the Iraqi people.

•   Iraq is maintained as a unified state with its territorial unity intact.

•   Effective representative government by and for the Iraqi people.

4.   There is no doubt in my mind that ORHA is a pioneering organization and a potential model for the future. The internal design may change but the creation of an organization to fuse the efforts of the many agencies and actors involved in a post conflict situation is the fundamental idea that lies at the heart of the National Presidential Security Directive which created ORHA.

5. This Unified Mission Plan is in two parts; Part 1 sets out the overall strategy, principal goals and themes for Post Hostilities Iraq, and is designed to be enduring in nature. Part 2 explains the way in which ORHA, as it is currently configured, intends to deliver the ideas laid out in Part 1. It is designed primarily to serve as a focus for the efforts of all ORHA staff, but is also of clear relevance to a wide range of other military and civil organizations operating within Iraq, and externally to other governments and international organizations.

J M Garner,

Director OHRA/Interim Civil Administrator??

PART 1 - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

SECTION 1 - PLANNING SCENARIO

Geopolitical Overview.

1.1   While Iraq has not been a popular neighbor or responsible international actor, Western military action against Iraq is equally unpopular. Additionally, the Muslim and Arab world accuse the West of hypocrisy over its approach to Israel, which is in stark contrast to the hard line adopted towards Iraq. Indeed, the Israeli 'occupation' of Palestine is of much greater concern to Arabs than Saddam Hussein's atrocities. Consequently, any perception that coalition forces have invaded Iraq to seize oil reserves, or because Iraq is a Muslim-state, will have an adverse impact on the US and coalition partners in terms of international political support for the mission and its wider political objectives. Therefore longer term occupation or heavy-handed post conflict activities will exacerbate anti-US feelings, across the Middle East in particular. This may in turn erode support for the global war on terrorism.

1.2   Short description of Iraq: tribal family; religious; ethnic; historical; political aspects.

The Operating Environment.

1.3   An intervention operation such as this entails simultaneous humanitarian, peace support and combat operations. Within this doctrinal construct certain considerations prevail -- all of which are variables not absolutes -- which will determine the size, shape, capabilities and focus for a military force, and impact on the conduct of civil activities:

a.   The level of threat, both to the mission and to the individual.

b.   The extent to which high intensity combat operations are required, an issue which has individual and force connotations.

c.   The varying number of civil and military actors and their importance at different levels.

d.   And who is compliant and who is actively resisting.

1.4   Such operations do not develop in a linear way, with neat transition phases, all carefully controlled by some detailed and rigid master campaign plan. They evolve and fluctuate at different levels, in different ways and in different places. In this, a clear visualization of time, timing and consequences is important in order to allow civil and military decision-makers to shape their environment; i.e. when to do something, how long to do it for and what are the desired resultant effects? The complex post hostilities operating environment in which both military forces and civilian organizations will operate requires a truly integrated civil/military approach and structural and intellectual agility, at every level.

Prevailing Security Conditions.

1.5   In broad terms the military role is to create a secure and stable environment in order to assist the civil authorities to empower existing legitimate organizations and dismantle separate or parallel power structures. This has both internal and external aspects, the former primarily related to civil disorder, the latter to border control. This may require military forces to 'police the security gap' and to support counter terrorism activities, but the transfer to a credible and legitimate law enforcement organization must be urgently pursued. In such a security environment, the establishment of a secure environment is the highest priority military task.

1.6   The potential for instability, likely to exist for some time after the war is over. The most probable threat will come from residual pockets of fanatics, secessionist groups, terrorists and those would seek to exploit ethnic, religious, and tribal fault lines for personal gain. The threat from these groups would manifest itself in high impact tactics such as car or suicide bombings, sniping, and 'hit and run' raids. A high level of such attacks will have an adverse impact on the creation of stability, a prerequisite for self-sustaining peace.

SECTION 2 - ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions.

(Be ruthless. Ensure they are relevant to the planning; if they do not allow the planning to continue, they are irrelevant. The final list becomes the issues we must track or do something to mitigate against.)

2.1   Initially USG/Coalition operation. UN role uncertain at this stage but unlikely to be authoritative in the early stages.

2.2   Infrastructure damaged but not completely destroyed. Sufficient infrastructure exists at the end of hostilities -- buildings, roads, transportation, communications -- to support initial reconstruction and humanitarian activities.

2.3   Essential government functions will have to be carried out immediately. Iraqi governance at all levels will be ineffective and will require both oversight and assistance. Civil Affairs officers will provide the initial presence and represent the initial governance authority until ORHA personnel arrive. Some Iraqi officials so tainted as to be unusable, but others can be retained. Technocrats will be essential to start governance. Free Iraqis/expats can identify reliable Iraqis with relevant expertise who can be entrusted with positions of responsibility.

2.4   The political parties established by the expatriate Iraqi community will become active in-country. A strategy to interact effectively with this community will be developed based on the conditions. Opportunities to work with various Iraqi groups will present themselves. These opportunities must be carefully handled both to avoid pitfalls and to take advantage of genuine prospects of hastening progress toward meeting ORHA's objectives.

2.5   No major environmental dangers will exist that impair the progress of the mission.

2.6   Justice sector institutions will be maintained and used to extent possible. Must remove unacceptable individuals from office, disband units and organizations, and eliminate law and processes that impede development. Saddam's political appointees will remain with police, judiciary and prison systems at lower ranks. Legitimate demands upon justice system in the immediate post-conflict period will likely exceed Iraqi capabilities which are likely to be in disarray.

2.7   Maintaining law and order will be necessary from Day 1. Existing police/security forces lack any legitimacy with Iraqi people and are seen as oppressors. Extent of public voluntary compliance with law will be low. 200,000 security personnel in three ministries require vetting, supervision and reform.

2.8   A security environment sufficiently stable for the provision of relief and humanitarian assistance will be established, using military resources as necessary. Real potential for conflicts arising from vigilante/retribution activities, property disputes, and civil disturbances which may limit the ability of ORHA civilians to perform their operations and require daily prioritization of tasks and allocation of security forces.

2.9   IDPs and Refugees:

•   Anticipated return of approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and up to 1 million refugees now in neighboring countries.

•   Displacement of 1.3 million civilians toward borders in addition to 700,000 current refugees. Near Baghdad: an additional 900,000 displaced persons, adding to current 800,000 IDP total.

•   Rapid conclusion of conflict would limit additional IDP and refugee movements.

•   U.S. military distribution of humanitarian relief in immediate post-conflict period will be available on an emergency basis

2.10   Interruption of Oil for Food (OFF) due to UN evacuation, security environment, availability and increased cost of shipping insurance.

•   60% of Iraqis are completely dependent on OFF. Iraqi civilians will stockpile four to six weeks of food prior to conflict.

•   OFF humanitarian goods and distribution will be necessary for at least six months post conflict.

•   Initial absence of NGO and 10 implementing partners will inhibit humanitarian operations

•   Retail distribution system has ceased to function WFP standby arrangements with neighboring countries and pre-positioned food could help bridge food gap until OFF restart

•   Fundamental changes in OFF will be difficult to pass through UNSC.

2.11   Education. Schools open as soon as possible in secure areas. Sufficient resources to pay teachers will exist.

2.12   Housing.

•   Returning exiles, IDPs, refugees will place additional strains on existing housing stock.

•   The creation of an affordable housing program for the nation is finance-based rather than commodity-based

•   Damage to housing stock will not be severe and there will be room to integrate housing finance in the banking sector

•   DART will assume immediate shelter requirements.

2.13   Availability of Iraqi records and data will be sufficient to enable at least basic functioning of civil ministries. Military forces will be able to secure key administration buildings (bank vaults, personnel records systems, financial records, etc) and maintain that protection until ORHA civilian advisors have determined their disposition.

2.14   Health?

2.15   Economy. Oil sector dominates economy, however, oil revenue insufficient to cover reconstruction costs. Costs of rebuilding economy directly impacted by extent of damage to key economic structures. Full restoration would be an inappropriate objective. Returning economy to pre-Gulf War levels (or any other artificial benchmark) is cost prohibitive and could take many years. Target is to place the economy on the path of sustainable growth.

•   Short-term US Engagement (12-18 months): U.S. post-conflict reconstruction establishes foundation for broad-based economic reform and growth.

•   Long-term International Engagement: Iraq aided by international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, etc.), builds upon this economic foundation.

SECTION 3 - POLICY PLANNING

Campaign Legitimacy.

3.1   What will provide post hostilities campaign authority? What do we need and what is the impact if we don't get it? Key to internationalizing this issue and therefore reducing the chance of a backlash/intafada is removing/reducing the levels of the US-led coalition 'invading forces' as quickly as possible. Western, and particularly US-basing, is a 'burning thorn' in Arab terms and the sooner that multinational force of minimum numbers is in place the better. It is unlikely that countries, not in the original coalition, will be willing to joining CJTF(I) without a recognized form of legitimacy such as a UN mandate (or UNSCR).

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

3.2   Initial

3.3   (UNSCR) 1441. (adopted at security Council meeting 4644, 8 November 2002)

3.4   Subsequent - OFF and beyond

National Security Presidential Directive-24

3.3   Narrative????

3.4   The specific tasks contained in NSPD-24 are listed below:

•   Assisting with humanitarian relief

•   Dismantling WMD

•   Defeating and exploiting terrorist networks

•   Protecting natural resources and infrastructure

•   Facilitating reconstruction; protecting infrastructure and economy

•   Assisting re-establishment of key civilian services (food supply, water, power, and health care)

•   Reshaping and reforming Iraqi military with civilian control

•   Reshaping internal security institutions

•   Supporting transition to Iraqi authority

•   Build links to specialized UN agencies and NGO's

•   Build links to planning counterparts in coalition governments

Her Majesty's Government Policy Objectives.

3.4   ??

Australian Government Policy Objectives.

3.5   ??

Other Coalition?

3.6   ??

SECTION 4 - THE ROAD TO TRANSFORMATION

The Ultimate Goal - Towards the Strategic End-state

4.1   The universally agreed end-state for a post-Saddam Iraq is defined as:

A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact, and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.

4.2   This goal was reaffirmed at the Azores Summit of March 2003 at which Coalition leaders declared:

We envisage a unified Iraq with its territorial integrity respected. All the Iraqi people -- its rich mix of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and all others -- should enjoy freedom, prosperity, and equality in a united country."

Measurable Benchmarks.

4.3   Having identified the ultimate goal, it is important to derive a set of measurable benchmarks which, when achieved in combination, indicate that the End-state has been achieved.

a.   A national identity that unites all Iraqis while preserving individual tribal, ethnic and religious heritages. Education

b.   A broad-based, freely elected government in-place that:

•   Is a responsible member of the international community

•   Respects and proects the basic human rights of all Iraqis (Rule of Law??)

•   Maintains territorial integrity

•   Does not own or pursue a WMD capability

c.   A self supporting economy with a rejuvenated oil industry, but not solely dependent on oil revenue. Agriculture/rations tourism?

d.   An Iraqi 'National Defense Force' in place that is representative of Iraqi society, properly balanced and capable of defending its territorial integrity using only conventional means, which is subordinate to and supports the national civil authority, and with systems in place to complete the transformation to a professional military organization.

Identifying the Greatest Impediments to Success.

4.4    Self Determination.Iraq has the natural resources plus the national characteristics to be a potential role model within the Middle East, exerting a positive influence on its immediate neighbors and providing a wider incentive internationally. This latent capacity will only be realized by a bottom-up drive from the Iraqi population to embrace new ways and to modernize, without losing the strength of their cultural basis. Thus, the 'thing' on which the achievement of the strategic End-state bears is assessed to be the resolve of the Iraqi people to build a better future; in other words self determination. This hinges on two key factors; the posture and conduct of the military force, and the speed with which control of key resources and institution is returned to Iraqi nationals. Success will depend on the quality of the process ORHA and the international community jointly establish with the Iraq. To achieve this requires tangible and culturally sensitive commitment on behalf of the international community, and careful perception management to prevent runaway expectations. It is highly desirable that this is achieved wholly by consent, but in extremis, coercion should be used, where necessary and carefully, to ensure compliance.

4.5    Countering Erroneous Perceptions. The greatest threat to the post hostilities mission has two interconnected strands to it. The first is the perception, internally within Iraq and internationally, that the war was all about gaining control of Iraq's natural resources. The second is apprehension over an ostensible increase in US hegemony. To counter such a perception it will be important to widen the contribution from the international community, to ensure that the Campaign Authority (i.e. the legal underpinning of operations) is regionally accepted (especially in Iraq), and that tangible economic and social improvements in the life of the Iraqi people, funded by Iraqi oil and other natural resources, are evident.

4.6    Impartiality.Under Saddam's dictatorship the Iraqi people have been isolated from the international community; politically, militarily, economically and technologically. The people are war weary, their spirit has been tested to breaking point and they are deeply suspicious of any administration. No matter how impartial international civil or military actors strive to be, virtually every action that is taken will be more to the advantage or disadvantage of one party or another. Accusations of partiality will undoubtedly occur, but their impact can be minimized if actions are transparent to all. The significance of impartiality is that if it is discarded, and the international mission is perceived as being partial, it will have a negative effect upon the level of consent for the operation and thus make the conduct through effective communications will be key in achieving the End-state.

a.   Civil actors

b.   Coalition Forces must be seen as a liberating force -- a force for good -- whose prime purpose is to empower the Iraqi people to shape their own future. There must be no perception of an occupying force, no talk of defeat or claims of victory. The military must act in line with the highest standards of professional conduct and their posture must be one that projects an image of a credible and robust force, firm but fair in their actions.

Drawing the Roadmap.

4.7   Having determined the End-state and the ways in which it can be measured, the key 'milestones' (each of which is a particular condition to be achieved) are set out along the appropriate Lines of activity, and sequenced in time and space, dividing it into phases or stages if appropriate. Finally, the critical path can then be set out. A schematic depiction of this is shown below and in more detail at Annex?

4.8   (Describe the road map.) Stages, phases, passages: stabilize, meet essential needs, decon/recon, improve their material conditions, empower, set on the path, ensure irreversibility of processes. Confidence, mutual understanding, gaining trust over time. Transparency.

Lines of Activity - Vision Statements.

4.9    Rule of Law.A system of laws and institutions (police, prosecution. courts and corrections) which operates impartially, without regard for ethnicity, religion, sex, race, political affiliation or other natural characteristic, and provides sufficient public order, levels of human and property rights and objective dispute resolution so as to enable the people of Iraq to enjoy personal freedoms, economic prosperity, representative government and domestic tranquility.

4.9   Social/Cultural.

a.   Tradition versus modernity and the youth figures. Exposure of youth to global influences and Middle East problem of liberalizing religious basis of politics. Youth must have say. Downstream challenge.

b.   Religion??

c.   Cultural/historical??

4.10   Economic Reconstruction. Build a foundation to put the Iraqi people on the path to self-managed economic prosperity as part of the global community, with economic opportunities in a market-based economy and privately owned enterprises. Construct a functioning market-driven agricultural system. Private sector forces will be optimized by limiting governmental agricultural assistance to inherently governmental functions (e.g. extension, water planning-delivery, re-establishing marketing links).

4.11   Governance/Diplomatic.

a.   Ensure that each Iraqi can be an active member of the social and political aspects of nationhood through the re-development of provincial and community level governance structures.

b.   Help to rebuild regional and international relations??

4.12   Education/Health.

a.   Rebuild the health and education systems of Iraq to ensure that these services are available to all Iraqis through the provision of technical assistance.

b.   Levels of education and what each people at each level have known (influence of memory)

4.13   Humanitarian Assistance.

a.   Relieve human suffering by establishing a responsive humanitarian assistance organization that coordinates and facilitates the delivery of relief and humanitarian assistance to those in need, including:

•   Essential, basic health care needs

•   Minimally adequate levels of potable water and waste disposal

•   Adequate nutrition

•   Emergency shelter

b.   Restore and protect the human rights and dignity of the Iraqi people.

c.   Prevent loss of civilian lives by initiating humanitarian mine and unexploded ordnance action programs.

4.14   Information.

a.   Indigenous Media: Within 12 months, reconstitute indigenous Iraqi media as a model for free media in the Arab world.

b.

4.15   Military. Given the historical role of the Army in Iraqi society, the reformation of the military is a key aspect of achieving the End-state. The military must embrace change, principally a recognition that its role is to support, not dominate, the civil authority; it must become apolitical. Organizational change restructuring and re-equipping will be a relatively straightforward process, but it must be underpinned, from the outset, by a significant adjustment in Iraqi military ethos. Of critical importance to the generation of a new ethos is the creation of a professional and representative military leadership that recognizes and accepts its role in safeguarding civil society. Minimizing the psychological and physical gap between the surrender of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the beginning of reformation process is of central importance.

WMD???????? Elimination is defined as a capability which has been rendered operationally ineffective and would take considerable time and effort to reconstitute. Disabling WMD will be a significant task requiring substantial support from military resources.

SECTION 5 - CONCEPT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

ORHA Mission Statement.

5.1   The role of ORHA is to; help alleviate dependence on Humanitarian Assistance; assist in the rejuvenation of a broad-based Iraqi economy by supporting the recovery and repair of critical infrastructure; underpin the creation of effective Governance based on Iraq's rich and diverse cultural, ethnic and religious heritage; so as to assist the Iraqi people to build their own future.

Overall concept of Operations.

5.2   The Concept of Transition and Transformation. Transition and transformation are two post-conflict concepts which can be described as having a complex, symbiotic relationship. Transition speaks to the activities, role and posture of the civil and military actors in a post conflict environment. A rapid and orderly transfer of authority from the international mission to the host nation is of the essence. The process of transformation is driven by the indigenous people and is fuelled by their desire to build a self sustaining peace. An important role for the military is to assist the civil authorities in empowering existing legitimate organizations and dismantling separate or parallel power structures in order to create the basis for Iraqi self-government. Parallel, not sequential, deconstruction and reconstruction underpins transition and transformation. The goal is to set the conditions to enable the rapid transfer of government to the Iraqi people.

5.3   The Process as the Path - Engaging the Ministries. The pressure to achieve products, measures of effectiveness, and results is immense. The focus of attention on milestones toward the End-state is important, yet it risks not giving the attention needed on establishing an effective process. In one past crisis response, the term "the process is equally important to the product" was extensively used, for good reason. The Iraqis will want to institute and receive assistance to facilitate processes which make them full partners in the path/route of achieving our mutual goals. This will need to be done by the ministries as well as at the regional and local levels. Examples of essential processes which will effectively engage and depend on Iraqi participation are the following:

•   Constitution development.

•   Ministry management development strategies developed with ministry personnel.

•   Creating a new institution (e.g. ministry) for personnel management. procedures and training.

•   Develop Iraqi consultation processes to address national issues and specific needs (e.g. reconstruction committees) necessary to create a participative democracy.

•   Find effective ways to criminalize the practices of the old regime and enforce those laws to counter the destructive forces.

•   Create an Iraqi capacity to manage and resolve potential conflict situations through non-violent means.

•   Establish the principle of accountability of the government to the population through developing transparent practices of budgeting and staffing; strengthen civil society to hold the government accountable.

•   Develop an effective process for Iraqis to address cross-cutting issues. such as using a Marketing Economics Simulation (SENSE) around specific issues.

•   Strengthening local governance.

5.4   Deployment. ORHA will move forward into Iraq in stages, and as the environment becomes more permissive. The outline concept sees a near simultaneous deployment of Regional Coordinator North and South followed by, at later point, again near simultaneous deployment of Regional Coordinator Central and Headquarters ORHA, but not any three elements together. Locations and timings are subject to the conditions which exist in each region.

5.5   Organization and Operation.

•   Evolutionary Path from military to military-civil to civil-military. Avoid rigid phases. Describe the kind of evolving environment. In such an operating environment, this concept relies on a clear understanding of Commander's Intent and decentralized decision-making and execution of operations.

•   Acting in close cooperation with the military. Importance of holistic view and coordinated progress in post conflict stabilization activities.

•   Empowerment through the Ministries

•   Regional Coordinators

•   How to do central control and coordination i.e. HQ operation

Resources.

5.6

RESOURCES

Reprogramming of FY 2003 Funds and Supplemental FY 2003 funding for relief and reconstruction:

•   USAID/OFDA (DART, FFP)

•   Dept of State (PRM, PM)

•   DOD (OHDACA)

Personnel

•   DART, Civil Affairs Personnel

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